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Abstract 
Antibiotic policies in the UK dairy industry: A voluntary industry-led approach in action. 
Stephanie Begemann 
 
Today a major topic of concern is the use of antibiotics in food animals and its link with the development 
of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in humans. Public health agencies across the globe frame the ‘misuse 
and overuse’ of antibiotics in agriculture as major human driver to the development of AMR in animals, 
humans and the environment. In 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) has made its livestock sectors and 
food supply chains responsible to reduce and achieve responsible antibiotic use. Since, antibiotic 
surveillance systems are being implemented across livestock sectors to measure and monitor antibiotic 
practices. This is complemented with educational interventions and guidelines to ‘rationalise’ antibiotic 
use by farmers and veterinarians. According to the latest UK veterinary antibiotic surveillance and sales 
report, the sales of veterinary antibiotics for use in food-producing animals have dropped with 40% 
between 2013 in 2017. It is believed by governmental and agricultural policymakers that the antibiotic 
policies undertaken by the livestock sectors is taking force. 
 
This PhD thesis has reconsidered the progress claimed by the UK veterinary antibiotic surveillance and 
sales reports. Moving beyond statistical realities, it examined how the UK’s industry-led approach is 
taking shape in practice. A multi-sited ethnographic methodological framework has been used to 
examine at first how the UK has consolidated around an industry-led approach, in contrast to some other 
European countries who used legislation to tackle persistent antibiotic practices. Second, taking the UK 
dairy industry as case study, interview and observational methods were used to understand how dairy 
policies are formulated by the dairy sector and dairy supply chains and how the policies are practised 
by farmers and veterinarians. Findings reveal that the policies in the dairy industry only partially address 
the complex network of people, animals and the environment in which dairy antibiotics circulate. 
Although milk processors and retailers in the UK have taken up the lead to produce dairy antibiotic 
policies, the policies seem to benefit market purposes rather than addressing structural issues in UK 
dairy production systems. Some of the antibiotic policies produce new travel routes of antibiotics 
between systems resulting in new public health risks. Other antibiotic policies fail to assess how 
veterinarians and farmers are constrained in their antibiotic choices by their agricultural actor-networks. 
As a result, the UK’s industry-led approach maintains and reproduces irresponsible antibiotic practices 
in the UK dairy industry.  
This study reveals how antibiotic ‘misuse and overuse’ in agriculture is far from a behavioural matter, 
with solely farmers and veterinarians to blame. Instead, antibiotic use in food animals is embedded in 
complex economic networks that constrain radical changes in dairy husbandry management and 
antibiotic use on farms. To achieve responsible farming and improve antibiotic practices, the UK 
government should take responsibility and work more closely with the UK livestock sectors to 
understand what regulatory and financial support is needed.  
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1.1 Introduction 
Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) is the ability of a microbe (such as bacteria, fungi, viruses, 
and parasites) to resist the effects of medication (such as antibiotics, antifungals, antivirals, 
antimalarials, and anthelmintics) that once could successfully treat the microbe. The use of 
antibiotics (ABs) in livestock is believed to contribute to the development of antibacterial 
resistance in humans (World Health Organisation, 2001). From 2011 onwards, global 
awareness and a call for action by the World Health Organisation (WHO) has placed the 
problem of AB ‘misuse and overuse’ in human and animal settings high on political agendas 
(WHO, 2011b). Countries are being urged to implement and/or improve national strategies in 
order to reduce livestock AB-use. In 2016 in the United Kingdom (UK), after deliberation 
between experts, governmental and agricultural policymakers, a voluntary industry-led 
approach was established. The UK livestock sectors were made responsible for designing AB 
policies and to control AB practices. However, previous experiences of voluntary industry-led 
approaches in the UK have shown a lack of livestock industry commitment and consequently, 
little success in AB reduction across its livestock industries (UK-VARSS, 2013). Other 
European countries who made significant progress in reducing AB-use together with 
improving their herd health practices have all used official regulation with their governments 
closely monitoring progress (Cogliani et al. 2014) . What made the UK government agree to 
continue with a voluntary industry-led approach? What was at stake in transferring the 
governance of livestock AB-use to the UK livestock sectors? Following from this, how is a 
voluntary industry-led approach actually done in practice?  
This thesis will consider these gaps in knowledge about the UK’s industry-led governance 
model of livestock AB-use. Using Science and Technology Studies (STS) as a theoretical and 
methodological framework, livestock ABs are the central objects of study. Of key interest is 
to examine how livestock ABs are constructed as a concern within and across political and 
agricultural arenas, and how this influences their political and local governance. The first part 
of the thesis will examine how scientific evidence was used over time by UK policymakers, 
experts and the agricultural industry to frame livestock AB-use as a public health risk. By 
examining what was at stake during the problematisation of livestock AB-use as public health 
risk, insights will be provided into how the UK’s political culture co-produced its governance 
of responsible livestock AB-use. The second part of this thesis will focus on how the UK dairy 
sector implemented dairy AB policies from 2016 onwards, as this sector still heavily relies on 
standard AB treatments. AB decision-making in relation to risks and responsibilities will be 
studied from within dairy agricultural knowledge networks. This will provide further 
knowledge on the effects of an industry-led policy model on livestock AB-use in practice.  
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In what follows in this introduction, I will discuss how AB-use in the food animal industry is 
internationally framed as a public health risk. I will introduce the UK’s industry-led approach, 
which trusts the food animal industry and their ‘methods of science’1, such as AB surveillance 
models and educational tools that have been introduced to ‘rationalise’ farmer and veterinary 
AB practices. This will be opposed to the public-private policy model of Sweden, Denmark 
and the Netherlands, which uses legislation to tackle structural commercial interests attached 
to veterinary prescribing. The limitations of AB surveillance models and educational tools that 
underpin the UK’s industry-led approach will also be discussed. Moving away from human 
behaviour as the central object of study, I will introduce the theoretical framework of Science 
and Technology studies (STS). I will explain how I will turn my research gaze towards 
livestock ABs themselves as central object of study, and what STS concepts and theories I will 
use to trace livestock ABs across sites where they have come to matter. 
 
1.2 Relevance of the ‘problem’ 
1.2.1 Antibiotics as valuable agents across human and veterinary medicine  
ABs are produced in nature by bacteria or fungi as a chemical defence mechanism, to protect 
themselves from other micro-organisms in their neighbouring environments (Walsh, 2000). 
This dates back hundreds of millions of years, which means AB resistant bacteria is not a 
modern occurrence but an ancient, natural phenomena (D’Costa et al., 2011). ABs are often 
referred to as ‘magic bullets’, as they kill disease causing microbes without harming the host 
(Chandler & Hutchison, 2016, p. 3). Since their discovery in the late 1920’s, the use of ABs 
has revolutionised health care by controlling micro-organisms that pose risks to health; 
reducing associated morbidity and mortality rates across human and animal populations 
(O’Neill, 2014). More than 85% of human infections worldwide results from acute respiratory 
infections, diarrhea, measles, AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (WHO, 2001). ABs are vital 
medicines to reduce mortality rates of these diseases when bacterial infections follow. They 
are also essential medicines in hospitals to prevent infections during surgical interventions, 
cancer chemotherapy and organ transplantation (Davies, 2011).  
 
1 I refer to ‘methods of science’ in this thesis as methods grounded in the experimental method and 
on observations of the natural world (Green & Thorogood, 2004). Methods of science are considered 
by political and scientific communities as methods able to produce knowledge independent from the 
social world, and therefore able to generate objective, rational and neutral data (Green & Thorogood, 
2004). Examples are surveillance, systematic risk assessments, scientific measurement and economic 
calculation, used to establish relationships of cause and effect and manage technological risks (Barry, 
2002; Jasanoff, 2016; Leach & Dry, 2010).   
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Since the 1950s, ABs have also become routinely used in global food production systems, by 
contributing to food security, food safety, animal welfare and animal and crop production 
(WHO, FAO, & OIE, 2016). ABs can be used to prevent or treat bacterial infections in 
individual or groups of animals. There are four types of AB usage in agriculture (Callens, 
2015): 1. Strategic prophylaxis or preventative treatment, in group or individual animals, 
before clinical signs of disease are apparent to avoid infection. Some examples include 
surgery, transport and mixing of animals, intra-mammary treatment at the end of lactation in 
dairy cattle. 2. Metaphylaxis or control treatment, which is the treatment of a group of animals 
after the development of clinical signs of disease. This type of treatment treats both clinically 
affected animals, while controlling transmission to other animals of the group. 3. Curative or 
therapeutic treatment, in individual animals that show clinical signs of infection. 4. 
Antibacterial Growth Promotor (AGP) use in food producing animals (Callens, 2015). This 
prolonged subtherapeutic use of antimicrobials was discovered in the early 1950s, when it was 
identified that ABs fed in low doses to food-producing animals improved growth, food 
conversion ratio and reproductive performance (Reijnders, 2006) . Consequently, AGPs 
became used globally as economic tools in several industrialised animal husbandry production 
systems. In 2006, the European Union was the first organisation to ban the use of AGPs 
following scientific and public concerns about their association with AMR in humans 
(Begemann et al. 2018). The United States only banned antibiotics used for enhancing growth 
in livestock on January 1, 2017 (Kahn, 2016). To date, most regulatory agencies are currently 
focused on the control of antimicrobials used  for non-therapeutic use in livestock. However, 
some antimicrobials are still registered for prophylactic and metaphylactic administration in 
livestock, posing a challenge for policymakers (Brown et al. 2017). 
Veterinary antibacterials can be administered to food producing animals through various 
routes (Callens, 2015). Local or topical use involves cutaneous (skin) treatment, nasal, intra-
articular, intra-ocular, intra-auricular, and intra-mammary and intra-uterine. Systemic use is 
the administration via oral (medicated feed or water) or parental routes (intravenous, 
intramuscular, intraperitoneal, transdermal and subcutaneous injections) (Callens, 2015). 
These different routes of administration, together with a large variety of types of veterinary 
ABs, has led to a wide range of veterinary AB products available on pharmaceutical markets. 
Similarly, food animal feed companies that are licensed can incorporate ABs into the feed they 
sell, adding commercial benefits to the sale of medicated feed (Kahn, 2016).  
In the UK, around 30% of ABs are believed to be used in veterinary medicine, of which 87% 
are in the livestock sector (Buller et al., 2015). ABs in the UK are classified as ‘POM-V or 
Prescription Only Medicines – Veterinary Surgeon’, which means they can be used on 
veterinary prescription basis only (UK-VARSS, 2018). However, once prescribed, farmers are 
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able to store ABs on farms and administer ABs without veterinary supervision. In other 
countries in Europe, such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, farmers are not allowed 
to routinely administer ABs themselves (EMA, 2018) ABs are used in the UK livestock sector 
to combat and prevent animals disease, while maintaining the health of herds and flocks. As 
such, a wide range of properties and interests attached to these medicines have made ABs 
move across hands and sites, in which they have become indispensible (Reynolds Whyte et 
al., 2003). Veterinary ABs have not only become essential as therapeutic tools, but have 
become part of economic ‘infrastructures’ across global health and food production systems 
and commercial markets (Chandler et al. 2016).  
 
1.2.2 The burden and consequences of AMR  
The downside of the popularity of ABs is the rapid development of bacterial resistance (WHO, 
2011a). Antibiotic resistance occurs once micro-organisms cease to be killed or inhibited in 
the presence of cytotoxic concentrations of ABs (Wright, 2007). Antimicrobial resistance is a 
broader term, encompassing resistance to drugs for treating infections caused by other 
microbes, such as parasites, viruses and fungi in addition to bacteria (WHO, 2015)2. Although 
antibiotic resistance is considered a natural phenomenon, human and animal AB actions, such 
as poor infection prevention, poor control practices and excessive use of antimicrobials in 
human and animal medicine, are believed to increase the selective pressure in favour of 
resistant micro-organisms to survive, while killing the sensitive organisms (WHO, 2015). As 
Walsh (2000, p. 776) has argued, ‘once an AB is proven to be effective and enters widespread 
human therapeutic use, its days are numbered’.  
Problematically, a variety of use of AB types overlap in both human and veterinary medicine. 
When antibiotic resistance occurs in bacteria after AB-use in animals, resistant bacteria have 
the potential to spread from animals to humans (Economou & Gousia, 2015; Van Den Bogaard 
& Stobberingh, 2000). Zoonotic micro-organisms (or mobile genetic elements) from animals 
and humans can travel in both directions; from human contact with animals (farm, wildlife or 
companion), through the food chain, and through contact with waste from humans, animals 
and pharmaceutical plants (Public Health England, 2014). Resistant genes restrict themselves 
not only to human and animal hosts, but persist in manure and slurries, which enter agricultural 
lands and become integrated with soil microbes (Kahn, 2016). Wildlife, especially birds, 
contribute to the spread and transmission of resistant genes (Public Health England, 2014). 
 
2 This thesis focuses on antibiotics as antimicrobial agents and resistance in bacteria to antibiotics. As 
antibiotics are antimicrobials, antibiotic resistance and AMR will be used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis.  
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Equally, worldwide human travel and livestock transport is also believed to contribute 
significantly to the rising threat of AMR (Van der Bij & Pitout, 2012).  
The ecological complexity of AMR continues to produce uncertainties about the precise 
factors that lead to selection and maintenance of resistant organisms in bacterial populations 
(Economou & Gousia, 2015). The use of ABs in livestock is believed to contribute to the 
development of AMR, but there are ongoing controversies regarding the level of risk to human 
health. The invisible routes of AMR transmission make it difficult for scientists to assess how 
AB-use in food animals contributes to AMR in human pathogens (Landers et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, bacteria found in humans, animals and food continue to show resistance to 
antimicrobials used across species (ECDC, EFSA, & EMA, 2015). In addition to the scientific 
uncertainties, it is estimated that the human cost of AMR currently claims at least 50,000 
deaths each year across Europe and the US alone, and could go up to 10 million deaths in 2050 
(O’Neill, 2014). Moreover, economic experts (O’Neill, 2014) argue that the increased 
mortality and morbidity as a result of AMR will impact on global economic productivity. If 
developing resistance continues at the same rate, the world will be producing between 2% to 
3.5% less in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), costing the world 100 trillion USD by 2050 
(O’Neill, 2014).  
 
1.2.3 The global problematisation of antibiotic use in agriculture  
In response to the uncertainties involved with livestock AB-use, the ‘overuse and misuse’ of 
antimicrobial agents in humans and animals was framed by the WHO in 1998 as the main 
cause for the increased emergence and spread of micro-organisms (WHO, 1998, p. 3). 
Subsequently, AB ‘overuse and misuse’ reappeared across international and national reports 
as one of the main human drivers for AMR. In 2001, the WHO urged countries to develop 
national action plans, which should include the creation of national surveillance systems to 
monitor antimicrobial usage in food animals and AMR, to implement veterinary prescribing 
guidelines and to design education-based programmes for veterinary surgeons to reduce the 
‘overuse and misuse’ of antimicrobials in food animals (WHO, 2001, p. 37). In September 
2009, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) launched, ‘The European Surveillance of 
Veterinary Antimicrobial Consumption’ project (ESVAC) to capture trends in farmer and 
veterinary use. This project coordinates the collecting and reporting of sales of veterinary 
antimicrobial agents in animals from member states (EMA, 2011). The report from the 
European Commission in 2011 on AMR discussed how the ‘inappropriate’ use of therapeutic 
antimicrobials across human and veterinary medicine, the use of antimicrobials for non-
therapeutic purposes and contamination of the environment ‘jeopardized’ AB applications 
(European Commission, 2011, p. 2). Equally, the most recent WHO (2015) global action plan  
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frames the ‘misuse and overuse’ of livestock and human AB-use as a key driver of the 
acceleration of AMR. 
Leach and Dry (2010, p. 27) have revealed the discursive power of global language to 
problematise epidemics and subsequently summon into existence an ‘imaginary’ consensus 
how to govern them. AB ‘misuse and overuse’ across human and agricultural settings is widely 
accepted today as the main human driver that could potentially accelerate AMR in organisms 
and the environment (WHO, 2015). With nations collectively agreeing on this risk narrative, 
it is made governable, nationally and globally (Leach & Dry, 2010). This is supposed to foster 
a coordinated approach to face the chaotic and disorganised landscape of AMR by prioritising 
policies that tackle livestock AB ‘overuse and misuse’. Countries are however given flexibility 
within this framework, to determine what they consider as a concern in their national AMR 
action plan. Furthermore, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
stated in 2015, that a positive association was found between antimicrobial consumption in 
food-producing animals and occurrence of resistance in bacteria from such animals (ECDC et 
al., 2015). They recommended refining existing surveillance systems by providing detailed 
information on antimicrobial consumption in species and production types in animals, 
continue the monitoring of AMR, and promote responsible AB-use of antimicrobials in 
animals. Consequently, the reduction of sales of veterinary antimicrobials has become a 
desirable objective in the combat against AMR (EMA, 218, p. 15).  
 
1.2.4 Different European responses to regulate antibiotic use in agriculture 
The UK’s industry-led governance model 
The ‘UK Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy and Action Plan’ of 2000 and the ‘UK 5 Year 
Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy (AMR) 2013-2018’ highlighted the need to reduce 
‘unnecessary and inappropriate’ use of ABs in food producing animals. In these AMR action 
plans, the UK livestock sector was given the responsibility to improve its AB usage 
surveillance systems and to implement education, training and guidelines to optimise AB-use 
and animal husbandry by farmers and vets. However, concerns across the media and various 
pressure groups (Soil Association, British Society for Antimicrobials, Alliance to Save Our 
Antibiotics) blamed the intensive livestock sector for the excessive use of ABs in food animals, 
increasing the risk of antimicrobial resistance (Morris et al., 2016). In 2014, the ‘Review on 
Antimicrobial Resistance’, an economic expert committee chaired by economist Lord Jim 
O’Neill was commissioned by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, to take the lead on 
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AMR as a global problem (O’Neill, 2014). In 2015, the Review provided an overview of the 
public health and economic health risks involved with the use of ABs in animals and 
agriculture (O’Neill, 2015). Criticising the ‘excessive’ use of antimicrobials in agriculture, by 
arguing 70% of antimicrobial use in the USA is used in animals (O’Neill, 2015, p. 6), the 
review provided in their final report of 2016 three global recommendations. First that all 
nations should produce 10-year targets to reduce AB-use, which were introduced in 2018. 
Second, the use of Highest Priority Critically Important Antibiotics (HP-CIAs) for human 
health needed to be banned or restricted. Finally, AB surveillance systems needed to be 
improved, with food producers in charge to provide transparency on AB-use in their food 
supply chains. As will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the framing of the 
O’Neill expert reports resulted in a controversial debate, in which the livestock sectors initially 
disagreed with the recommendations.  
Responding to previous concerns, the UK government incorporated the main 
recommendations of the O’Neill Review in their ‘Government Response to the Review on 
Antimicrobial Resistance’ policy report of 2016 (Department of Health, 2016). A regulatory 
compromise between governmental and industry policymakers was made: the livestock 
industry would implement most of O’Neill´s recommendations. If successful, no regulatory 
intervention would be necessary. A multispecies reduction target to 50 mg/kg by 2018 was set 
from 62 mg/kg in 2014 (Department of Health, 2016). Aside from this target, species experts 
of the livestock sectors had to produce sector-specific HP-CIA and overall AB reduction 
targets by 2018, underpinned by herd health activities to improve animal husbandry 
(Department of Health, 2016). Furthermore, individual livestock sectors and their food supply 
chains were responsible for setting up AB usage monitoring systems, raising AMR awareness 
amongst farmers and vets, improving veterinary disease prevention and prescribing practices 
and improving farm management and animal welfare, to reduce the need for AB treatments. 
Importantly, within these policies, the vet-farmer relationship is positioned as fulcrum to drive 
change (RUMA, 2017). Supported by industry-led training, protocols and guidelines, vets and 
farmers are stimulated to work together upon the policies in partnerships, rather than in expert-
lay relationships. This is considered to foster collaboration and share power between both 
professions. Evaluating other approaches in European countries, different risks have been 
prioritised.  
 
Public-private led governance models 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, often position themselves as ‘example countries’, are 
governed through public-private models, which means they have both legislative and industry-
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led initiatives in place (Aarestrup, 2015; Lundström, 2016; Speksnijder et al., 2014). Each 
country (Lundström, 2016; SEGES, 2014; Van Beers-Schreurs, 2016) implemented the 
following policies: AB reduction targets, veterinary prescribing guidelines, mandatory Herd 
Health and Herd Treatment plans, and restrictions or bans of HP-CIAs. To make all 
antimicrobial usage on farms and by vets transparent, national AB surveillance systems have 
been established that are governed either by the government (Denmark), by an independent 
authority (the Netherlands), or by both the government and industry (Sweden). Denmark and 
the Netherlands use these data to ‘benchmark’ farmers and vets to identify high 
users/prescribers. Veterinary prescribing is strictly therapeutic only; restricting the 
prophylactic and metaphylactic use of ABs at herd/flock level, unless evidence suggests 
differently. In-feed ABs can only be used for therapeutic purposes, tackling some of the 
economic interests involved with feed companies (Lundström, 2016; SEGES, 2014; Van 
Beers-Schreurs, 2016). 
Each strategy of these countries contains boundaries to tackle economic veterinary prescribing 
pressures. Sweden (Lundström, 2016) and Denmark (Aarestrup et al., 2010) ‘decoupled’ the 
prescription of ABs from sales of veterinary medicines by vets. This means vets in these 
countries are not permitted to own a pharmacy or sell medicines for profit, resulting in no 
economic incentive for vets to prescribe ABs to farmers. ABs are dispensed to farmers through 
pharmacies, supplied by drug wholesalers or manufacturers (Wierup 2001). In the 
Netherlands, decoupling was considered by the government and the options were examined 
by an independent consultancy bureau (Berenschot, 2010). The resulting report stressed that 
decoupling would not be effective and recommended instead to strengthen the position of vets 
as gatekeepers. Consequently, the Dutch government implemented an intervention in 2014 
(UDD maatregel), which allows for only vets to prescribe and administer ABs (Speksnijder et 
al., 2014). The vets may only prescribe after clinical inspection on the farm and diagnosing an 
issue that requires treatment. There are however exceptions in which farmers can keep small 
amounts of ABs on the farm under strict control of the vet. To further strengthen the 
consultancy role of the vets, the countries have implemented mandatory 1-to-1 contracts 
between farmers and vets. This requires each individual farmer to have an appointed vet, with 
whom he/she evaluates, on a regular basis, mandatory herd health plans and disease protocols 
(Speksnijder et al., 2014). Farmers are as such not able ‘to shop around’ for vets who can sell 
them drugs; they are dependent on the clinical gaze of their contracted vet.  
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Trust versus legislation 
The legislative initiatives of the public-private governance models pushed vets in these 
countries to transition from drug-financed business models to consultancy-financed models. 
At the same time, they facilitated for the livestock sectors to focus on prevention strategies, to 
invest in animal husbandry knowledge, and consequently to lower the need for ABs. In 
contrast, UK’s industry-led approach is built on trust, in that the livestock sector and their 
instruments, such as the AB surveillance systems and evidence-based communication tools, 
are able to drive change in the mindset of farmers and vets, and to produce objective 
inscriptions of that change.  
In 2015, Buller, Hinchliffe, Hockenhull, Barrett, & Reyher (2015), by request of the UK 
Department of Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) examined how ABs are used in 
farms and how the notion of AMR influences these practices. They found a tendency amongst 
farmers and vets to underplay the importance of the livestock sectors’ contribution to AMR as 
a public health issue. They identified five areas of concern: 1. Prophylactic and metaphylactic 
use might still be in place for inappropriate purposes 2. Inappropriate use of ABs to treat 
animal health issues  3. Unnecessary use of later generation ABs also used in human medicine, 
when other older ones would be as effective 4. Over-dependence on ABs as a replacement for 
improved animal husbandry 5. Incorrect dosage and application on-farm. Furthermore, what 
becomes clear from this study is that there are still commercial realities at play that drive non-
therapeutic AB practices (Buller et al., 2015). 
The previous discussion raises some questions: How is the UK’s industry-led approach 
tackling the previous areas of concern? Can we trust scientific methods, controlled by the 
livestock industry, to tackle commercial interests and to rationalise use? 
 
1.3 Rationale for this study  
1.3.1 Interrogating technocratic interventions 
AB data surveillance and AB knowledge tools are believed to promote the production of 
‘certified knowledge’ (Sismondo, 2010, p. 8). According to the UK’s industry-led policy 
models, these evidence-based/technocratic interventions know best how to use AB medicines 
and how to convert farmers and vets to correct ways of thinking about how to use them. This 
positivistic thinking differentiates between what is considered as science and what is 
considered as culture: human values interfere with the objectivity of natural facts and facts 
need to be purified of values to become objective knowledge. People are seen to behave 
rationally once they understand their contextual constraints and motivations (Green & 
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Thorogood, 2004). To positivists, scientific methods are seen as the gold standard to approach 
phenomena; it unifies methods, provides a solid connection between observations and data, 
and agrees what evidence represents the truth about the natural world (Porter, 1995, p. 20; 
Sismondo, 2010, p. 4). The positivistic model and its truth claimed by scientific methods have 
however come under increasing scrutiny, as several social scientists have argued that science, 
its methods and its technologies are grounded in social activities, rather than objective and 
value free (Jasanoff, 2004; Sismondo, 2010). Equally, AB surveillance systems and 
educational tools are not artefacts that stand outside the realm of contexts. As will be discussed 
next, they are co-constructed by the needs, interests and practices of these particular contexts.  
 
1.3.2 Surveillance models and their metrological fragility 
AB data surveillance models are used to produce objective numerical data about AB behaviour 
to identify the success of interventions. Leach and Dry (2010) argue how surveillance models 
have become important tools used to assess and evaluate global risks. Global surveillance 
networks are seen as the new solution to failure of national health systems. Their numerical 
‘facts’ have the power to order problems, settle uncertainties, and govern the social 
(Mansnerus, 2013). However, Leach and Dry (2010) reject the objectivity of scientific data 
models and discuss how these scientific models have social and political lives. They observe 
a close interplay between science and politics that influence the processes of modelling. The 
politicisation of a problem, why it matters and to whom and what should be done about it co-
constructs the development and preservation of these models (Leach and Dry 2010). This 
becomes clear when we evaluate how nations approach AB surveillance models, their 
implementation and governance differently. Moreover, as will be dicussed in Chapter 4 and 5, 
differences exist between and within UK livestock sector groups in how they design and 
implement AB surveillance models. 
At the same time, Barry (2002, p. 270) argues how the authority of numerical evidence 
suppresses ‘potential places for contestation’, enabling debates to settle. Models and 
calculation become more than information; they serve as ‘anti-political’ instruments to steer 
debates and settle concerns (Maeseele, Hendrickx, Pavone, & Van Hoywegen, 2013, p. 208). 
Equally, Jasanoff  (2016, p. 53) argues how ‘assigning number to a scenario is itself a means 
of framing and therefore is also a political act’. Consequently, some elements of an issue at 
stake are difficult to calculate and escape the metrological gaze: ‘calculative realities’ are ‘thin’ 
descriptions of reality (Jasanoff 2016, p.58). This has also been discussed by Barry (2002), 
who speaks of the ‘fragility of metrological regimes’ (p.274). Standardised procedures of 
models are not able to represent the complexity of the object and its practices in action (Barry 
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2002, p.275). Moreover, data can easily misrepresent an object under investigation, as the 
situation is framed, leaving out a whole series of other questions. 
Using veterinary AB sales data, global and national claims upon progress in livestock AB-use 
are made (EFSA, 2017). Evaluating 2016 veterinary AB sales data in the UK (UK-VARSS, 
2017), the UK livestock sector already achieved the national cross sector target of 50 mg/PCU. 
However, veterinary AB sales data from pharmaceutical companies tells us nothing about how 
ABs end up being prescribed, dispensed and administered. Then how do data presented 
through AB surveillance systems upon AB sales/usage actually reflect AB practice? Are the 
areas of concern in which ABs are used irresponsibly improving? What happens outside the 
statistical realities of livestock AB-use? 
 
1.3.3 The limitations of education-based interventions 
One of the pillars of the UK’s industry-led approach are education-based tools and 
programmes, which are believed to be capable of rationalising behaviour. These evidence-
based tools and programmes need to standardise the industry’s mantra; ‘right drug, right dose, 
at the right time’ (RUMA, 2017). Protocols, guidelines and standards became popular tools 
during the 1960s-1970s, as they were seen as tools that could unify medical practices and 
guarantee similar approaches to evidence across medical institutions (Berg, 1998, p. 227). 
These tools pressure ‘uniformity and reproducibility’ by providing a set of instructions, which 
help people in charge to structure their decision-making process (Berg, 1998, p. 228). 
Guidelines and protocols are often produced with the intention to organise decision-making 
capacities of individuals. By addressing the ‘limitations and failures’ of individual thoughts, 
they serve as a recipe to structure individual thoughts into a standardized, collective assemble 
(Berg, 1997, p. 1083). By ‘advising’ individuals to take sequential step by step actions 
however, the protocol ignores contextual factors at play that drive processes of individual and 
collective action, and how in turn, these contexts shape protocols (Berg, 1998).  
Enticott (2012) has explored the relationship between veterinary practices and protocols. 
Focusing on how vets adopt bovine tuberculosis (bTB) protocols in England and Wales, he 
shows how the ‘smooth’, rigid protocol becomes ‘replaced and transformed’ by ‘informal and 
situated’ practice (Enticott, 2012, p. 76). Veterinary expertise is not a stable, nor a mechanical 
response to disease encounters. Instead, veterinary expertise is co-produced by the 
circumstances of the on-farm encounter and the geography of animal disease. A ‘clash’ can 
therefore often be observed between the ‘evidence-based’ theory of protocols/ 
guidelines/standards and the reality of the professional decision making processes (Berg, 1997, 
p. 1083). Unexpected clinical conditions, time pressure, environmental constraints, 
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insufficient professional skills, and limitations of technologies can all interfere with how 
protocols will get adopted in clinical situations. Knowledge exchange tools are not inert, 
flawless representations of how the practice shall become; they are fluid tools that reshape 
practices in co-production with existing socio-material realities at play (Berg, 1998). Berg 
(1998) argues that as such, more understanding is needed on how different logics on 
phenomena co-exist and how they have come into play in practical realities. 
Hamilton (2017) is equally critical of evidence-based approaches that aim to bridge the theory-
practice divide during the vet-farmer encounter. Many evidence-based approaches that 
circulate to bridge the theory-practice divide try to impose theoretical knowledge upon clinical 
situations to achieve change. As Hamilton argues (2017, p. 225), ‘knowledge is not a ‘product’ 
requiring discovery, communication and uptake’. Instead, during the vet-farmer encounter, 
knowledge gets tweaked and tinkered with, to serve its purpose. The exchange of knowledge 
should be considered as a process rather than an exchange of an ‘artifact’ (Hamilton, 2017, p. 
5). Taking the former discussion into account, science and its methods are not transferred 
through a linear process in practice. How can we evaluate whether the reduction targets, 
educational and awareness programmes deliver what they promise, e.g. driving the mindsets 
of farmers and vets? What about the economic and commercial concerns across food supply 
chain, producer and veterinary landscapes?  
 
1.4 From science to practice 
1.4.1 Turning towards the object: antibiotics 
In this thesis, it will be argued that there are limitations attached in trusting scientific methods 
and their evidence to govern AB-use in agriculture. Surveillance models only partially 
represent reality and the adoption of knowledge tools is not a straightforward process. There 
is as such, a gap in knowledge in the design and workings of the UK’s industry-led policy 
approach in practice.To address the former interest, I will examine how livestock AB-use is 
framed, managed and communicated across UK political and agricultural settings. Instead of 
accepting established risk frames, regulatory responsibilities, and granting scientific methods 
analytical privilege, I want to examine how the risks of livestock ABs are framed at a number 
of locations: parliamentary politics, livestock sectors, food supply chains, producers and vets. 
Where other studies separate previous locations as sites of research, I want to explore how 
these sites interfere and co-exist with each other, and how this shapes AB governance and its 
practices (rather than the instruments of sciences). To do so, I will turn my gaze away from 
wanting to capture human behaviour and turn it towards the action of the object itself: livestock 
ABs.  
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This reasoning is situated within the broader framework of Science and Technology Studies, 
which underpins the theoretical framework of this thesis. STS developed during the 1970s as 
a reaction to the ‘objective’ status of the natural sciences, arguing that the natural sciences are 
inherently social (Sismondo, 2010, p. 10). Building on previous scholarship that rejected the 
deterministic claims of natural sciences (Kuhn, 1962; Polanyi, 1962; Popper, 1963), STS 
scholars argue that it is by studying the social practices of science that we can understand how 
they are mutually constituted by other institutions in society, such as law and political systems 
(Bijker et al., 2010; Jasanoff 2005 a; Sismondo 2010). Taking scientific objects or technologies 
as objects of study rather than human behaviour, STS scholars study the formulation of 
knowledge practices within and across sites of interests, in which the object circulates. Instead 
of separating what is considered as science and what is considered as culture, STS bridges the 
nature/culture divide, by bringing non-human actors into their analytical framework. Animals, 
technologies, literature, microbes, chemicals, institutions, laws, markets, and many more 
shape how humans order life. The relations we build with human and non-human actors, which 
Latour (2005) refers to as Actor Networks in his Actor Network Theory (ANT), shape how 
we produce knowledge, and how this knowledge in turn, shapes the configuration of the actor-
networks (Sismondo, 2010).  
How knowledge is produced upon ABs depends what concerns (in terms of other actors) are 
attached to the ABs. For a farmer, ABs represents healthy cows and economic security, and as 
such, dependency. For vets, ABs deliver farmer customers and financial income. For a retailer, 
ABs pose a risk to consumer trust and unstable markets. For policymakers, ABs used in 
livestock are suspected to pose a threat to public health. For experts, ABs provide publications 
and professional recognition. As will be explained throughout the thesis, different matters of 
concern circulate about ABs, depending upon the network they belong to. The way in which 
ABs matter across actor networks, and how this results in different priorities and responsible 
AB-use practices is of particular interest to this thesis. Certain human and non-human actors 
might facilitate or constrain policy formulation, implementation and practice. Exposing these 
actors therefore, will provide more insights in to how the UK’s governance model works in 
practice. Including non-humans in my research is of importance, as it allows me to explore 
what actors come to define AB policies and practices.  
Taking the former discussion into account, my interest goes beyound the philosophies of social 
constructivists, who argue reality is merely an expression of human epistemology (how we 
come to know the world). Instead, I take a realist constructivistic approach to study how actor-
networks continuously ‘assemble and re-assemble’ ontological realities (what the world is 
made of), in accordance with what is at stake in their actor-networks (Latour, 2005). Due to 
the existence of multiple actor-networks in which livestock ABs circulate (politics, science, 
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agriculture, food supply chains, consumers), there are multiple AB actor-networks that co-
exist and shape each others’ networks. The co-existance of multiple ontological object worlds 
has been explored by Law and Mol (2011) in their research towards understanding how vets 
diagnose and work with Foot and Mouth Disease. The authors find differences in how 
veterinary epidemiologists, clinicians and the laboratory operate: they have different 
interactions with the disease and they do different practices of investigation. Instead of looking 
with a different perspective to the same world, Law and Mol (2011) show how each 
specialist/tradition works with their own specific ontological variant of the disease. 
This PhD project will examine which ontological variants of livestock ABs circulate in the 
UK. As previously discussed, I am interested to understand how nations govern and practice 
livestock AB-use differently, and how we can assess the impact of these policy frameworks. 
More specifically, I want to understand how governmental and agricultural policymakers in 
the UK define responsible AB-use, and how this ontological variant is performed in practice. 
How do AB actor-networks out there respond to the UK policy framework and what are the 
intended and unintended effects? I will next introduce the concept of ‘political cultures’, which 
I will use in chapter 3 and 4 to examine how UK policymakers problematised/politicised 
livestock antibioitc use as risk and what mechanism in the UK were used to settle/de-politicise 
the issue. Afterwards, I will bring in the concept of ‘co-production’ and elaborate on ANT to 
explain how I will study in chapter 6 and 7 the adoption of AB policies by the UK dairy 
industry.  
 
1.4.2 Science and politics: what counts as ‘evidence’? 
The first part of this thesis explores the politics of governance itself: why did the UK decide 
to implement an industry-led approach, even though there is an awareness of commercial 
realities attached to livestock AB? What was the process of decision-making, e.g. how was 
evidence on livestock AB-use as a public health risk produced, negotiated, framed? Examining 
how an issue becomes problematised, how consensus is achieved and by whom, will provide 
an insight in how boundaries are set, how responsibilities are distributed and what institutional 
reasoning underpins the former (Jasanoff, 2005a). This is of importance, as it will bring me 
towards an understanding of whose views have come to dominate at the expense of others and 
which views control the governance of livestock AB-use in the UK. Moreover, it will enable 
me to situate this thesis in the broader debate of AMR governance; how should we evaluate 
the performance of different nations with respect to governing livestock AB governance? I 
will return to the latter question in the discussion of this thesis. 
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To examine the origins and persistence of the UK’s industry-led approach over the decades, I 
will use STS scholar Sheila Jasanoff's (2005a) theoretical concept of ‘political cultures’. 
Questioning the universality of science and its methods, Jasanoff  argues that science, just as 
other types of knowledge, is situated in human interests. Political cultures, then, represent the 
way in which nations choose to govern uncertainties that accompany bio-objects and their 
innovation. Events that present themselves in society do not in themselves define public 
response and political action. Events enter in interpretative contexts, and will become framed 
in accordance with how contexts make sense of the event, rather than it being an objective 
encounter (Jasanoff, 2005a). Consequently, when uncertainties about bio-objects, such as 
medicines or biomedical technologies, define themselves in society, countries have specific 
ways of interpreting, framing and managing biotechnological risks. Values about acceptable 
levels of risks, cost-benefits or public priorities can become reflected in a country’s selective 
use of scientific knowledge, prioritising certain knowledges over others. There are 
assumptions involved in what it is expected that science should deliver, however sometimes 
tailored to political and scientific agenda rather than benefiting society (Jasanoff, 2005a). 
Policymakers’ decisions during risk management cannot therefore be considered as neutral; 
they are a result of political compromise and careful boundary maintenance, during which 
certain views are prioritised at the expense of others (Jasanoff, 2016). Jasanoff argues ‘social 
contracts’ can be in play between science and politics to ‘steer’ scientific findings into political 
goals and to set boundaries on biotechnological risks (Jasanoff 2005, p. 226). This has also 
been argued by Stirling (2010, p. 4), who suggests that we should explore presented risks 
beyond the ‘single definitions presented by science that are most amenable to political 
manipulation’. There are as such, differences in how nations look at a set of events and who’s 
views fall inside the frame. 
This becomes clear if we examine how countries across the world have problematised the risks 
involved with Antibiotic Growth Promotor (AGP) use in food producing animals. The 
scientific evidence produced by the UK Swann ‘scientific expert’ committee in 1969 warned 
about the public health risks involved with AGP use in agriculture and advised to phase out 
their use. Since, European countries started to phase out AGP use in agriculture at different 
paces (Kahn, 2016). In Sweden, the government responded to farmers who wanted to ban 
AGPs, as farmers believed that consumer concerns about AGPs would affect agricultural 
markets. Callon (1986) has defined this as the ‘Sociology of Translation’: actors who were 
previously unconnected can reconcile around a ‘matter of concern’, by sharing the same 
problem-solution definition or Obligatory Passage Point (OPP). AGP use as ‘concern’ 
reconciled Swedish policymakers, scientists, farmers, vets and consumers, who agreed 
together that banning AGP use would serve everybody’s interest. As such, Sweden was the 
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first country to ban AGP use in 1986, followed by other Nordic countries in the two decades 
that followed (Cogliani et al., 2011). However, as will be extensively discussed in chapter 3, 
resistance in Europe to the scientific claims made by the Swann Committee from farmer lobby 
groups and pharmaceutical companies, allowed for a continuation of AGP use in the two 
decades that followed (Kirchhelle, 2018). Due to a series of events during the late 1990s, from 
food safety scandals to new groups entering the scence, AGP use was eventually banned across 
Europe in 2006. In contrast, the US agricultural lobby successfully fought against AGP 
legislation up until 2017 (Kahn, 2016). The public risks involved with AGP use were 
continuously counteracted by The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) (Kahn, 2016). 
Global pressure from international organisations finally made the US decide in 2017 to ban 
growth promotor use. 
We find as such opposing science claims, characterised by the ‘circumstances of their 
production’ (Sismondo, 2010, p. 11). What becomes clear is that the apparatus of politics is 
not designed to democratically collect, present, confront and evaluate different concerns. 
Rather, politics makes certain versions of risks attributed to livestock AB-use visible, while 
silencing others. How nations define and use scientific evidence determines how nations 
respond to bio-objects under debate and the concerns at stake, rather than objective facts 
discovered over time. The structural agency of nations/groups that steers how individual 
people respond to technological/environmental risks has also been discussed by 
anthropologists Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky in their Cultural Theory of risk (1983). 
This theory seeks to explain how structures of social organisation steer individuals perceptions 
of risk and how this reinforces structures in competition against alternative risk perceptions.  
Having established how nations can have different ‘matters of concern’ associated with the 
bio-object under debate, in accordance with their political culture, I will next introduce the 
characteristics of the UK’s political culture. 
 
1.4.3 The UK’s political culture: expert committees 
Jasanoff (2005) has characterised the UK’s institutional framework as a technocratic political 
culture, by which she means that scientific experts inform scientific debates. These scientific 
expert committees are presented as providing independent and impartial advice to the 
government. Scientific experts in the UK enjoy a widely respected status of ‘character, 
experience and technical expertise’, and provide ‘narratives of reassurance’ to the public, that 
the problem is under control (Jasanoff, 1997, p. 228). In cases of scientific uncertainty, expert 
committees are used by the government to inform policy and settle concerns. This is in contrast 
to, for example, Sweden, were scientific evidence will be evaluated by other experts and non-
18 
 
experts to democratically discuss how to act. The difference in political culture between the 
UK and Sweden will be discussed extensively in Chapter 3. Taking an STS position, Jasanoff 
(2015) argues how these scientific experts and their methods do not stand outside the politics 
of what is desirable, prioritising certain interests over others (Jasanoff, 2016).  
The Bovine Spongiforme Encephalitis (BSE) crisis in 1990s is a good example of how 
scientific experts and their evidence became tailored to the interests of agricultural lobby, 
rather than consumer safety (Jasanoff, 1997). During the crisis, scientific experts chosen by 
the UK government to assess the public health risks attributed to BSE dismissed BSE as risk 
to human health, although other scientific communities warned about the association between 
BSE and the human Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) (Hinchliffe, 2001). There was 
an infamous incident where a British politician fed a beef burger to his daughter, in which beef 
was declared as safe to eat by the British government, protecting the farmer economy 
(Jasanoff, 1997). In contrast to what the British government had advised, it turned out BSE 
was transmittable from beef into the vCJD in humans, with deaths among infected people. 
Concerns emerged about the meaning of expertise in relation to the management of complex 
issues (Jasanoff, 1997). The silencing culture of experts and policymakers, entrenching the 
lay-expert divide, became questioned by several non-scientific members of the public, who 
felt ignored by policymakers (Irwin, 2006; Jasanoff, 1997). To bridge the lay-expert divide, a 
political reform took place for a new mode of scientific governance (Irwin, 2006). Public 
dialogue, transparency and democratic engagement on risk became the new pillars of scientific 
governance. The former reliance on committees of technical experts became replaced by a 
model of science and society (Irwin, 2006). However, Irwin (2006, p.302) questions this new 
‘social contract’ between lay-expert groups, in that the power of experts will not simply 
disappear by including non-experts in the debate.  
Taking the former discussion into account, I am interested to explore the process of regulatory 
decision-making between experts, policymakers, industry policymakers and non-expert 
groups (farmers, vets, consumers). How was livestock AB-use made into a ‘matter of concern’ 
across policy settings, by whom and what was at stake? How were alternative viewpoints 
considered and articulated in the UK during processes of livestock AB-use governance from 
the 1960s onwards and how was regulatory consensus achieved? 
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1.4.4 Studying the implications of the UK’s industry-led approach 
 
The ‘co-production’ of human and microbial worlds 
By understanding the UK’s political culture in terms of agricultural AB governance, this will 
allow me to study what counts as evidence of progress in livestock AB-use to policymakers, 
and what interpretations of evidence are acceptable. Importantly, policy frames are not static 
entities that provide a snapshot of the world. The way in which nations frame events has 
consequences; it shapes the world (society and nature) we come to live in. Jasanoff (2004) 
refers to this as the idiom of ‘co-production’. Our understanding of problems and how we 
respond to them simultaneously shapes the natural worlds we live in: nature and society evolve 
together. The idiom of co-production is useful in AMR contexts, as it allows me to examine 
what the consequences are of adopting a particular risk frame to govern issues. Not only does 
the UK’s industry-led approach result in certain AB practices, these practices simultaneously 
co-produce how microbes and their ecologies respond to these practices. Human responses 
and microbe responses are acting together, evolving together, co-producing each other’s 
worlds. It matters to examine how policy frames translate into practice and their implications 
on social and natural worlds (Jasanoff, 2005). 
Having established the limitations of scientific methods to evaluate policy impact, the second 
part of this thesis will examine how livestock industries take up their responsibilities and 
practice the policy expectations. I will explore how the UK industry-led approach performs 
new social and natural worlds. In order to do so, I will use the UK dairy industry as a case 
study. Although the pig and poultry industry are considered as the high users, at the start of 
this PhD in 2015, the dairy industry had high prophylactic use of ABs, high HP-CIA use, and 
lacked AB usage monitoring systems (RUMA, 2017). As the UK dairy industry had no clear 
overarching AB policies in place, this served a good case study to start tracing how this sector 
and its actors take up responsibilities and implement responsible AB-use policies. With 
livestock ABs as central objects of study, my interest was to explore how dairy actor-networks 
interpret the risks of livestock ABs, and how this shaped policy, practice and nature. Moreover, 
the object-centred approach enables me to study how dairy actors (producers, milk processors, 
retailers, vets, dairy organisations) and other non-human actors (animals, technologies, 
markets, educational tools, microbes, etc.) build together cognitive and material worlds, 
instead of reducing this into human endeavour (Knorr Cetina, 1997, p. 1). I will next elaborate 
on how I will study dairy actor networks as a relational activity. 
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Antibiotic decision-making in the UK dairy industry as Actor-Network activity 
My approach to studying AB decision-making as an actor-network activity is situated in 
Latour´s Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 1987, 2005). ANT, as a particular theoretical 
framework within STS, was developed in the early 1980s by Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and 
John Law (Sismondo, 2010). Its origins are situated in ethnographic studies of laboratories, to 
study how science and the creation of scientific knowledge is a social activity between 
researchers and their laboratory environment (human and non-human) (Sismondo, 2010). 
ANT opposed itself to social theories that focus on either the study of human actions at micro 
level, or the study of social structures (such as institutions, class, gender, law, etc) at macro 
level, to explain social orders (Latour, 2005). ANT was one of the first theories that withdrew 
from nature/society and agency/structure debates in social theories. Proposing a sociology of 
associations instead, ANT argues that the social should be traced in associations between 
human and non-human actors. Instead of having individual agency, humans and non-humans 
are made to act by each other; they are interdependent (Latour, 2005).  
The latter is important, as it means that decision-making of dairy actors cannot be approached 
as an individual, rational act. Instead, dairy actors are part of actor-networks that influence 
their AB decision-making. Examining the dairy AB actor-networks of dairy producers, milk 
processors, retailers, dairy organisations and dairy vets will therefore be an important part of 
this research, as it will help me to understand which actors drive AB decision-making within 
and/or across the dairy AB networks. Fox (2011, p. 858) argues, that to understand what makes 
actors act and how power is dispersed, we need to trace the actors in action, from ‘within a 
situated activity.’ ‘Existence’ is what needs to be explained in analysis, by the study of 
practices (Fox, 2011, p. 858). This is an important methodological consideration, as it forces 
me to think beyond causality and study what makes actors act and become powerful (or not) 
according to their actor-networks. Some of the actors that are aligned to ABs might overlap, 
while some actors might be unique to the actor-network of the particular site/actor. For dairy 
organisations, for example, statistical evidence (as a non-human actor) of AB reduction is of 
high importance. For farmers, keeping the cow healthy is potentially of bigger importance than 
producing statistical evidence of progress. This might might lead to different practices of AB 
policies, affecting both social and natural orders. How dairy actors respond to the risks 
attached to dairy ABs co-produces AB practices and microbial responses. Moreover, the 
former approach will enable me to understand how the UK’s industry-led approach performs 
in practice; how it is aligned with the local actor-networks, and consequently, its intended and 
unintended social and natural consequences. 
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1.5 Aims and objectives 
The overall aim of this study is to examine how livestock AB-use was problematised across 
policy landscapes, how this resulted in a particular framing of the issue, and how this translates 
itself in practice. To do so, I will turn away from evidence-based models that are used in the 
UK to both frame and master the issue of livestock AB ‘overuse and misuse’. Instead, I will 
take livestock ABs as the centre of my research, and trace them across policy, supply chains, 
producers and veterinary networks. I will examine how AB decisions are made across and 
within the actor-networks of the previous actors, and understanding what is at stake by 
studying which actors drive AB decision-making. This will allow me to discuss how these 
actors could become potential sites for intervention. The objectives are: 
 
• My first objective is to compare the historical political cultures governing livestock 
AB-use as a public health risk in the UK and Sweden, between the 1950’s and 1990s. 
I will examine how these two countries use science to inform the governance of 
livestock AB-use and how interests, values, priorities drive policy decision-making. I 
will evaluate how this has looped back on the material and social order of AMR. 
 
• My second objective builds from the first objective, and aims to study how the UK’s 
political culture ‘co-produced’ the governance of livestock AB-use from the 1990s 
onwards. I want to know what was at stake during this process and how this has 
resulted in a voluntary industry-led approach. 
 
• My third objective involves studying an industry-led approach in practice beyond 
statistical realities. Taking the dairy industry as the sector of interest, I want to know 
how dairy actors make decisions upon livestock AB-use as matter of concern 
according to their agricultural networks. Moreover, I am interested to study how the 
practices of policies impact upon livestock AB-use as a public health risk. 
 
• My fourth and final objective is a methodological objective; I want to provide a novel 
approach in how we can study the efficacy of AB interventions in livestock AB-use. 
This will hopefully contribute to new scholarship in this area to inform policy frames 
that circulate today. 
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1.6 Overview chapters  
After the methodology chapter, the thesis can be divided in two sections underpinned by their 
theoretical approach. The first section includes chapter 3 and 4. In these chapters I will work 
with the previously discussed concepts of ‘political culture’ and ‘matter of concern’, to study 
how decision-making about livestock AB-use as public health risk in the UK has taken/takes 
place. The second section includes chapter 5, 6, and 7 in which Actor Network Theory will be 
used to study how decision-making on AB policies and their practices takes place in the dairy 
industry. The thesis ends with a discussion and policy recommendations. 
 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
The methodology chapter will describe how I have used a multi-sited ethnographic approach 
to explore livestock ABs as the central objects under study. I will describe how I followed 
livestock ABs and dairy ABs during their journey between experts, policymakers and dairy 
agricultural networks. I will detail the methods I used (document analysis, interviews, and 
observations) and provide details of how this shaped my research journey. Staying faithful to 
the concept of ‘co-production’, I will situate the relationship between myself as researcher and 
my research as an ‘expedition’.  
 
Chapter 3: Comparing the historical risk governance of livestock antibiotic use between 
the UK and Sweden 
Using historical scientific literature, policy documents and newspapers, I will explain how the 
political cultures of the UK and Sweden historically framed livestock AB-use as a risk and 
how this has ‘co-produced’ the livestock AB infrastructures in both countries. Using Sheila 
Jasanoff’s concept of ‘political cultures’, it will be argued how the UK and Sweden have 
different ways of dealing with livestock antibiotics as public health risks, which results in 
different practices of livestock antibiotic use. 
 
Chapter 4: Antibiotic use in the UK’s livestock industry as ‘matter of concern’ 
This chapter combines policy documents and interviews with agricultural policymakers. I will 
discuss from the 1990s onwards how the UK made decisions upon its governance of livestock 
antibiotics. Using Callon’s (1987) concept of ‘matters of concerns’, I will discuss circulating 
political and economic interests of experts, policymakers and agricultural groups, and how this 
resulted in the UK´s industry-led approach. The intended and untintended effects or 
‘overflows’ of these dynamics, characteristic to UK’s political culture, will finally be 
examined. 
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Chapter 5: An introduction to the UK dairy sector and its regulation 
Using existing literature, I will introduce the UK dairy industry and discuss how it is regulated. 
I will discuss the historical shift in dairy sector regulation from state-producer to milk supply 
chain control and how this was part of European food safety crises and re-definitions of food 
quality. I will show how this has resulted in private quality assurance systems through which 
the UK dairy supply chain is regulated. Important human and non-human actors in the dairy 
supply chain networks that make up milk quality and milk safety will be introduced. As will 
become clear in the next chapter, dairy supply chain actor-networks co-produce antibiotic 
policies and their practices. 
 
Chapter 6: Dairy antibiotic policies and their practices 
Using fieldwork data, this chapter will discuss how the UK’s approach towards livestock 
antibiotic governance translates to local practices. Following an industry-led approach in 
action, this chapter will start with a discussion of the UK dairy sector’s response to political 
pressure. I will discuss types of interventions, what is prioritised and who is made responsible 
to show what is expected from dairy supply chain members. I will discuss next how the UK 
dairy supply chains and their private quality assurance systems take up their responsibilities. 
Using Bruno Latour’s (1987) Actor-Network Theory, I will trace which actors in the dairy 
supply chains matter and how this shapes the UK dairy supply chain antibiotic policies and 
their practices. The overflows of dairy antibiotic policies and their practices will be 
furthermore discussed.  
 
Chapter 7: Dairy antibiotic decision-making in practice  
Using fieldwork data, this chapter will show how dairy antibiotic decision-making by farmers 
and veterinarians takes place.  While national policy and local dairy antibiotic policies aim to 
rationalise behavioural antibiotic activities of farmers and veterinarians, I will use Actor-
Network Theory to expose which human and non-human dairy actors influence antibiotic-
decision making outside the realm of policies.  
 
Chapter 8: Discussion and conclusive remarks 
In this chapter, I will bring together the findings of the previous chapters. I will  discuss the 
implications of UK’s voluntary industry-led policy frame and discuss its  tensions with 
livestock AB-use as a public health risk. Moreover, I will provide policy recommendations 
and area’s of concern that warrant further research. 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 Methodology chapter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
25 
 
The ethnographic journey: tracing antibiotics on the 
move 
 
“Method goes with work, and ways of working, and ways of being” (Law, 2004, 
p.10). 
In this chapter of the thesis, I will introduce how I engaged with my research field and how 
my research focus and methods were shaped during this process. With my qualitative 
constructivist approach as point of departure, I will discuss my adoption of an ethnographic 
methodology. Following ANT literature, I will use the metaphor of ‘tracing’ to position 
livestock/dairy ABs as my central study objects and ‘follow’ them across sites where they 
bring me. Thus, the ‘tracing’ metaphor allows me to deal with my research as an ‘expedition’, 
beyond the security of research boundaries. With tracing as an active process, I not only 
observe but participate in the production of this expedition. Thus, I will discuss how I 
approached the research field, its inhabitants and how I ordered my research data. This chapter 
deals with the decisions and interpretations I made while tracing livestock ABs, of which the 
outcome will be discussed in the data chapters.  
 
2.1 A multi-sited ethnographic expedition 
To study the governance of livestock ABs, I opted for an ethnographic approach. This allowed 
me to examine how knowledge of livestock AB-use is produced across sites, people, objects 
and organisations and the consequences of this knowledge production. As discussed in Chapter 
1, I did not want to measure and qualify established knowledges, but to understand livestock 
AB policies and their practices in the UK beyond the borders of behaviours. I used the work 
of Bruno Latour (2005), Michel Callon (1986, 2009), John Law (2004), Annemarie Mol 
(2002) and others theoretically aligned with ANT. Their multi-sited ethnographies, with 
technologies and their network constitutions as centres of attention, differ from more 
traditional ethnographies.  
Traditional ethnographies study people’s actions and accounts in everyday contexts instead of 
experimental settings (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). They are most often single-sited 
ethnographies, demarcated in advance to study the situated human experience. The origins of 
ethnography lie in the nineteenth century and are situated in old colonial projects (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 2007). Travellers and missionaries studied ‘primitive’ societies in order to teach 
them Western values (Faubion, 2007). During the twentieth century, ethnography became a 
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methodology used by anthropologists to go native for a considerable amount of time outside 
the West and study people and their practices in their natural settings (Patton, 2002). The world 
was studied in its natural state, with the researcher only observing without participating in it. 
Humans were regarded as the primary agents and their ‘intimate knowledge’ with the world 
needed to be studied (Marcus, 1995, p. 99).  
This naturalistic approach, in which the ‘objective’ researcher studied the culture of native 
people, has however become criticised over the course of time by anthropologists themselves 
as being un-reflexive (Marcus, 1998). It became since remoulded by various sociological 
theories, such as functionalism, hermeneutics, Marxism, constructionism, feminism, post-
structuralism, and also STS (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Today, ethnography can be 
conceptualised as an approach to its subjects, with culture and context operating as its key 
concerns (Cooper, 2012). Decisions about sampling, such as who to interview, will evolve as 
the research progresses. Doing ethnography means that in many cases, the interests and 
research questions might be refined or even transformed during the research (Law, 2004). 
Harris (1971) argues how anthropologists are able to develop a particular perspective about 
human life during their observational journeys. By constantly analysing the observations while 
they unfold instead of merely reporting, categories of interpretation evolve during the process 
of data collection and data analysis. The ethnographic process is as such relatively unstructured 
while the researcher is not constrained by classical fixed research design and pre-defined 
categories of interest (Harris, 1971). 
Importantly, doing ethnography in STS/ANT involves a different methodological approach 
than classical ethnographies. Hess (2001) distinguishes between two generations of 
ethnographies in STS. The first STS/ANT ethnographies evolved during the early 1980s as a 
response to ethnographies that only studied humans and their social activities. Due to 
legitimacy of science and its ‘objective’ methods, scientific practices were left unexplored. 
Questioning however the value-free notions of scientific facts, STS was interested to study the 
natural sciences, and it was at that time that the first laboratory ethnographies emerged (Bijker 
et al., 1987; Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). 
 
“While ethnographers were quite capable of retracing the links that bound the 
ethnosciences to the social world, they were unable to do so for the exact science” 
(Latour, 1993)  
 
Moving into the laboratory, STS scholars took scientific controversies of a technology under 
discussion as the point of departure. Using an ethnographic approach, STS entered into 
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laboratories and followed the scientists, in order to understand how social and technical 
practices constituted scientific facts (Sismondo, 2010). The construction of knowledge was 
studied beyond human activities, taking into account the agency of non-human actors (from 
techniques, texts, lab animals, pathogens etc.). The second generation of STS ethnographies 
moved beyond the laboratory and examines the production of knowledge and technology 
outside laboratories, in hands of lay groups, media, activists and more (Hess, 2001). Their 
research tends to be multi-sited, examining the variety of knowledges across sites and actors 
instead of being limited to scientific experts in their laboratory settings (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007). As my ethnographic interests are situated in AB knowledge practices (Mol, 
2002), the handling (politically, economically or physically) of livestock/dairy ABs could be 
expected to differ between sites. The practice of ‘tracing’ ABs involves asking the question: 
what are the complex relations that AB practices raise across sites? 
A multi-sited ethnography tackles the bounded territories of single-sited ethnographies 
(Marcus, 1995), and allows researchers to follow the movements of ABs as the ethnographic 
object of interest (Latour, 2005). In this journey I proposed to trace heterogeneous entities 
(humans, non-humans, organizations, documents) to understand how livestock ABs are 
constructed and used. This approach involved a willingness to pursue connections and 
circulations among actors beyond boundaries (Hine, 2007); it involved following 
livestock/dairy ABs across controversies, documents, tv documentaries, scientific 
programmes, conference sites, farms and more. In line with this approach I traced 
livestock/dairy ABs to the sites where they brought me, including both human and non-human 
actors. The sites were treated as fluid, interactional and unstable (Murdoch, 1998). In the 
context of this thesis, tracing involves as such a fluid activity, following livestock/dairy ABs 
across controversies, policy documents, tv documentaries, scientific programmes, conference 
sites, agricultural organisations, veterinary practices, farms and many more. The tracing 
metaphor becomes my methodological tool to guide my expedition, allowing me to enter every 
site with wonder without seeking for truth (Latour, 2005). Knowledge is considered as active, 
continuously evolving to what we as societies come to see as truth. My research as such does 
not involve finding truth, but instead describe how truth upon ABs is ‘enacted’ or ‘performed’ 
(Mol, 2002, p. 33): how are AB statistics produced and what do they represent? What do these 
statistics mean once opening up their scientific facts? As Annemarie Mol argued in her 
ethnography of how atherosclerosis is ‘enacted’ in Dutch hospitals (Mol, 2002, p. 5): 
 
“The driving question is no longer “how to find the truth?” but “how are objects 
handled in practice?”  
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Ethnographers often employ a variety of qualitative methods, tailored to the demands of the 
research site(s). This strategy is sometimes referred to as triangulation, in which more than 
one method of data collection is used (Barbour, 2001). The methods usually involve 
observation (participant or non-participant) as the main method (covert or open), 
complemented with other methods such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, the study of 
material (documents) and may include quantitative approaches such as questionnaires (Green 
& Thorogood, 2004). In this study, triangulation was used in a flexible manner in accordance 
with the sites of a multi-sited ethnography. This meant that in some sites I requested 
documents, interviews, observations, focus groups or a combination of any of these. The 
selection of different types of data for my study was based on what I needed to know; not on 
a strategy designed before entering the field. I will discuss this process more detail in the 
following sections. 
 
2.2 Preparing the expedition 
Marcus (1995, p.113) argues that conducting multi-sited ethnographies can evoke 
‘circumstantial activism’ of the observer in the research field: exploring different sites may 
evoke different personal interests, shaping how these sites will be examined. Equally, Law 
(2004) has situated the co-production between research and researcher in his STS methodology 
book ‘After Method’, in which he argues that methodology and data re-produce each other. 
As such, the type of people, sites, objects that I encountered shaped the choices I made. My 
own agency as a researcher mattered, as I was in the end in charge of the expedition and the 
selection of sites to be explored. In this Chapter I aim to provide an account of my expedition 
which would enable any outsider to understand the choices and decisions I made along the 
way. As I question knowledge practices, it is important for me to acknowledge my own 
knowledge practices. As ANT suggests, researchers do not act in a vacuum; they are part of 
networks that co-produce interpretations and actions (Latour, 2005). In what follows, I will 
discuss my encounters and choices in chronological order as much as possible, although in 
some cases, I will show how methods overlapped. 
 
2.3 Exploring sites 
2.3.1 Tracing back antibiotic controversies 
At the start of my PhD in October 2015, I was surprised to find there was no official regulation 
in place in the UK to nationally control the use of ABs in food supply chains. I was biased, as 
I came from a country (the Netherlands) which had just experienced the implementation of a 
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government-industry led AB reduction strategy across its livestock sectors. Embedded within 
this were official targets, rules and a national surveillance system. I was surprised that two 
European countries (the threat of Brexit was no reality yet) could differ so greatly in their 
regulatory approach. With this in mind, I wrote my research proposal and ethics application in 
the first half year of my PhD. As I was interested in studying contrasting regulatory approaches 
to livestock AB governance, my initial proposal involved a country comparison between the 
UK, the first country in which a critical report on the risks involved with livestock AB-use 
was published (The 1969 Swann Report) and Sweden, the first country in which the use of AB 
Growth Promotors (AGPs) in 1984 became banned. While waiting for the UK ethics approval 
in the months that followed, I turned to historical documents to understand how livestock AB-
use was problematised in the UK and Sweden. 
Latour argues (2005, p.27) we should always start in the ‘middle of things’ in order to track 
who is involved, what identities are made, and how solutions are framed at dispense of other 
solutions. I trace’ back to when livestock ABs were first problematised  in order to map out 
controversies (Whatmore, 2009) on livestock AB-use in both countries. Anthropologists 
traditionally frame records, documents, artefacts and archives as material culture, as it 
provides detailed information about the workings of organizations and programmes (Patton, 
2002). Documents moreover structure what the discourses are, who they represent, what new 
discourses emerge, and finally what other groups and documents the documents constructs. I 
started to trace primary sources, including European, UK and Swedish policy documents, UK 
newspaper articles of ‘The Daily Mail’ and ‘The Times’ and the UK veterinary journal 
‘Veterinary Record’. These documents took me back to the 1950s. I visited the British Library 
in London in order to access old newspapers that covered the time period. Secondary sources 
included scientific journals and books. Following the methodology of a discourse analysis, 
attention was paid to what was said by whom in order to capture the co-producing effects of 
discourses and identities. This allowed examination of how farm ABs in both countries became 
institutionalized in relation to both countries political cultures. It was during this process that 
I came familiarised with UK’s use of ‘scientific experts’ to settle AB controversies. But also, 
that countries differ in how they use science and that there are politics involved in how 
knowledge was produced upon livestock AB-use as risk. 
This preliminary reflection upon my discourse analysis upon both countries produced new 
sites of interests, from scientific experts to policymakers, policy documents and the 
agricultural sectors themselves. However, as we will see, I was about to come across important 
crossroads in which I had to make decisions about the direction I took. 
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2.3.2 Tracing unfolding antibiotic controversies 
As my multi-sited ethnography involved tracing livestock ABs to the sites, I had to track 
different leads at the same time. A major event during my desk based discourse analysis had 
caught my attention. You could argue that I was lucky, as I was about to enter into the midst 
of a controversy. As discussed in the theory section, STS scholars use the midst of 
controversial debates as an opportunity to explore what is at stake and what claims are made 
by participants and their opponents (Sismondo, 2010, p. 125). The UK O’Neill expert 
committee published in December 2015 and May 2016 controversial reports, critiquing the 
‘overuse and misuse’ of ABs. This provided me with an opportunity to explore if and how the 
O’Neill review would become an important actor in my expedition. I was particularly 
interested in the following set of questions - How the O’Neill reports frame the problem and 
which arguments were used? Who were the opponents and what counter claims did they make 
and why? Sismondo (2010) offers five ways to explore how actors take over controversies by 
deploying certain strategies:  
1. They give detailed critiques of observations, experiments and positions  
2. They introduce new tests, and calibrations of instruments and procedures 
3. They isolate one position as more scientific or central – or as deviant 
4. They show one position to be more useful  
5. They ignore deviant viewpoints and data  
According to Callon (1986, p. 8), scientific controversies are characterised by ‘trials of 
strength’, during which scientists try to ‘impose and stabilise the identity of the other actors it 
defines through its problematisation’. The midst of controversies offers as such the opportunity 
for researchers to study who is claiming what and why. Moreover, controversies leave 
‘unexpected’ trails, and allow to trace new social connections (Latour, 2005, p. 43).  
When the O’Neill expert report in 2015 was published, attacking global and national livestock 
AB-use, it was the perfect moment for me to step in the controversy and follow what truth 
claims were made by whom. Opponents to the 2015 report presented themselves, such as the 
representative organisation for the Animal Medicines Sector in the UK (the National Office of 
Animal Health [NOAH]), the British Veterinary Association [BVA], and the livestock sectors’ 
overarching agricultural organisation Responsible Use of Medicines in Agriculture Alliance 
[RUMA]. They became important initial ethnographic sites for me to trace. To understand 
however the unfolding controversy, I had to not only monitor it, but trace back what was at 
stake to the groups who made opposing claims. In the early stages of my research I relied on 
documents to trace back the role of groups such as RUMA, BVA, NOAH in the early debates 
in the UK on livestock AB use. Using the online web archives I reconstructed how positions 
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and arguments of the different groups had taken shape and informed the current debate. This 
was an important exercise at the time, as it forced me to understand the workings of the 
agricultural industries in the UK 
 
2.3.3 Conference sites: exploring debates 
To keep informed on industry ‘knowledge practices’ about livestock ABs, I connected myself 
online to the twitter feeds of RUMA, BVA and NOAH. Through this connection I found out 
about a conference entitled ‘Antibiotics and Farming: Prescriptions for Changes’, (14th of 
April 2016), organised by the UK AB advocacy groups Medact, a London-based global health 
charity, and the Alliance to Save Our Antibiotics. The conference brought together 
policymakers, health professionals, agricultural stakeholders, environmental groups and civil-
society groups to discuss how farm AB-use could be reduced. This offered a great opportunity 
for me to listen to and observe the documented and online debates as they were played out in 
practice.  
It became apparent during the conference that the debates on livestock AB-use in the UK were 
dominated by a selected group of organizations who acted as spokespersons for the involved 
industries at large. These organizations were RUMA, the BVA, and the Soil Association. They 
appeared to adopt multiple roles, not only representing their own organisations, but circulating 
in different networks; from agricultural networks, to pharmaceutical networks, policy 
networks, scientist/university networks. This provided me with a focus on understanding how 
these networks functioned and how they produced knowledge about the risks of livestock ABs 
to human public health.  
 
2.4 Tracing the actor-networks of dairy antibiotics 
2.4.1 Meeting key informants and key organisations 
By the end of the summer 2016, my research received University of Liverpool ethics approval. 
The undertaking of the documentary comparison between the UK and Sweden had enhanced 
my knowledge of the political cultures and the agricultural industry in both countries. 
However, in the course of this I had begun to realise that extending my empirical work to 
Sweden was over-ambitious and would limit my ability to understand the processes of AB-use 
in the UK. I therefore decided to focus the research on livestock AB-use in the UK. I still kept 
the field open to the UK livestock sectors and ideally, still wanted to compare them all in their 
AB knowledge practices. However, as I will show, the explorative nature of ethnography in 
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combination with my tracing activities would point me towards one livestock sector in 
particular.  
Fortuitously, at the beginning of October 2016, I interviewed a key informant, a veterinary 
surgeon specialised in dairy herd health with links to a large retailer (Veterinary surgeon 19). 
The interview was semi-structured (see Appendix 3) with a list of pre-defined broad topics to 
stimulate discussion (Green & Thorogood, 2004). Although I used the sets of questions as 
guideline, we ended up talking about a variety of topics that concern dairy AB-use, opening 
up new traces. I learned about the complexities involved with regulating dairy AB-use, and 
the vet provided me with important new human and non-human actors, such as milk contracts, 
milk residues, milk prices, retailers and milk processors. Being important non-human actors, 
they forced me to pay attention to them. An invitation to the ‘BioInfect’ conference (October 
2016) in Cheshire allowed me to hear from Sir Lord O’Neill. This 1-day conference critically 
discussed human and animal industry related R&D issues of diagnostics and AB alternatives. 
At the conference, I was introduced to agricultural representatives and other key informants 
who where willing to participate in my research. Before I will discuss this more in depth, I 
will discuss how I recruited veterinary surgeons and how this shaped my research trajectory.  
 
2.4.2 The first interviews: Veterinary surgeons 
During the first stage of my recruitment period, I recruited three vets at the University of 
Liverpool, (1, 17, 18) who had either worked as vets in livestock sectors or were still working 
part-time as vets in practice. As I had hoped for, one of them referred me to other veterinary 
colleagues working full time in practice (Veterinary Practice 1 and Veterinary Practice 2). 
Another one referred me to a livestock industry organisation 3, with whom the vet had contacts 
with. This resulted in an interview with this livestock industry organisation in the months that 
followed. The formal activities (executed for every interview) of the interview recruitment 
procedure included an oral or email invitation. Once potential participants had agreed to the 
interview, we set a date and time. I sent the interview guide (Appendix 3) in advance of the 
interview so that interviewees could prepare themselves. The interviews were either held face-
to-face in a convenient setting, over skype or the phone to save travel budget, and ranged from 
45 minutes up to 2.5 hours. The interviews were recorded and the same day transferred to a 
password protected hard drive. The participants were given a pseudonym and interviews were 
either transcribed by myself or sent to a transcribing centre. The transcripts were saved on the 
University Server to protect it again from unauthorised access. 
A limitation of interviews according to qualitative researchers is that what people say differs 
from what they do. It does not mean the interview data is invalid, but it is a ‘normative account’ 
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of reality (Green & Thorogood, 2004, p. 102) As the interviews with vets progressed I became 
interested in the number of discourses within which ABs sat. As a result I decided I needed to 
witness AB practices by vets and farmers more in detail. I wanted to trace what was done 
during AB practices through the method of observation. By the beginning of my second year 
of the PhD, my ethnographic journey had become set on a study of dairy AB policies and their 
practices.  
 
2.4.3 Non-participant observation: tracing the Actor-Networks of dairy 
antibiotics 
Observational methods allow researchers to observe phenomena in relation to their sites of 
action. This was an important element of my research, as I wanted to observe how dairy AB 
realities are assembled, instead of trying to make sense of their singular presented version 
presented by science (Latour, 2005). It allowed me to get to know the dairy ABs in relation to 
their agricultural actor-networks, instead of ‘knowing about them’ through their 
representatives (documents, policymakers, dairy spokesman, AB-users) (Green & Thorogood, 
2004, p. 132). Observation complements data derived from interviews, as observation situates 
what is said about the object in its natural setting. Researchers can decide to take an overt role 
in which people are aware they are being studied (referred to as participant observation), or 
take a more covert role and not expose themselves as researchers in the research setting 
(Patton, 2002). A concern with overt roles is that this can interfere with the natural behaviour 
in the research site. The covert observation role has to deal with the ethics of secrecy, as private 
behaviour is being studied. I have taken a non-participatory, overt approach in my own 
observational fieldwork, and this made reflexivity about my influence as researcher an 
essential part of the ethnography. This is in line with Law’s (2004) ‘After Method’ 
methodology, in which he argues that we need to reflect upon how the field and researcher 
have co-produced each other. In order to keep track of my observations, feelings and 
reflections, I kept my research diary with me in which I wrote down findings whenever the 
environment allowed me to. This field notebook represented my data collection of the 
ethnographic fieldwork. Another dimension in how observational studies can vary is the length 
of the observation period. Traditional anthropological ethnographic studies expect researchers 
to spend at least six months and often a year or more in a culture of interest in order to grasp 
its local dynamics and unveil the complexities of social life (Savin-Baden & Howell Major, 
2013). However, the time of the observation period depends on the research aim and questions 
of the study rather than of some pre-defined ideal of length (Savin-Baden & Howell Major, 
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2013). I will explain next how I performed my observations and how they further shaped my 
research journey. 
 
Retailer-farmer meetings  
I attended 10 dairy retailer-farmer meetings on AB policies across the UK in the period of 
January and February in 2017 (See Table. 2.1). With consent from the retailer, I was able to 
observe during the meetings how the retailer, in collaboration with its milk processors, 
transferred new AB policies informed by the ‘O’Neill’ targets to their contracted farmers. 
During the observations, I made notes in my research diary processed the same evening in a 
word document on my laptop. To evaluate the implications of the presented policies, I tried to 
speak with farmers before and after the meetings. Some of the farmers thought I represented 
the retailer and felt initially uncomfortable sharing their thoughts about the retailer. By 
explaining my role as a researcher assured them I was acting independently from the retailer. 
Once I had established my research role, some farmers opened up and were willing to share 
with me with their thoughts about the retailer activities. One of the farmer spokesman (Farmer 
1), involved with the retailer policies, invited me to his farm for a 1-1 interview. Vets were 
also invited to attend the meetings, enabling me to study the interaction between the different 
supply chain actors. During each farmer meeting, a small number of vets were present. I was 
mainly interested in finding out how actor-networks were built between the retailer and milk 
processor representatives, ABs, policies, farmers and vets. What became apparent to me during 
the meetings was that retailers and milk processors played crucial roles in how AB 
infrastructures developed. My role started to change from a non-participatory observant to a 
semi- participant observant when I was asked to evaluate the AB policy presentation of the 
retailer. My own presence as researcher started to contribute as such to the format and content 
of the retailer-farmer meetings. I started to matter in the retailer-farmer actor-network, 
contributing to its ontology (what is out there). Over the course of the 10 meetings, I integrated 
more and more with the team by travelling with them, discussing meetings and presentations 
over meals. I was moreover able to hear some of the ‘gossiping’ about the ins and outs of the 
supply chain liaisons. As there are many different dairy supply chain liaisons in the UK, 
circulating in different agricultural networks, one of my next tasks was to start recruiting more 
retailers and milk processors.  
 
Observing veterinary practices 
Although I initially wanted to undertake six weeks of work shadowing veterinary practices, 
spread over three veterinary practices in the North-West, Midlands and South/South-West of 
England, difficulties accessing veterinary practices forced me to change my plans. 
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Connections via my research team enabled me to perform three weeks of participant 
observation in a veterinary practice in the North-West (Veterinary Practice 3). One veterinary 
practice in the South (Veterinary Practice 4) agreed for me to spend one day of observation 
with one of the partners. Although I had approached several veterinary clinics via phone, via 
email, via vets I had met during farmer retailer meetings, and through an advertisement in a 
monthly veterinary magazine of a veterinary cooperative, I was not able to recruit another 
veterinary practice willing to let me work shadow their AB activities. It was a frustrating and 
uncertain time period, but it was at the same time part of the fieldwork experience.   
Veterinary Practice 3 
During the participant observation period of three weeks at the first veterinary practice, I was 
able to follow every vet (Veterinary surgeon 6-15) in the practice for at least one day, and in 
some cases for 2-3 days. I interviewed them as well during the car rides, using my semi-
structured interview structure. As it felt uncomfortable using my audio recorder, I took notes 
of the interviews in my research diary. Observations of vets on farms and during their 
interactions in the veterinary practice were written down in my research diary during the car 
rides and between visits. These notes were further processed in the evenings and weekends in 
a word document on my university laptop. Reflecting upon my presence, I felt this did not 
seem to affect decisions about AB treatment, and vets did not seem at all reluctant to prescribe. 
However, when I asked if my presence affected their prescribing, they answered that my 
presence in some cases made them reflect about their AB prescribing choice. In general, the 
vets seemed very open and eager to let me observe their practices. This was in itself interesting, 
considering that it was hard to get practices to participate. The partners told me that they 
initially had disagreement about me coming to the practices. They thought that it could benefit 
the practice, however, enabling them to reflect them upon their practices. During my 
observation period, it felt as if they wanted to show me they were actively working on 
responsible AB-use and that they were proud to share this with me. 
My background as a vet could have nurtured their openness towards me, as I was always 
introduced as a veterinary surgeon or colleague when we entered a farm. The vets often asked 
me to assist when they were performing activities, such as spraying animals that were 
vaccinated, handing them materials, writing down fertility and mobility scores, or in some 
cases doing auscultations or take the temperature of animals. Farmers were also encouraged 
by the vets to talk with me about their AB practices and their opinions about retailers and milk 
processors. Again, from a non-participant, I became a semi-participant observer; I became an 
actor in veterinary and farmers actor-networks. This enabled me to talk to many farmers during 
my observations, on a wide range of farms, operating in a wide range of circumstances. In 
some cases, these discussions took place over coffee where the vets also joined the discussion. 
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In other cases, discussions took place either during the practices of the vet or after when the 
vet was cleaning and packing his/her equipment. Patton has described this process as the 
insider and outsider dynamics or the emic versus etic perspective of researcher and field 
(Patton, 2002). By being an insider of a culture, some anthropologist believe that this gives 
more meaningful emic perspectives. Others believe that researchers need to be outsiders/ have 
an etic perspective in order to be far away enough from the particular culture to remain critical 
(Patton, 2002). In my case, I had never worked as a vet in a dairy practice, although I had 
received during my veterinary training experience of working with farm animals. Thus, my 
veterinary background allowed me to access knowledge sites and activities within the 
veterinary practice as research site, however with enough distance to watch the performance 
of dairy AB actor networks in their natural habitats. I was also able to interview vets during 
the car rides, or in the veterinary practices (Veterinary surgeon 6-15). The veterinary partners 
came together for a focus group discussion, in which I was able to discuss with them their 
thoughts and actions about dairy AB-use. In other cases, I observed interactions between 
veterinary vets during their coffee or lunch breaks. 
 
Veterinary Practice 4 
My participant observation day in the second veterinary clinic in the South had been arranged 
by one of the farmers (Farmer 3) I had met during the retailer-farmer meetings. The veterinary 
clinic had a practice mission to stimulate innovation in dairy, from medicine use to herd health 
planning to prevention. In common with the previous veterinary clinic, there was a publicly 
stated emphasis on ‘responsible AB usage’ activities. With the vet (Veterinary surgeon 16) 
who agreed for me to do the participant observation, we drove around during which I had the 
chance again to meet farmers and discuss some of their activities. We ended the day with the 
farmer (Farmer 3) who had referred me to him. This turned into a spontaneous focus group, 
with the vet farmer and his herdsman discussing activities that involved responsible AB-use. 
Although it was only one day, I was able to compare the day to some extent with my previous 
observation period in veterinary practice 1, strengthened my findings and reflections.  
 
2.4.4 Interviewing agricultural actors 
Getting access to big companies that are not open to the public and who have commercial 
interests was not an easy task. As my reading and fieldwork progressed, I had made an 
inventory of the organisations I wanted to interview. However, this list evolved in response to 
access issues and as the actors changed during the research. As previously discussed, through 
the ‘Bioinfect’ conference in Cheshire, I met key informants who were willing to participate 
in my research: two livestock industry organisations (Livestock industry organisation 1 and 2) 
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and a pharmaceutical company (Pharmaceutical Company 1). The amount of information 
provided by the interviews made me start to prioritise certain leads over others. Although 
pharmaceutical companies are important players and their market activities important sites for 
future research, I decided that I would only trace their network activities in relation to the 
agricultural networks in which I was interested. Market regulations, R&D, patents, business 
portfolio’s and more contribute to how pharmaceutical companies position themselves in 
agricultural networks, these commercially sensitive networks seemed to me to be too complex 
for this PhD in the time available. 
The previous interviews not only contributed to new leads to trace, but they referred me to 
acquaintances in the field who agreed to get interviewed. One acquaintance was a key figure 
in one of UK’s livestock organisations (Livestock industry organisation 4), who brought me a 
new perspective upon how the dairy industry was evolving in comparison to the other livestock 
sectors. The other acquaintance was again representative of a veterinary pharmaceutical 
company, who was interested to share opinions (Pharmaceutical Company 2). Although I had 
decided to not trace the workings of pharmaceutical companies, it still offered me the chance 
to explore how the pharmaceutical company positioned itself in agricultural networks. As the 
spokespersons of the pharmaceutical companies I interviewed were vets by training, they 
shifted between their ‘pharmaceutical head’ and ‘veterinary head’. 
During the farmer retailer meetings, I recruited a retailer spokesman (Retailer 2) and 
spokesman of a UK milk processors (Milk processor 1) for a semi-structured interview. In 
addition, in response to a recruitment advertisement I had placed in the monthly magazine of 
one of the veterinary cooperatives in the UK, I recruited an interested vet/consultant 
(Veterinary surgeon 21). The interview I undertook with this person lasted three hours and 
became a vehicle for me to test out some of the ideas that were emerging from my research. 
With interviewee and researcher interacting, we produced knowledge together (Green and 
Thoroughood 2009, p. 102). This invited me to reflect upon some of the ideas I had developed 
in the course of my research. Through the previous spokespersons, I was able to recruit Retailer 
1, Milk Processor 2 and another vet/consultant (Veterinary surgeon 20) working for another 
retailer. Although still using my original semi-structured interview guide, we expanded the 
conversation with the actor-networks I traced during my fieldwork.  
Over the summer 2017, I was able to recruit one more vet (Veterinary surgeon 4). During the 
same time period (late summer) my supervisor was also able to get me in touch with a farmer 
(Farmer 2), who was contracted by a milk processor whom I had interviewed. In addition, the 
agricultural network of researcher/clinical vet 1 offered me the opportunity to take part in two 
farmer focus groups (Retailer focus group 1 and 2) organised by the retailer of whom I attended 
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the retailer-farmer meetings. These focus groups were designed to evaluate the AB policies 
with farmers. The design of, and questions used in, these focus groups were, however, not 
designed by me. I took the opportunity instead to listen to the discussions and speak with the 
farmers ‘off the record’ before and after the meetings. It provided me with insights in to how 
the farmers work with initiatives of the retailer, on and off the record.  
Finally, I tried to get access to policymakers (Veterinary Medicine Directorate (VMD), 
Department for Food, Environment and Agriculture (DEFRA)) via email, but I did not receive 
any responses. Although policymakers are an important part of this research according to the 
controversies I traced, I was not able to explore these within this study. I consider this as a gap 
in my data. Nevertheless, the other traces had brought me to unexpected new actor-networks, 
or which their importance was confirmed by other actors along the way.  
 
2.4.5 Closure of my ethnographic journey: witnessing the RUMA-VMD 
conference 
In October 2017, I attended the RUMA-VMD conference on responsible antibiotic use in 
London, which would be the last ethnographic activity of my fieldwork. During this event, all 
major livestock sector stakeholders came together in order to evaluate progress on AB policies 
and the status of responsible AB use in practice. The conference was an important site for me 
to close my multi-sited journey, as it brought me back to the site from where I started: the 
controversy of the O’Neill reports and its settlement into responsible AB usage targets. Would 
I hear some of the same problems in persistant AB infrastructures I came across during my 
ethnographic journey? How would the UK livestock sectors reflect upon their practices of the 
policies? The controversies with which I had started this expedition had turned into low 
profile. Nobody spoke, however, about the tension between policies and practices I came 
across during my fieldwork. It was time for me to start analysing my data. 
 
2.5 Data analysis 
2.5.1 Transcribing 
In accordance with my theoretical position, my data analysis evolved around the generation of 
data from the fieldwork material instead of using pre-determined models. This inductive 
approach allowed me to generate patterns, codes and themes by the language and/or topics 
discussed by the respondents or from the observational data. The first step of data analysis was 
transcription of data in textual record  (Savin-Baden & Howell Major, 2013). In order to situate 
actor-networks that were emerging throughout the fieldwork, I transcribed interviews as close 
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to the time they were undertaken as possible. Transcribing my interviews allowed me to revisit 
my data and spend time with its textual records. The first interviews were transcribed by 
myself in order to better understand how the interviews proceeded. The transcription followed 
a ‘denaturalised’ approach typically used by ethnography and most other social sciences 
approaches (Savin-Baden & Howell Major, 2013). The aim of this transcription method is on 
content/information and thus what is said, rather than how it is said (Savin-Baden & Howell 
Major, 2013). Naturalised approaches, which consider every utterance and body language, is 
typically used in conversation and linguistic studies that aim to analyse speech patterns in 
interaction (Green & Thorogood, 2004). Nevertheless, by listening to the transcripts several 
times I tried to examine moments of ease or unease, doubts, uncertainty etc., as this provided 
me with insights in how the participant situated their own thoughts. Hearing myself respond 
to the interview participants and my formulation of questions also helped me to reflect upon 
how I influenced the interview and what I could improve subsequently. As time proceeded 
during my fieldwork, some of the anonymised interviews were sent to transcribers for 
transcribing. When I send interviews for transcribing to transcribing centres, I had to ensure 
the confidentiality of the records by making the identities anonymous. The transcribing records 
itself are kept on a secured hard drive space that is only accessible through passwords. The 
transcribed interviews were checked against the sound files for the interview. This first step of 
data analysis helped me to familiarise with my data while making notes of what I thought was 
of particular interest.  
 
2.5.2 Coding 
For the data analysis, I used a thematic analysis, which involved the identification of recurrent 
themes in the data that organised my topics of interest. After familiarisation with my data 
during the process of transcribing and re-reading the transcripts, I started the first stage of 
thematic analysis which is the coding of the data. Data was ‘reduced’ in labels or codes which 
helped me to start comparing transcripts. To help me organize my data and data analysis, I 
decided to use N-Vivo software as coding tool. N-Vivo is a program used by qualitative 
researchers which helps to organise, analyse and find patterns in unstructured data. After 
transferring the transcripts into the program, I began to highlight words/texts of the transcripts 
into labels, order these labels and compare them across transcripts. Through this approach, 
topics, metaphors and actors emerged that I thought would be relevence to my research. The 
code, keyword or small phrase simply highlighted what I thought the section in the text was 
saying; the next step was to order my codes into broader categories and looking for links 
between these codes. To do this, I designed a coding framework with main and sub themes.  
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2.5.3 Nvivo 
An important part of coding is to continue refining and reflecting upon the codes and themes 
as data analysis progresses. In my case, I shared my codes and themes in N-Vivo with my 
supervisors. Although the program of N-Vivo helped me to order data, codes and themes, we 
found that my coding did not always represent the data in its full account. I first of all focused 
too much on identifying ‘actors’ that were involved in the construction of AB networks. 
Secondly, I remained too descriptive and failed to identify patterns and concepts that would 
help me theorize the data. It was, for me, the first serious crisis of the PhD. My supervisory 
team decided that there would be time to restart data analysis from the beginning and work 
with the transcripts without using a software tool. So a next stage of data analysis began.  
 
2.5.4 Themes  
By reading and re-reading, highlighting and putting notes on the transcript and in a coding 
diary, I was able to better ‘grasp’ the data and evolve from a descriptive to a conceptual 
analysis from the data. After analysing a couple of transcripts, I felt more comfortable with 
the data and I started to bring in STS theories and concepts that supported my data. I also 
updated my N-Vivo project during the process by comparing my new data analysis with the 
old data analysis and restructuring where necessary. As my ethnography was multi-sited, I also 
sometimes struggled using N-Vivo as an ordering tool. The more transcripts and sites I 
analysed, the clearer in my mind the story I wanted to write became. The data Chapters are 
written to reflect my ethnographic and data analysis ‘journey’. 
 
2.6 Ethical considerations 
As this research deals with individuals, groups and research sites, the research had to be 
approved by the University of Liverpool Committee on Research Ethics before fieldwork was 
able to start. In any study, it is important to consider how participation may harm the members 
or sites of research. This is particularly so when the topics studied are sensitive. Informed 
consent is a central principle to the conduct of UK research. This means that people engage in 
research as participants of their own free will and when they do so they are aware of the 
implications of their participation (Green & Thorogood, 2004, p. 57). I designed an informed 
consent document tailored to the research settings (Appendix 2). During the recruitment stage, 
the consent document was sent to the participants alongside the information sheet.  
However, the iterative process of ethnographic research brought me to sometimes unexpected 
people and sites of observation. Equally, the semi-structured interviews presented me, in some 
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cases, with unexpected sensitive topics that were not formulated in the consent forms and/or 
interview guide. I ensured nevertheless the principles of anonymity and confidentiality. 
Knowledge of the identity of the participants was limited to my own research team, contact 
details of the participants were stored on a password-protected computer and participant 
observation notes and interviews were anonymised to protect the privacy of participants. As 
the data itself can contain information that can lead to the identity of the participants, I have 
tried to avoid any reference or attribution that could expose the participant (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003). After completion of the PhD, the records will be destroyed to ensure they will not be 
deposited for new research. 
 
2.7 Some final personal methodological reflections 
It is important to reflect on how I, as a researcher, made choices and connections when tracing 
livestock antibiotics among sites, people and objects. Some sites were more ‘active’ than 
others, which produced variety in terms of the intensity and quality of the fieldwork (Marcus, 
1995, p. 100). Changing actor sites also meant that I had to immerse myself in complex fields 
with different interests and opposing claims. To stay committed to the object, I had to reflect 
continuously upon the life-worlds I entered and the claims that were made by the research 
participants to legitimate their reasoning or delegitimize others (Hine, 2007, p. 657). 
Thinking about my philosophical and theoretical position, I have approached the veterinary 
profession during my ethnography as an institution made up of human and non-human actors 
that contribute to AB infrastructures in practice, rather than as a culture made up of human 
behaviour. It was more important for me to study what particular actors (such as protocols, 
secretaries, colleagues, veterinary business models, farmers, and cows) co-produced AB actor-
networks. A reflection needs to be made as well about the type of veterinary clinics in which 
I performed my participant observation. Both veterinary clinics belonged to the same large 
veterinary corporate structure which owns several large veterinary practices across the UK. 
These corporate veterinary businesses buy veterinary clinics and standardise their brand and 
services. By belonging to a veterinary corporate structure, the veterinary clinics report that 
they are able to buy their medicines more cheaply and receive a higher mark up on the 
medicine when selling it to farmers. Veterinary clinics who do not belong to these veterinary 
corporate structures do not have this advantage, while at the same time having to compete 
against them. It would have expanded my research field if I had been able to do participant 
observation in a non-corporate veterinary practice, to examine how AB actor-networks were 
performed in their daily practices. Despite my best efforts, this did not come to pass.  
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One of the most difficult parts of conducting the ethnography was the recruitment of research 
participants. Throughout my fieldwork, I had many positive recruitment responses, but also 
many were negative. In particular, I was not able to recruit participants at UK government 
level. Although I approached these actors, they did not reply to my emails and reminder emails. 
Similarly, farmer, veterinary organisation, policymakers and veterinary practices equally did 
not respond to emails. Thinking about my recruitment techniques, I realise I limited my 
success by sticking to email recruitment. I did not feel confident in the beginning to chase or 
phone people, which limited my opportunities in getting positive responses. At the same time, 
I was relatively satisfied during the fieldwork with how the recruitment developed, as I was I 
finding myself busy all the time processing ethnographic data, examining literature and trying 
to build my story around the data. As the fieldwork year was not only a year of collecting data 
but learning a new methodology, my time was precious. This might have downplayed my 
motivation to collect more data. It was hard to step away from the research and see it as work, 
as the data kept coming in and I was intrigued with what I was presented. Nevertheless, I 
struggled sometimes with my ethnographic approach as it demanded flexibility in my thinking; 
having to switch between different people and settings. I was sometimes uncertain about how 
the research would develop and if it was going into the right direction.  
Another difficulty emerged during the writing up stage of my PhD. Although my ‘tracing’ 
methodology involves the exposure of actor-networks, I nevertheless had to ensure that my 
informants remained anonymous. At the same time, some of my informants wanted to know 
what content of the interviews I would use to publish. This resulted in some informants asking 
me to delete sensitive data, as the information could unwillingly expose their identity. I 
therefore had to adapt some of my research findings to protect the anonymity of my research 
informants. This shows how my research has been shaped by the actor-networks it tried to 
expose. 
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Table 2.1: List of people interviewed (not in chronological order). 
Interview list Respondent 
Livestock industry organisations • Livestock industry organisation 1 (Male, 50-65) 
• Livestock industry organisation 2 (Male, 40-55) 
• Livestock industry organisation 3 (Male, 50-65) 
• Livestock industry organisation 4 (Male, 50-65) 
•  
Dairy processors • Dairy processor 1 (Male, 35-50 
• Dairy processor 2 (Male, 35-50) 
•  
Retailer • Retailer 1  (Male, 50-65) 
• Retailer 2  (Male, 35-50) 
•  
Pharmaceutical companies • Pharmaceutical company 1 (Male, 50-65) 
• Pharmaceutical company 2 (Male 50-65) 
•  
Veterinary surgeons 
 
 
 
 
Veterinary practice 1 North West/Wales 
• Veterinary surgeon 1 /researcher university of Liverpool, North 
West/Wales (Male, age 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 2 North West/ Wales (Female 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 3 North West/Wales (Female Parnter, 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 4 North West/Wales (Male, Partner, 50-65) 
 
Veterinary practice 2 North West 
• Veterinary surgeon 5 North West (Male, 35-50) 
 
Veterinary practice: 3 North West 
• Veterinary surgeon 6 (Male, partner 50-65) 
• Veterinary surgeon 7(Male partner, 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 8(Male, partner 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 9(Male partner, 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 10(Male, 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 11(Male, 35-50) 
• Veterinary surgeon 12(Male, 25-35) 
• Veterinary surgeon 13(Male, 25-35) 
• Veterinary surgeon 14 (female, 25-35) 
• Veterinary surgeon 15 (Male, partner 50-65) 
 
Veterinary practice 4: South 
• Veterinary surgeon 16 (Male, partner 35-50) 
 
Veterinary surgeons University of Liverpool 
• Veterinary surgeon/researcher 17(Female, 25-35) 
• Veterinary surgeon/researcher 18 (Male, 25-35) 
• Veterinary surgeon/researcher 19 (Male 45-60) 
 
Veterinary consultants 
• Veterinary surgeon  20  (Male, age 35-45) 
• Veterinary surgeon  21  (Male, age 35-45) 
  
Farmers • Farmer 1 midlands (Male, 45-50) 
• Farmer 2 midlands (Male, 45-55) 
• Farmer 3 South (Male, 45-55) 
 
Retailer farmer meetings  Retailer-Farmer meeting Aberdeen 
Retailer-Farmer meeting Ardingly 
Retailer-Farmer  meeting Cannington 
Retailer-Farmer meeting Devon 
Retailer-Farmer meeting Lanarkshire 
Retailer-Farmer meeting Neston 
Retailer-Farmer meeting Nottingham 
Retailer-Famer meeting Preston 
Retailer-Farmer meeting Shropshire 
Retailer-Farmer meeting Usk 
 
 Retailer focus groups Retailer focus group 1  North West Derbyshire 
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• Farmer  (Male, 45-50) 
• Farmer  (Male, 45-55) 
• Farmer (Male, 50-65) 
• Farmer  (Female, 45-55) 
• Farmer  (Female, 45-5) 
 
Retailer focus group 2 North West Cheshire 
• Farmer  (Male, 45-50) 
• Herdsman  (Male, 25-35) 
• Farmer (Male, 50-65) 
• Farmer  (Female, 45-55) 
• Farmer  (Female, 50-65) 
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Chapter 3 
Comparing the historical risk governance of agricultural 
antibiotic use between the UK and Sweden 
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3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce how two different countries, the UK and Sweden, 
have come to formulate and regulate AB-use in agriculture since the 1950s. I have chosen the 
UK and Sweden to compare as the UK was the first country in the world that produced a 
scientific report on the public health risks of agricultural AB-use, and Sweden was the first 
country in the world that produced legislation on the growth promotor use of ABs. Sheila 
Jasanoff’s (2004, 2005) concepts of ‘co-production’ and ‘political cultures’ will be used to 
explore how both countries responded to controversies that emerged on the risks of AB-use in 
agriculture. It will be argued how both countries used different styles of scientific reasoning 
and justification, due to the different dynamics between policy, science and publics. This co-
produced different risk classifications and patterns of agricultural AB-use. 
The period in the UK between the 1950s-1990s can be characterised as a political culture 
governed by ‘expert committees’ (Jasanoff, 2005a, p. 102). The government maintained (and 
still does) a strong relationship with science and scientific expert committees in the governance 
of risks. These expert committees are presented as providing independent and impartial advice 
to the government on the basis of evidence and means that they enjoy a widely respected status 
of ‘character, experience and expertise’ through which they gained public credibility (Jasanoff 
1997, p. 228). The UK government uses these expert committees to settle scientific 
controversies and to act on behalf of the public under the imperative of public safety. Sweden 
on the other hand is not only characterised by State interventionism, but also by a ‘consensus-
oriented’ political culture, bridging State and private actors (Bostrom & Klintman, 2006). 
Scientific controversies are managed outside the traditional science-policy arena. Instead of 
identifiable scientific experts being used as the (only) powerful actors to formulate and steer 
risk policies, as in the UK’s expert committees, the Swedish agricultural decision-making 
process involved wider public participation (Saifi, 2004). This produced a more open approach 
towards the governance of the risks related to agricultural AB-use. 
The Chapter starts by exploring the agricultural contexts of both countries and how ABs as 
both therapeutics and economic tools emerged in relation to the modernisation of agriculture. 
With the goal of maximising food production, agriculture and its modern techniques were used 
as a means to improve both countries’ economic position in return for cheap and abundant 
food. As such, agricultural ABs in both countries became legitimised in a ´productivist´ 
framework. When scientific controversies about the economic use of antibiotics in livestock 
unsettled their use in the 1960s, the UK Swann expert committee was established in 1969. 
However, they presented inconclusive results on the public health risks of ABs used in food 
animals. This allowed the UK’s political culture to downplay the public health risks thus 
enabling their continued use until the end of the 1990s. By contrast, Sweden’s consensus-
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oriented political culture led several scientific and non-scientific discourses to enter the debate, 
which led to a different risk management of agricultural ABs. The discussion explores what 
can be learned from understanding the impact of a country’s political culture on risk policies 
and the implications of this for future policy on agricultural AB-use. 
The documents used for this Chapter involve primary and secondary sources between 1950-
1990 based on the following search terms: ‘The Swann Report’ ,’livestock antibiotics’, 
´antimicrobial growth promotors, ´antibiotic resistance’, ‘intensive farming’, ‘factory farms’ 
and ‘animal welfare´. Primary sources included European, UK and Swedish policy documents, 
UK newspaper articles of ‘The Daily Mail’ and ‘The Times’ and the UK veterinary journal 
‘Veterinary Record’. Secondary sources included scientific journals and books that discussed 
one or more of the former search terms. Following the methodology of a discourse analysis, 
attention was paid to what was said by whom in order to capture the co-producing effects of 
discourses and identities. This allowed an examination of how agricultural ABs in both 
countries became institutionalised through the interplay between scientific knowledges, expert 
committees, politics and public knowledges. 
 
3.2. 1940s-1950s: Post-war agriculture and antibiotics 
At the beginning of the 20th century, with just around 10% of the British population employed 
in the agricultural sector, agriculture in the UK was of little economic and public interest (Self 
& Storing, 1963). By contrast, Swedish society was characterized as agrarian, with two thirds 
of the Swedish population working in small family farms responsible for supplying the needs 
of local communities (Morell, 2011). Agricultural values were largely absent in the UK, while 
Sweden had a strong identification with nature. This differences in terms of the value of 
agriculture, influenced the way in which agricultural AB-use became problematized after the 
Second World War (Saifi & Drake, 2008). Europe experienced the benefits of industrialization 
which enabled agricultural economies to flourish. After years of food shortage, political goals 
were set, on the one hand, to maximise agricultural output for economic purposes and, on the 
other hand, to guarantee the general public an era of food security (Grant, 2005). The UK saw 
agriculture as a mechanism by which the national economy could be restored and its 
international trade position strengthened (Grant, 2005; Self & Storing, 1963). The Swedish 
government wanted to make its agricultural sector more rational and efficient, to transform its 
mostly rural society into a modern society (Flygare & Isacson, 2011; Martiin, 2015). The 
responsible agricultural government departments, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) in the UK and the Ministry of Agriculture in Sweden, became heavily involved 
with regulating agriculture during the 1950s-1970s (Murdoch & Ward, 1997; Saifi & Drake, 
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2008). To guarantee the stability of agricultural markets and agricultural prices, both countries 
set up agricultural price setting schemes that involved annual negotiations between state 
representatives and farmers to fix prices of agricultural products (Cox et al., 1986; Martiin, 
2015). In the UK, this was a decision-making process between the UK government and 
agricultural stakeholders. In Sweden, however, consumers were involved in the price setting 
schemes of agricultural products, which represented an important part of their post-war 
agricultural politics (Martiin 2015). Productivistic mentalities in both countries towards 
modern agriculture started to take shape between the 1950s-1970s: farms, farmers and their 
representatives all became part of the economic construction of the agricultural sector, in 
which the agricultural community became convinced that efficient and maximum food 
production could only be ensured when farming was industrialized (Murdoch & Ward, 1997; 
Saifi, 2004).  
 
The modernization of agriculture not only produced new relations between the government, 
farmer unions and society, but increased market opportunities for various scientific 
technologies that improved animal husbandry systems, including agricultural ABs. 
Agricultural ABs were introduced as therapeutics in both countries by the end of the 1940s to 
treat sick food animals (Kahn, 2016). In the beginning of the 1950s, it was discovered in the 
United States that when ABs were fed in low doses to food animals, these animals showed 
improved growth, food conversion ratios, and reproductive performance; so-called Antibiotic 
Growth Promotors (AGPs) (Soulsby, 2007). In the decade that followed, AB-use in food 
animals took on new purposes, quickly establishing them as standard, not only for the 
treatment of disease, but to prevent disease and as AGPs. The use of ABs as growth promoters 
acquired special attention as they could be used as economic tools to support livestock 
production systems (Kahn, 2016). In addition, as AGPs they did not require a veterinary 
prescription (Barton, 2000). Importantly, there was no European legislation at that time and 
each member state approved its own regulations about AGP use (Castanon, 2007). 
 
The Post War modern agricultural landscape, and its close relation with science as a means to 
industrialize agricultural husbandry, allowed for the stabilization of agricultural ABs as both 
therapeutic (including preventative use) and as economic tools in the use of animals in food 
production. The use of chemicals in agriculture was also seen by both countries as an 
opportunity to improve and expand animal husbandry systems (Grant, 2005; Martiin, 2015). 
This initially legitimated the uncontrolled use of agricultural ABs. Strong relations developed 
between agricultural ministries and farmer unions with a strong interest in managing the 
agricultural market-place together. However, the UK excluded public debates from the 
political scene, while Sweden made agricultural issues part of wider societal debates. 
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Importantly, the high value placed in Sweden on nature, combined with concerns about the 
impact of agricultural techniques on environmental and public health, raised its profile in 
Swedish political debates (Vail, Hasund, & Drake, 1994). Moreover, the public participation 
model of Sweden allowed these concerns to infiltrate scientific risk debates that concerned 
modern agriculture. The former differences in governmental models, consumer positions and 
public values regarding the governance of intensive farming influenced how both countries 
would receive the first scientific report on agricultural ABs and further problematize the issue. 
 
3.3 Controversies in the 1960s: The de-stabilisation of 
agricultural antibiotic-use 
3.3.1 The UK: agricultural antibiotic controversies and the role of ‘expert 
committees’ 
In the 1960s, after agricultural ABs were commonly used as economic and therapeutic tools, 
the first scientific evidence on resistant bacteria in food animals was reported (Randall 1969). 
At the same time, animal welfare concerns from consumers started to raise questions about 
modern agriculture (Food for the table – food for thought 1964). The UK’s political culture of 
establishing expert committees to settle discussions played an important role in how 
agricultural AB-use was to become framed and regulated. In the UK, the problematisation of 
intensive farming practices and ‘animal welfare’ at the beginning of the 1960s can be seen as 
one of the first ‘expert’ discourses in which AB-use was considered and ‘co-produced’ by 
science and the UK government. A key event in the UK at this time was the publication of 
animal welfare activist Ruth Harrison’s book ‘Animal Machines’ in 1964, in which she 
described the moral and ethical dimensions of intensive poultry and livestock farming. 
Intensive livestock farms became framed as ‘factory farms’, referring to the automated 
practices and detrimental livestock conditions. The book initiated extensive public debate and 
led to mass demonstrations in London that condemned the ‘cruel’ modern farming methods 
(Winter, 1964). However, the agricultural industry and farmer communities responded stating 
that Harrison presented an unfair picture of farming to the public (“Food for the table - food 
for thought,” 1964) The National Farmers Union (NFU) condemned the book as a ‘false 
picture of British agriculture’, and the Poultry and Egg Producers’ Association described its 
comments on intensive egg and poultry production as a ‘slur on production’ (Winter 1964). In 
the media, the response to Harrison’s condemnation of intensive farming practices was 
dismissed as ‘emotional reasoning’ (“Food for the table - food for thought,” 1964)  
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However, in 1965, in response to the public outcry on Harrison’s book, the government had to 
intervene to settle the controversies and to restore public trust in agricultural practices. They 
appointed an expert committee chaired by Professor Roger Brambell, who produced the 
‘Report of the Technical Committee to Enquire into the Welfare of Animals Kept Under 
Intensive Livestock Husbandry Systems’, which became known as ‘The Brambell Report’ 
(1965). Importantly, the UK’s political culture had a tendency to use scientific expert 
committees to explore matters ‘technically’. These expert committees enjoyed a widely 
respected status of ‘character, experience and expertise’ through which they gained public 
credibility (Jasanoff 1997, p. 228). The Brambell report concluded, surprisingly, that in the 
absence of scientific evidence to measure animal welfare, the ethical dimensions of animal’s 
feelings should be taken into account when making decisions on agricultural intensive systems 
(Brambell, 1965; Woods, 2012). However, the Brambell report (1965) also encouraged the 
‘progressive state’ of intensive agricultural systems and claimed that in relation to housing 
standards and the continuation of AB-use in livestock: ‘the effects are more likely to be 
beneficial than adverse’ (Brambell, 1965, p. 14). Although tensions between scientific and 
ethical perspectives on animal welfare still remain unresolved (Woods, 2012), the Brambell 
report supported the continuation of intensive livestock practices and within this the use of 
ABs (Brambell, 1965). 
At the same time, international scientists were reporting bacteria with drug resistance in both 
humans and animals and in the UK, questions were raised as to whether this could be related 
to the practice of AB feeding in farm animals. The matter had been examined before the 
publication of Brambell report by a joint expert committee under the chairmanship of Lord 
Netherthorpe in 1960 (Randall, 1969). Their report concluded in 1962 that the situation should 
be further explored, but reasserted there was no human health risk. The economic benefits of 
AGPs were re-emphasised and the committee advised continued feeding of AGPs to food 
animals (Randall, 1969). As such, the expert committees (Netherthorpe, Brambell), used by 
the UK government to settle public controversies, were in fact co-producing the continued 
legitimation of agricultural AB-use. 
In the years that followed, new scientific counterclaims on the relationship between drug 
resistance, food safety and AGP-use were made by vets (Anderson & Path, 1968; Smith, 
1968). Moreover, veterinary scientists Anderson and Path (1968) believed that intensive 
animal husbandry systems and practices provided opportunities for resistant bacteria to 
develop and spread, and they questioned the economic purpose of farm ABs. Public anxiety 
was also starting to rise about the effects of chemicals on health, such as DDT, insecticides 
and on ‘things that may find their way into our food’(“Rapid action on livestock antibiotics,” 
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1969). As a result, the economic purpose of farm ABs continued to be questioned or 
‘destabilised’ by competing scientific, political and public discourses. 
In response to these growing concerns another expert committee was established to address 
these scientific and public concerns   ̶  the Swann committee   ̶  who published their 
recommendations in the Swann Report in 1969. The remit of the committee was to discuss the 
control of AGPs (ABs distributed without veterinary prescription to serve economic purposes) 
and the control of therapeutic ABs (ABs needing veterinary prescription and which served 
medicinal purposes) (Randall, 1969). An area of particular interest for the Swann Committee 
(1969) was to identify AGPs which would be of economic benefit to the UK, but would not 
impact on the efficacy of therapeutic drugs for humans by developing AMR. The Swann report 
(1969) concluded that agricultural AB-use in general could pose a hazard to human and animal 
health as it could stimulate the development of resistant bacterial strains. However, it also 
recognised the economic importance of AGP-use. It advised AB-use in animals should not to 
be used as growth promotors and suggested further exploration and monitoring of the issue by 
setting up yet another independent scientific committee (which would not happen until the late 
1990s). 
Swann (1969) recommended that agricultural ABs should be divided into two risk categories: 
‘feed’ ABs (AGPs) that would be available without prescription and ‘therapeutic’ ABs that 
would only be available by veterinary prescription. The preventative use of ABs was 
considered less important. The shift in framing AGPs as ‘feed’ ABs can be seen as a tactical 
move; it downgraded the risk of AGPs into a ‘harmless’ food additive. The risk classification 
was supported by the veterinary community in the UK who believed it was the higher dosages 
of therapeutics that led to AMR and not the sub therapeutic dosages of AGPs (Kahn, 2016). 
In effect, the Swann report approved continuation of economic agricultural AB-use and co-
produced the use of farm ABs. The UK consumer was used to matters that concerned public 
safety being handed over to scientific expert committees who would inform the UK 
government (Jasanoff, 1997). Although several UK consumer organisations existed at that 
time, they were not unified and did not therefore act as a co-operative pressure-group in 
support of consumer interests (Tivey, 1968). The absence of a strong consumer movement 
limited the opportunity for consumers to participate in food policies. This is despite, the 
Chairman of the public group the ‘Farm and Food Society’ stating that: ‘there is now a 
mounting pile of evidence to show that "factory farming methods”, which over the last decade 
have made rapid advance with the full support of successive Governments and of the National 
Farmers Union (NFU) hold health hazards for the consumer’(“Better Farming or Self-
Betterment? ‘Factory’ Farming Under Attack,” 1970).  
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The UK government represented the interests of the consumers through the advice of expert 
committees, which kept issues related to food risks as a private dispute between policy actors 
and scientists (Jasanoff, 2005a; Phillips, 2003; Wales, Harvey, & Warde, 2006). Against this 
political culture of science-centred approaches towards food risks and lack of public 
engagement, the risk classification of agricultural ABs into feed and therapeutic ABs became 
established and the risks were diverted from the public radar.  
 
3.3.2 Sweden: the democratic formulation of the risks of agricultural antibiotic 
use 
Sweden’s strong environmental values and its political culture of consensus-oriented 
regulation of environmental and public health risks co-produced a different ‘space’ for the 
debate about agricultural ABs. During the 1960s   ̶  1970s, Sweden’s agricultural landscape 
underwent massive change (Saifi, 2004). As with the UK, the Swedish agricultural model was 
characterised by State interventionism to modernise agriculture (Flygare & Isacson, 2011). 
Although the Swedish public held the Swedish State ultimately responsible for a clean 
environment and a healthy society, environmental and agricultural policies were developed 
through democratic debate between science, State and consumers (Bostrom & Klintman, 2006; 
Vail et al., 1994). When scientific controversies about the environment and agricultural 
practices emerged, consumer organisations were invited to participate in discussions by 
policymakers. This resulted in policies that were agreed upon by scientific and non-scientific 
groups (Vail et al. 1994). 
When Rachel Carlson’s book Silent Spring was published in 1962 in Sweden, it led to public 
discussions about the environmental effects of modern agricultural practices (Flygare and 
Isacson 2011). Public concerns were raised about chemical use and toxic substances entering 
the environment that could lead to adverse effects (Vail et al., 1994). Swedish animal 
production had a long tradition of controlling infectious diseases in livestock (Wierup, 2001a), 
but vets were concerned that ABs were increasingly being used to cover up poor animal 
husbandry practices (Kahn, 2016). This prompted vets to question the dependency of Swedish 
agriculture on industrial techniques. After the publication of the Swann report, Swedish vets 
were one of the first groups to raise concerns about AGPs. Swedish farmers, who were 
dependent on the internal market, worried about the loss of trust by consumers in their products 
and also started to question the use of AGPs (Kahn, 2016). When scientific evidence was 
published raising questions about the growth-promoting effects of AGPs on calves in the early 
1970s, it led the calf and beef production industry to voluntarily end the use of AGP (Wierup, 
2001a). In a public letter, the Swedish Farmer Association (LRF) promised the restrictive and 
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careful use of ABs (Edqvist & Pedersen, 2002). Moreover, the LRF itself requested that the 
Swedish government ban the use of AGPs in food animals. The Swedish Board of Agriculture 
reassessed the case but drew similar conclusions to the recommendations in the Swann report 
and advised the continued use of AGPs. No consensus was reached between science, State, 
farmers and consumers on how to regulate AGPs and the controversies in Sweden on AGP-
use in food animals continued. To maintain the trust of consumers and to limit the development 
of resistant bacteria, farmers themselves proposed that ABs should only be used under 
veterinary control (Edqvist & Pedersen, 2002). 
In 1981, a series of newspaper articles in Dagens Nyheter (Daily News) reported that more 
than 30 tons of ABs were used in feed animals for growth promotion each year  (Cogliani et 
al., 2011). Swedish consumers were outraged and a consumer report in Sweden in 1984 
showed that consumer faith in meat had dropped significantly, which prompted farmers to 
produce food without the use of drugs (Cogliani et al., 2011). As scientific uncertainty 
continued, both consumer organisations and the LRF asked for mandatory policy measures to 
control the use of ABs (SOU, 1997). The Swedish consensus-oriented political culture took 
both scientific and public knowledges seriously resulting in the 1986 Feeding Stuff Act, which 
banned the use of AGPs in agriculture (SOU, 1997). Despite this, concerns about the 
regulation of preventative and therapeutic use of agricultural ABs in Sweden continued to 
grow and this further impacted on the risk classification and use of agricultural ABs (Grave et 
al., 2006). The Swann report in Sweden raised more concerns than it answered. While it 
resulted in further research, this reached similar conclusions to the Swann committee. As 
science in the political culture of Sweden fulfilled a democratic role instead of a determining 
role, the debate remained open and as such, the risks of economic and therapeutic use of 
agricultural ABs were constructed as a concerning societal issue. This was in contrast to the 
UK’s exclusive reliance on expert committees to inform and frame the risks about agricultural 
AB-use. The Swedish 1986 Feeding Stuff Act, which banned AGP-use in agriculture, made 
Sweden the first country to build an economically viable agricultural system without using 
ABs to compensate for poor management and low housing standards (Wierup, 2001a). 
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3.4 1970’s-1990’s: The re-stabilisation of agricultural antibiotic 
use  
3.4.1 The UK: re-classifying agricultural antibiotics as economic and 
therapeutic tools 
 
Following the publication of the Swann report in the UK, an article in the Financial Times 
responded with the message that ‘the case against antibiotic feeding has not been fully proved 
by any means. It could be said to be as much instinctive as factual’(Cherrington, 1969).The 
scientific uncertainties of the report became a focus of protests from farmers and the 
pharmaceutical industry in 1970 who feared the consequences of limited AB-use in food 
animals (Fishlock, 1970; Reeves, 1970). Farmers feared additional costs would be accrued 
were the recommendations to be implemented and protested that small providers would be 
forced out of business (Williams-Smith, 1970). Although many politicians supported the 
report, a House of Commons (1969) meeting discussed the danger of economic losses due to 
feed additive stocks, effects upon husbandry systems and the extra costs of food production. 
This only became more intensified by the growing influence of Europe.  
When the UK joined the EEC and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1975, it had to 
engage with Europe’s agricultural focus on maximum food production and food security, 
which further incentivised the intensification of animal husbandry systems (Grant, 2005). 
Europe followed Swann’s recommendations of dividing farm ABs into two categories: feed 
ABs and therapeutic ABs (Castanon, 2007). British policy makers did not set up an 
independent committee to explore the AGP issue further and when Margaret Thatcher came 
into power 1979, her deregulatory agricultural ambitions and disinterest in farming led to a 
dilution of the Swann Report’s recommendations (Edqvist & Pedersen, 2002). In the decades 
that followed, several scientists (Dutta & Devries, 1984; Levy, FitzGerald, & Macone, 1976; 
Linton, 1977; Threlfall, Rowe, & Ward, 1978) reported evidence of the transfer of multidrug 
resistant bacteria between humans and animals. However, in the absence of sufficient scientific 
evidence that the AGPs in use could pose a danger to animals, humans or the environment, 
they were allowed to be used (Castanon, 2007).  
The potential risks of therapeutic ABs used in food animals, raised in the Swann report, 
became largely ignored up until the 1990s (Barton, 2000). What becomes clear is that the 
political cultures of Europe and the UK treated the absence of conclusive evidence produced 
by expert committees on the link between the agricultural use of AGPs and AMR in humans 
as the absence of immediate risk. The media and consumers lost interest after Swann, which 
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kept further scientific scrutiny at a distance. It enabled at the same time for parts of the Swann’s 
report to become aligned with governmental economic interest and the productivist mentality 
of the agricultural lobby. The perceived absence of human health risks associated with AGPs 
resulted in a re-stabilisation of ABs in Europe and the UK turning them into economic and 
therapeutic tools. The debate was effectively silenced until 1990s (Edqvist & Pederson, 2002). 
 
3.4.2 Sweden: re-classifying agricultural antibiotics as therapeutics only 
Pushed by a strong environmental lobby, Swedish policymakers developed new goals during 
the 1980s to limit the environmental impact of mainstream agriculture, to stimulate local food 
production and to support organic farming (Flygare & Isacson, 2011). Concerns were not 
restricted to politicians, farmers and consumers anymore, but were echoed as well by public 
discourses on animal welfare during the 1980s (Vail et al., 1994). Moreover, the Swedish 
writer Ann Lindgren, well known for the creation of ‘Pippi Longstocking’, published a series 
of satirical stories on farm animals in leading newspapers, fuelling the animal welfare debate 
in Sweden (Lohr, 1988). A new Animal Welfare Act was passed in 1988 which was aimed at 
preventing animal diseases through high production standards on farms: Sweden was the first 
country in the world in which farm animals received rights (Ministery of Agriculture Food and 
Fisheries Sweden, 1998). As earlier discussed, the UK government framed the animal welfare 
debate as a technical debate, which led to some technical modifications to improve housing 
systems but animal husbandry systems continued to be intensified (Woods, 2012). The animal 
welfare debate in Sweden however was not silenced or dominated by science; it became a 
topic that involved a wide range of both technical and ethical discussions that questioned 
animal husbandry systems and their production techniques (SOU, 1997). In contrast to the 
UK, animal welfare established itself as an important pillar in agricultural debates and pushed 
farmers and vets to adjust their practices in favour of animal welfare (LRF, 2016). After the 
ban of AGPs in 1986, agricultural ABs became classified as therapeutic veterinary medicines 
only and had to be dispensed through pharmacies, supplied by drug wholesalers or 
manufacturers (Wierup, 2001a).Vets were not permitted to own a pharmacy or sell medicines 
for profit (Wierup, 2001a). The ban of AGP-use, concerns about AMR, therapeutic agricultural 
AB-use prescribed by vets only, the new focus by the public on agricultural sustainability and 
the flaws of animal husbandry systems resulted in Swedish farmers searching for alternatives. 
For farmers to produce both economically and ecologically responsible products without the 
use of ABs, investments in animal environment and management became essential (Ministry 
of Agriculture Food and Fisheries Sweden, 1998). 
In the years that followed, actions were not only taken to limit the public health risks from 
feed ABs, but also to abolish prophylactic use and limit therapeutic uses of farm ABs. In 
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addition, the Swedish National Veterinary Institute (NVI) started to collect scientific facts and 
statistics on antimicrobial use in farm animals during the 1980’s (SVARM 2000). The NVI 
wanted to know how and to what extent antimicrobials were used in livestock animals order 
to analyse trends in resistance. This analysis was however limited at that time by the fact that 
the amounts used could not be directly assigned yet to specific species of animals (SVARM 
2000).  The NVI furthermore undertook ‘problem-orientated’ research to limit further AB-use 
(Cogliani et al., 2011; Ministery of Agriculture Food and Fisheries Sweden, 1998). The 
Swedish approach to controlling infectious diseases in livestock led to the incorporation of 
preventive methods such as improved biosecurity, improved housing, more use of vaccines 
and vector control, better diagnostics including testing for sensitivity to antimicrobials 
(Wierup, 2001a). These measures, together with more effective use of ABs, lowered 
agricultural AB-use significantly in the decades that followed. 
Swedish consensus-oriented policy culture framed the risks of agricultural ABs differently 
within a wider debate on the future intensive animal husbandry systems. As Sweden’s political 
culture was characterised by consensus through a clear separation of interests, it did not solely 
rely on scientists to inform their decision-making process (Asdal & Gradmann, 2014). The 
scientific uncertainty on the risks of AGPs and AB-use in general forced Sweden to explore 
the topic further and eventually ban AGPs and restrict AB-use to avoid potential public health 
risks. Societal pressure on different fronts, such as consumer pressure, farmer concerns, animal 
welfare, sustainability discourses, contributed to the scientific governance of agricultural AB-
use (Edqvist & Pedersen, 2002). 
 
3.5 1990s: Consumer power, new scientific evidence, and 
European decision-making 
During the late 1980s-1990s, environmental and agricultural sustainability discourses emerged 
that created more public awareness of food safety and food quality in Europe (Grant, 2005). 
The BSE crisis in the UK during the 1980s-1990s proved to be a critical event as the UK public 
lost trust in expert authorities and blamed UK authorities for ‘not being transparent and 
accountable’(Jasanoff, 2005a, p. 111). The public demanded that agricultural decision-making 
was made more accessible ‘beyond the farming unions and agricultural officials’ (Phillips, 
2003, p. 24). The UK political culture started to experience a shift in the 1990s towards a style 
of governance which included public discussions and political transparency on risks posed by 
science and its technologies (Irwin, 2006). At the same time, new evidence of vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (VRE) in human hospitals and in livestock farms during the early 1990s 
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raised international concerns (Klare et al., 1999). It was suggested that the long term use of 
avoparcin as growth promotor had resulted in selection of VRE in these animals, which was 
transferred to humans via the food chain (Klare et al., 1999). Subsequently, attention was 
raised on the possible transfer of AB-resistant bacteria from the food chain to the human 
population (Barton 2000). Growth promotor use in animals became widely discussed as further 
research found antibiotic resistance in other animal and human enteric bacteria, such as 
Campylobacter, E. coli, enterococci and Salmonella Typhimurium DT104 (Barton, 2000).  
Nevertheless, when Sweden entered the European Union in 1995, the European Union initially 
asked Sweden to provide scientific underpinnings that supported their ban in growth promotor 
use (Wierup, 2001a). But other Nordic countries and Denmark started to ban avoparcine and 
other growth promotors as well in 1995. Further scientific uncertainty on the issue and 
consumer and political concerns of the Copenhagen recommendations of 1998 to the 
‘Precautionary Principle’ on growth promotor use in agriculture, banning growth promotors 
such as tylosin, spiramycin, virginiamycin, and bacitracine (Casewell et.al 2003). The 
economic properties of AGPs which had made them so popular became a weapon used against 
them. AGP’s were ‘misused’ and ‘overused’ because of their economic properties.  
Concerns about the ‘misuse and overuse’ of livestock AB-use as public health risk started to 
enter political and public debates. The WHO (1997, p.17) recommended  to review national 
practices of prudent use of antimicrobials in animals with a focus on surveillance, enforcement 
programmes, education strategies, and prescription and use. More scientific committees, both 
in Europe and the UK, were set up by the end of the 1990s to further evaluate AB-use and 
AMR both in humans and animals (Barton, 2000). The EU started to phase out AGP-use, 
leading to a complete ban of AGP’s in 2006 (Soulsby, 2007). However, the prophylactic and 
therapeutic agricultural AB would continue to remain largely unregulated at European and in 
the UK for the decade that followed. 
This is in contrast with Sweden, who banned prophylactic use and implemented strategies to 
further reduce therapeutic use. In line with Sweden’s political culture, AB strategies, 
antimicrobial guidelines, biosecurity, disease-control programmes, and optimised 
management and husbandry are continuously negotiated between the different parties (EMA, 
2016). The Swedish government set up mandatory evaluation of farm building plans, and 
developed mandatory and voluntary disease control programmes which have economic 
incentives for the farmer. The latest European Medicine Agency Report (2016) on AB sales 
for food-producing animals in 2013 showed that the population-corrected unit (PCU) sales in 
tonnes of active ingredient was 422 tonnes in the United Kingdom compared to 10 tonnes in 
Sweden. Differences in epidemiological profiles between countries of bacteria and AMR in 
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humans and animals have been identified as well the in latest public health reports of both the 
UK and Sweden (Public Health England, 2014; Swedres-Svarm, 2015).  
3.6 Discussion 
This Chapter has discussed how the political cultures of the UK and Sweden mattered in the 
governance of livestock AB-use as public health risk. How both countries used science to 
inform debates has been central in order to examine how this shaped natural and social orders 
of livestock AB-use and AMR as public problem. As discussed, the UK’s political culture 
heavily relied on scientific experts to inform livestock AB debates, steering ‘evidence-based’ 
policies. But building interventions upon a frame that is solely informed by scientific experts 
poses however two problems. First, science in itself does not hold an overarching truth about 
the problem it tries to describe and capture (Latour, 2005). When science tries to organise a 
problem, it inevitably ignores other types of lay knowledges (Jasanoff, 2016). However, 
scientific knowledge is just one representation of a problem amongst many other possible 
states of knowledges. This becomes clear in the Swedish case, as they incorporated consumers, 
vets and farmers aside science to inform the debate. By bringing in competing risk 
interpretations instead of avoiding them, this allowed for a reflexive and open examination of 
the presented scientific evidence itself (Wynne, 1992). Sweden embraced as such the 
complexity of the problem, addressing the environmental, animal welfare, and public concerns 
as a whole.  
At the same time, this Chapter has shown how the production of scientific knowledge and its 
applications are far from an objective process. In the UK, science has played an ambiguous 
role in the governance of livestock ABs. Although veterinary scientists initially questioned the 
legitimacy of using livestockfarm ABs as AGPs, the immediate risks of both AGPs and 
therapeutic ABs were downplayed by scientific expert committees (Brambell, Netherthorpe 
and Swann) and the UK government, resulting in the continuation of their use. Within this 
political system in which consumers accepted the privileging of science over beliefs, advice 
from expert committees on farm ABs became constructed as ‘matters of fact’ instead of sites 
of controversy (Latour, 1987). Hence, the UK government, experts and consumers did not act 
in isolation; they co-produced the silent UK consumer. This enabled continuation of both 
economic and therapeutic use of agricultural ABs up until the late 1990s, when national food 
crises constructed a new type of consumer and institutional reform. 
In contrast, in Sweden’s consensus-oriented political culture, the Swedish political culture 
proved to be reflective and pragmatic in its interpretation and use of scientific evidence. 
Scientific evidence was negotiated before risk policies were established. Absence of 
conclusive scientific evidence was seen in Sweden as a possibility of risk and the use of 
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agricultural ABs for economic purposes in food animals became a serious issue. A consensus-
oriented debate between scientific knowledges and non-scientific knowledges on agricultural 
AB-use and intensive farming enabled a broader scope of what was at stake and what needed 
to be done. With the Swedish economy being dependent upon their internal market, the will 
of consumers ‘co-produced’ how science became interpreted. With agricultural markets 
reflecting upon what was necessary to maintain consumer trust, State interventionism was 
accepted and agricultural AB legislation collectively decided upon. This pushed the 
agricultural industry to restrict their therapeutic AB-use and to adopt new innovative 
techniques. This not only resulted in Sweden being today one of the lowest users of livestock 
AB-use across Europe, but having at the same time high quality animal husbandry and welfare 
standards. 
The following Chapter will continue to explore how UK’s political culture responded from the 
late 1990s onwards to the global problematisation of the ‘misuse and overuse’ of livestock 
AB-use. How livestock AB-use was made to matter, by whom, and what was at stake will be 
the core interests of the Chapter. 
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Antibiotic use in the UK’s livestock industry as ‘matter of 
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4.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter discussed how the UK´s technocratic political culture used scientific 
expert committees in the 1950s and 1960s to examine the risks involved with livestock AB-
use. It showed how scientific evidence on ‘the misuse and overuse’ of livestock ABs as ‘matter 
of public health concern’ was reduced, simplified and manipulated to fit both political and 
agricultural agendas. This Chapter continues to explore from the 1990s onwards how national 
and international risk narratives on livestock AB-use resulted in today’s voluntary industry-
led approach in the UK. Previous attempts to introduce industry led approaches failed to unite 
experts, governmental policymakers, and agricultural industries. This changed when the UK 
established the ‘Review on Antimicrobial Resistance’, chaired by Lord Jim O’Neill in 2014, 
to evaluate the global economic and social impact of AMR. The 2015 O’Neill report openly 
accused livestock industries across the world of the ‘misuse and overuse’ of ABs. The Review 
proposed global and national AB reduction targets in livestock industries to immediately 
reduce AB-use. But without legal power, the O’Neill comittee first had to make livestock AB-
use into a ‘matter of concern’ to UK governmental and agricultural policymakers.  
 
Callon’s ‘sociology of translation’ will be used to expose the workings of the UK’s political 
culture. According to Callon (1986), in order for scientists to create scientific authority, they 
need to ‘enrol’ participants or ‘allies’ to turn resistance on a topic of concern into desirable 
futures. As an example, Callon (1986) used the preservation of scallops as an example of the 
way in which French scientists and fisherman in Saint Brieux, France came together, despite 
different interests, scientific and commercial, in the problem-solution ‘how and if scallops 
anchored themselves in their early lives’. He reveals how actors who were previously 
unconnected can reconcile around a ‘matter of concern’ by sharing the same problem-solution 
definition or Obligatory Passage Point (OPP). The OPP reflects the way in which the different 
actors converge on the formulation of the issue at the same time as keeping their own interests 
in mind. In Callon’s study, the OPP was formulated in such a way that the scientists could gain 
professional recognition while fisherman could increase their harvests (Callon, 1986). This 
first phase of translation is called problematisation, during which the recruiting actors try to 
make themselves indispensable by identifying allies and design an action program or OPP. 
Through the interessment phase, which often involves texts and documents, the recruiting 
actors try to lock the recruited into place within the roles they have defined for them (Callon, 
1986). In the enrolment phase, identities, goals, motivations, interests and more are negotiated. 
If successful, the recruited actors judge that their defined roles are better than other available 
options. They are now reconciled in an ‘alliance’. Mobilisation is the final phase, during which 
the spokespeople who enrolled in the alliance start speaking for the many they represent 
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(Callon, 1986).  
 
Importantly, only a successful cascade will allow the continuation of the alliance, not the other 
way around (Callon, 1986, p. 15). The alliance may at the same time at any moment fall apart, 
as enrolled actors may resist the roles and definitions they get attributed. The sociology of 
translation explores, as such, the dynamics of power and settlement during ‘knowledge-in-the-
making’ around a topic of concern. It can be used in practice to evaluate how a controversy is 
settled into a matter of concern by bringing opponents together that share interests by aligning 
with the OPP. I will use the sociology of translation (1986) in this chapter to study how 
livestock AB-use as ‘matter of concern’ brought economic experts, governmental and 
agricultural policymakers together and resulted in UK’s industry-led approach. I will discuss 
how different interests have been consolidated in the pursuit of a common goal of responsible 
AB-use. This process co-produced the emergence of the UK’s agricultural organisation 
RUMA from the 1990s as the agricultural AMR policy lead. As will become clear, RUMA 
was made into an anti-political organisation to serve political and agricultural purposes. But 
policy frames have intended and unintended effects. Callon (1998) has defined this as the 
‘overflows’ of frames. These overflows destabilise the standardisation of responsible 
medicine-use and can re-politicize livestock AB-use. The chapter will close with a discussion 
of the overflows of the UK’s technocratic policy frame of responsible AB-use.  
 
4.2 Initial failures to establish livestock antibiotic-use as ‘matter 
of concern’ across sites 
Although the UK Swann report (1969) concluded that livestock AB-use could pose a hazard 
to human and animal health, stimulating the development of resistant bacterial strains, the 
report failed to unite different interest groups to monitor the issue more closely in the decades 
that followed. In the 1990s, AB-use in both human and animal health became globally 
politicised with new evidence of AMR across species levels (European Union, 1998; WHO, 
1997). The WHO published, in 1998, a report which argued that antimicrobials used for any 
condition adds to the selective pressure of micro-organisms to develop resistance.  
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“The wide and increasing use of antimicrobial agents in humans and animals, and 
in agriculture has exerted intense pressure for microorganisms to develop resistance 
which is rapidly becoming a leading cause of concern for public health.” (WHO, 
1998, p.3) 
 
The WHO report (1998, p.3) stated that trust in the ‘healing power’ of antimicrobials by both 
professionals and patients had resulted in the ‘overuse and misuse’ of ABs in humans and 
animals. Most importantly, the ‘overuse and misuse’ of ABs in humans and animals was 
framed as the main risk to the emergence of AMR. A causal claim was made between AB 
‘behaviour’ and the development of AMR. The WHO (1998) urged countries to focus their 
risk interventions on three main pillars  
 
• AB surveillance strategies;  
• ‘Prudent’ use through ‘behavioural’ interventions;  
• Research: 
o  New ABs/alternatives 
o  The cost implications of resistance and of its detection  
 
4.2.1 UK 2000 AMR action plan: de-politicising antibiotic ‘overuse and misuse’ 
In 1998, the UK House of Lords published the ‘Path of Least Resistance’ report to inform the 
UK’s upcoming national action plan. The report stated that the use of ABs in animals had 
‘profound influence’ on AMR development in human pathogens (Standing Medical Advisory 
Committee Sub-Group on Antimicrobial Resistance, 1998, p. 11). In 2000, the UK 
government published its first ‘Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy and Action Plan’ taking into 
consideration the recommendations of the Standing Medical Advisory Committee (SMAC), 
the recommendations of the WHO, and those of the European Conference on ‘The Microbial 
Threat’ in Copenhagen September 1998 (Department of Health, 2000, p. 6). The overarching 
two policy pillars of the Government’s strategy were (Department of Health, 2000, p. 4):  
 
• To minimise the morbidity and mortality due to antimicrobial resistant infection 
• To maintain the effectiveness of antimicrobial agents in the treatment and prevention 
of microbial infections in man and animals. 
 
It involved the following ´methods of science´, outlined in Figure 4.1, to ‘control’ livestock 
AB-use.  
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Fig. 4.1: Strategies to achieve prudent use in UK’s 2000 Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy and 
Action Plan  
 
The AB surveillance data was directed at monitoring progress (Department of Health 2000, 
p.6); surveillance mechanisms became constructed as trustworthy technologies that enabled 
the governance of irresponsible AB behaviour. The surveillance data would not only improve 
data and information available on antimicrobial resistant organisms and illness to monitor 
trends but also inform veterinary and animal husbandry practice (Department of Health, 2000, 
p. 8). It would furthermore support optimal prescribing policies and practice and relate data 
on patterns of use and antimicrobial resistance. Finally, the data had to improve the correlation 
of data on patterns of AB-use, antimicrobial resistant organisms and clinical problems due to 
them, in animals and man (Department of Health, 2000, p. 8).  
Since 1998, AB data surveillance has been the responsibility of the Veterinary Medicines 
Directorate (VMD). The surveillance data was initially provided on a voluntary basis by the 
veterinary pharmaceutical companies from 1998-2004, but from 2005, this became a statutory 
requirement in accordance with the Directive 2001/82 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6th November 2001 on the community code relating to veterinary medicinal 
products (VMD, 2007, p. 9). This resulted in the publication of annual reports of the VMD 
(UK-VARSS reports) that provide insights on annual veterinary sales in the UK. 
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To promote optimal prescribing in animals, the VMD was made responsible for providing 
professional education and encouraged the production of prescribing guidelines, together with 
the British Veterinary Association (BVA), National Farmer Union (NFU) and the National 
Office of Animal Health (NOAH)3 with the cross-sector lobby group RUMA under NOAH’s 
umbrella. NOAH had established RUMA in 1997 to promote ‘the highest standards of food 
safety, animal health and animal welfare in the British livestock industry’ (RUMA, n.d.). 
RUMA members represented interests in agriculture, veterinary practice, the animal medicines 
industry, farm assurance, training, retailers, consumers and animal welfare. Although RUMA 
was established by the industry to provide public accountability of prudent use practices in 
agriculture, some industry members argued that RUMA’s role was the result of agricultural 
industry members wanting to maintain control over AB-use.  
 
“If you were being unkind, I heard people sort of saying that, you know, they were basically 
an organisation designed to maintain largely the status quo. Do the – say the right thing, but 
continue on as planned.” (Veterinary surgeon 20)  
 
As will become clear in the following paragraphs, RUMA’s role would be co-constructed over 
the years with the developing AMR issues and concerns around livestock AB-use and 
changing policy frameworks. But, with RUMA´s limited role at the time and a lack of 
commitment by the agricultural sectors, there was a failure to translate policies for prudent 
AB-use across livestock industries into action.   
 
“There has always been a lack of belief within the livestock sector that antimicrobial use in 
animals is a significant factor in resistance in humans and that meant that people were, in 
essence, standing back, and saying well, “it’s not us gov, we don’t really need to change.” 
(Respondent Livestock industry organisation 1) 
 
To reduce unnecessary and inappropriate use of ABs for non-therapeutic use in animals in the 
years to come, the VMD would (and still) review appropriate usage, in light of the advice from 
the then Advisory Committee on the Microbial Safety of Food (ACMSF) and the Veterinary 
Products Committee, and EU decisions (Department of Health, 2000, p. 16). To further support 
the regulatory framework to improve optimal antimicrobial prescribing, the VMD would 
critically assess products at the time of renewal of marketing authorisations to ensure product 
 
3 NOAH was established in 1986 to replace the Animal Health Register of the Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry, which dates back to 1955. NOAH represents the companies that research, 
develop, manufacture and market licensed animal medicine in the UK.  The aim of NOAH is to promote 
the benefits of safe, effective, quality medicines for the health and welfare of all animals. 
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characteristic summaries were correct. In addition, the VMD would follow up recent advances 
in pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic data to update antimicrobial dose rates and 
strategies for authorised and new antimicrobials (Department of Health, 2000, p. 17).  
However, these ‘methods of science’ focused mainly on measuring veterinary sales and 
educating AB-users, rather than addressing the structural problems of the UK livestock 
industries that resulted in AB dependency. The VMD published veterinary AB sales data 
between 2002-2012 (UK-VARSS, 2013; VMD, 2008) remained largely the same over the 
decade that followed. Table 4.1 shows the veterinary sales of ABs in the UK in the context of 
the livestock population, presented in sales of total antimicrobial therapeutic products by 
chemical grouping (tonnes active ingredient) 2002-2012.  
 
Table 4.1: The UK’s veterinary sales in tonnes of  active ingredient of total antibiotic products 
by chemical grouping between 2004-2012 for Food and Non-Food Animals 
Product  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Tetracyclines 243 240 192 174 174 177 200 110 187 
Trimethoprims/ 
Sulphonamides 
77 74 71 73 70 73 75 72 65 
B-Lactams 63 60 70 72 69 76 93 86 82 
Aminoglycosides 22 20 21 20 18 19 22 19 20 
Macrolides 39 37 36 33 35 39 35 37 41 
Fluoroquinoles 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Other 11 12 13 14 15 16 20 20 12 
Total 454 446 405 387 384 402 447 346 409 
 
Note: Adapted from UK-VARSS, 2013; VMD, 2008 
 
4.2.2 The impact of international organisations and risk narratives 
During the first decade of the 21th century, antimicrobial use and AMR in human and animal 
health remained a concern on international agendas (ECDC, 2009; FAO, OIE, & WHO, 2008; 
WHO, 2001). The WHO recommended six main interventions in 2001 to specifically address 
the use of antimicrobials in food-producing animals (WHO, 2001, p. 37): 1. the requirement 
for obligatory prescriptions for all antimicrobials used for disease control in food animals; 2. 
phasing out of the use of antimicrobial growth promotors if they were also used for treatment 
of humans; 3. creation of national systems to monitor antimicrobial usage in food animals; 4. 
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introduction of pre-licensing safety evaluation of antimicrobials with consideration of 
potential resistance to human drugs; 5. monitoring of resistance; 6. development of guidelines 
for vets to reduce overuse and misuse of antimicrobials in food animals. Europe became in 
2006 the first continent to ban the use of AB growth promotors in animal feed. Furthermore, 
the European Medicines Agency4 (EMA) launched, in September 2009, ‘The European 
Surveillance of Veterinary Antimicrobial Consumption’ project (ESVAC). This project has 
the main responsibility to collect and report, in a harmonised manner, sales of veterinary 
antimicrobial agents in animals from member states to assess veterinary prescribing patterns 
over time (EMA, 2011). The first ESVAC report was published in 2011, in which eight 
European countries had provided veterinary sales surveillance data for 2005-2009 (EMA, 
2011). The report showed how veterinary sales surveillance data across the eight countries, 
estimated in PCU5 (in 1000 tonnes) of the animal population only decreased by 3.1 % (See 
Table. 4.2). Other major findings of the report were the substantial differences in veterinary 
prescribing of antimicrobials between countries and differences in sales (EMA, 2011, p. 6). 
 
Table 4.2: Estimated PCU (in 1,000 tonnes) of the population of food-producing species by 
European country for the years 2005-2009. 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic  888 887 875 840 771 
Denmark 2443 2543 2537 2523 2447 
Finland 562 558 554 541 524 
France 7801 7666 7789 7707 7539 
Netherlands 3170 3214 3288 3133 3109 
Norway 436 437 429 438 440 
Sweden 837 828 819 819 825 
Switzerland - 729 731 734 743 
United Kingdom 6142 6190 6202 6018 5925 
Total 22280 23052 23224 22754 22322 
Note: Adapted from the first ESVAC report from the European Medicines Agency (2011)  
 
 
4 The European Medicines Agency is a decentralised body of the European Union responsible for the 
evaluating and supervision of medicines for human and veterinary use. 
5 PCU is the measurement standard set by the ESVAC (European Surveillance of Veterinary 
Antimicrobial Consumption). The calculation standard estimates the weight of the animal (or group) 
at the time of receiving an antibiotic. The unit is now used across EU Member States and is an 
approximation of consumption, extrapolated from sales data (VMD 2018).  
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With the burden of infections increasing due to multi-drug resistant bacteria in humans across 
Europe, AMR turned into a even higher-profile problem from 2011 onwards (WHO 2011). In 
2011, theWHO made AMR the main theme of its annual ‘World Health Day’ with the slogan 
‘Antimicrobial resistance: no action today, no cure tomorrow’. WHO Director-General 
Margaret Chan (2011) argued that: ‘the world is on the brink of losing miracle cures’ and ‘the 
world is heading towards a post-antibiotic era, in which many common infections will no 
longer have a cure and, once again, kill unabated’ (WHO 2011). Building on the momentum, 
the WHO regional office for Europe published a report in June 2011 which urged for a 
European action plan on antibiotic resistance. In this report, the WHO stated that:  
 
…the use, but especially the overuse, misuse and underuse, of antimicrobial agents 
often leads to the adaptation of micro-organisms through mutation, genetic 
recombination and selection, so that resistant strains may become the predominant 
organism in the community, health care settings or the environment’ (WHO, 2011, p. 
6). 
 
In 2011, the WHO published its ‘European strategic action plan’, which recognised AMR as 
a ‘global health concern’ (p. 2) and was adopted by Member States of the WHO European 
Region in September 2011. It promoted the development of comprehensive national action 
plans and the establishment of multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary coordination mechanisms. 
To the food animal industry, in particular, it recommended the strengthening of its surveillance 
of AB-use to monitor progress and continue with ‘prudent use’ interventions to reduce the 
overuse and misuse of livestock ABs.  
 
4.2.3 UK 5 Year Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Strategy 2013-2018 
In response to rising international concerns, in her annual report of 2011 Dame Sally Davies, 
the UK Chief Medical Officer, urged the UK government to take action and amend existing 
strategies (Davies, 2011). She framed antimicrobial stewardship, evidence-based 
antimicrobial guidelines, use of relevant diagnostics and controlling prescribing for HP-CIAs 
as key components of the UK’s national strategy. Importantly, she not only framed solutions 
in terms of changing human behaviour, but also argued that the main risk for AMR is human-
use rather than animal-use. In response to the CMO and the WHO, the UK Department of 
Health (DH) and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) re-evaluated 
the 2000 Action Plan and published the UK 5 Year Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Strategy 
2013-2018, focusing on the following 3 strategic aims (2013, p.7): 
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• Improve the knowledge and understanding of AMR 
• Conserve and steward the effectiveness of existing treatment 
• Stimulate the development of new ABs, diagnostics and novel therapies 
 
These aims were underpinned by 7 areas for future action as shown in Figure 4.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2: Areas of action in the UK 5 Year Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Strategy 2013-2018 
 
Emphasis in the livestock and veterinary sector continued to focus on data collection, but the 
rhetoric in the UK’s AMR action plan of 2013-2018 moved from ‘prudent use’ to ‘responsible 
prescribing’ (Figure 4.3). This located responsible AB-use on vets and farmers (UK 
Department of Health, 2013, p. 30). 
 
 
Fig. 4.3: Responsible antibiotic use in the UK 5 Year Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Strategy 
2013-2018 
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The action plan furthermore identified the need for research on the drivers of veterinary 
prescribing practices as central to minimising the pressures that influenced veterinary 
prescribing habits (UK Department of Health 2013, p.19). 
While the livestock industries continued to be largely responsible for the governance of 
responsible AB-use, the relationship between sales of livestock ABs and the prescribing of the 
drugs came under scrutiny. At the heart of this decoupling was the possibility that vets might 
lose their right to dispense antimicrobials with obvious economic consequences. Supported by 
NOAH, the BVA claimed ‘the UK veterinary profession must win the fight to prevent 
decoupling’ (Vet Times, 2013). BVA President Peter Jones commented that the threat of 
decoupling was ‘all part of the hysteria of the Scandinavians, notably the Danes, driven by a 
cadre of people in the authorities there, many of whom are ex-World Health Organisation 
(WHO)’ (Vet Times, 2013). However, decoupling was not only a concern for the UK 
veterinary community; it was a concern to the livestock industry as a whole. Decoupling would 
mean farmers would no longer be able to keep ABs on their farms. Tackling AB dispensing 
from veterinary practices to farmers could destabilise the economic interests involved with AB 
sales and AB-use.  
To remain in control of AB regulation, the agricultural industry appointed RUMA in 2013 as 
their AMR lead to design AMR policies and communicate evidence of action to policymakers 
and the public (RUMA Chairman Gwyn Jones, 2018). RUMA assumed a mediating role 
between different publics; representing the ‘voice’ of the industry to policymakers and the 
media, while maintaining the trust of the livestock industries they represented. Taking up their 
new role, RUMA produced a livestock antimicrobial action plan and reformulated ‘best 
practice’ antimicrobial guidelines. Updates of these actions were regularly communicated to 
policymakers and the media. This showed that the industry were accepting their responsibility 
for reducing ABs. It moreover safeguarded the industry’ control over ABs and diverted 
attention from regulatory interventions and threats of decoupling. RUMA acted as a 
spokesperson for the entire industry and was trusted in its role by policymakers and livestock 
industries. However, the respondent in the following quote questions RUMA’s claimed 
position in guiding the industry towards responsible use:  
 
“There was a question at the RUMA conference two years ago, about who is leading on AMR 
issues for the livestock sector” (Respondent Livestock industry organisation 1) 
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In the next section I examine how livestock AB-use was framed as a matter of concern by the 
O’Neill expert committee. 
 
4.3 The O’Neill expert committee: making livestock antibiotic use 
into a matter of concern  
4.3.1 O’Neill report 2015: The problematisation of livestock antibiotic use  
In 2014, the UK government established the ‘Review of Antimicrobial Resistance’, chaired 
by Lord Jim O’Neill. At that time, the UK showed ambition to become a world leader in the 
governance of AMR (RUMA Chairman Gwyn Jones, 2018).The ‘O’Neill committee’ was set 
up to engage with various international stakeholders to assess the risks of AMR from an 
economic and social perspective. With a ‘blank sheet of paper and open minds’ (O’Neill 2014, 
p. 2), the committee published 7 reports during 2014-2016. The creation of the committee 
chaired by O’Neill reflected the trust placed in expert committees in the UK to settle scientific 
controversies through the application of independent, objective evidence on behalf of the 
public under the imperative of public safety (Jasanoff, 2005a). But as will become clear, these 
economic experts are restricted to their own economic fields of expertise (Barry, 2002), 
selecting which uncertainties of the problem receive priority, while leaving others unexplored. 
Moreover, different interests involved with the O’Neill reports steered how their scientific 
evidence ended up being used in further policies. 
 
The Review’s 4th report published in 2015 titled ‘Unnecessary Antimicrobial Use and Waste 
in Agriculture’ challenged worldwide antimicrobial livestock practices (O’Neill, 2015). It 
argued that 70% of ABs are in the USA are consumed by animals while 30% consumed by 
humans, raising concerns on the quantities of ABs used in food producing animals. In order 
to evaluate the excessive use as a problem for human health, the report conducted a literature 
review to explore existing literature. They found 192 applicable papers, of which 114 openly 
stated livestock AB-use increases the risk of Antibiotic resistance in humans, and of which 
only 15 dismissed the link. The remaining papers did not make clear statements. In light of 
this information, the report claimed there is ‘sufficient’ evidence to support the link between 
livestock AB-use and AMR in human health. Following the international narrative of AB 
´overuse and misuse´ in food producing animals , the ‘excessive’ use of ABs in agriculture 
was the main focus of the report (O’Neill, 2015). Within this risk frame, the report proposed 
three interventions, displayed in Figure 4.4. 
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Fig. 4.4: Target area’s to reduce the ‘overuse and misuse’ of AB-use in the 2015 O’Neill report 
 
The O’Neill report (2015) suggested first of all to limit the quantities used in agriculture 
immediately and restrict HP-CIAs, especially with the crossover between ABs used in humans 
and animals. Firstly, using Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands as examples, the report 
suggested reduction to 50 milligram of ABs a year per kilogram of livestock in countries as 
starting point, leaving it up to individual countries how to achieve this. Harmonised global 
approaches were proposed to identify and reduce those antimicrobials that were of greatest 
importance to human health. Secondly, the report proposed radical improvement of the 
surveillance systems to monitor AB-use in agriculture and antimicrobial manufacturing waste. 
Finally, to tackle the environmental risks associated in antimicrobial production, the report 
suggested regulatory standards to improve waste management of AB manufacturers. It urged 
participants of the food supply chain to engage with companies and demand change (O’Neill 
2015). To stimulate action, the report proposed the following policy interventions: 1. 
Implement legislation to reduce antibiotic use, 2. Implement a tax on antibiotic use, 3. 
Subsidise the cost of implementing infection control measures or alternatives such as vaccines 
and diagnostic tools (O’Neill 2015, p. 25).  
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4.3.2 Controversies 
The 2015 O’Neill report received a mixed response across organisations in the UK 
representing the livestock industry and the media. The National Office of Animal Health 
(NOAH), representing pharmaceutical companies in charge of animal medicines, accused the 
O’Neill report of using insufficient literature and making speculative claims about livestock 
antimicrobial use (National Office Animal Health, 2015). The British Veterinary Association 
(BVA) accused the report of introducing ‘arbitrary, non-evidence based target setting’ (British 
Veterinary Association, 2015) while the National Farmers Union (NFU) was ‘disappointed 
with the lack of context and consultation’ (National Farming Union, 2015). Media sources, 
such as UK newspapers, constructed the potential AMR risks attached to livestock 
antimicrobial use as a particular feature of intensive farming systems (Morris et al., 2016). 
Although public concerns were raised, the O’Neill report had no legal power. It needed the 
agricultural sectors and policymakers in the UK to align with its proposals in order to mobilise 
action.  
 
Callon (1986, p.10) defined this as the problem of translation: in order for scientists to create 
scientific authority, they need to ‘enrol’ participants, or ‘allies’, in their own ‘problem-
solution’ definitions or ‘Obligatory Passage Point (OPP)’. In order to successfully bring actors 
together on an issue of concern, scientists must show that their proposal is indispensable to 
those whose support it seeks. Scientists need to formulate an OPP, which ensures the involved 
actors can keep their interests and objectives (Callon, 1986, p. 6). Hence, the O’Neill report 
needed to problematise the ‘misuse and overuse’ into a matter of concern and re-define 
responsible AB-use policies of livestock ABs in such a manner that it bridged agricultural 
actors and policymakers. This would get the recommendations of the experts on responsible 
AB-use translated into action. How the final O’Neill report tailored its messages to the needs 
of the agricultural actors, governmental policymakers and their own agendas is explored in the 
next section.  
 
4.3.3 How to enrol governmental policymakers and livestock industries 
The 2015 O’Neill report was critical of leaving livestock AB-use in the hands of agriculture 
and introduced regulation, taxation, and subsidies as alternative means of producing change. 
But this was not necessarily in the interest of governmental policymakers.  
“I think the government is wary of making commitments that potentially lead to long liabilities 
or long term costs.” (Respondent Livestock industry organisation 3) 
74 
 
The O’Neill experts had to come up with recommendations that enabled flexibility in 
governance responsibilities. The recommendations on ‘responsible AB-use’ had to settle 
public concerns, but with as little government involvement as possible. In turn the livestock 
industries were increasingly confronted with various pressure groups, as presented in Figure 
4.5, who accused the agricultural industries of ‘misuse and overuse’ of ABs in food producing 
animals (RUMA Chairman Gwyn Jones, 2018). 
 
 
Fig. 4.5: Pressure groups in the UK that urged to reductions in livestock antibiotic use  
 
Fearing legislation, the livestock industries became obliged to engage with the responsible 
AB-use debate in order to provide evidence of responsible AB-use activities. However, the 
livestock industries wanted to maintain control of their ABs.To governmental policymakers 
and the livestock industries, responsible AB-use was a concern with a willingness to engage, 
but on certain conditions.  
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human health’ (O’Neill, 2016, p. 24). Three broad steps were proposed to improve the 
situation, presented in Figure 4.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6: Target area’s to reduce the ‘overuse and misuse’ of livestock AB-use in the final 2016 
O’Neill report 
 
Firstly, the report proposed that countries should, by 2018, come up with country-specific sales 
reduction targets consistent with their economic development and production systems. For 
high-income countries, a target of 50mg/PCU6 should be initially aimed for in the short term. 
New targets should then be set after these in order to continue progress. The report also 
contained recommendations on how to achieve these reduction targets. Changes in production 
practices, the introduction of alternatives such as vaccines, improvement of animal husbandry 
systems, veterinary and farmer awareness and education, and public/consumer awareness were 
also put forward as other ways to reduce agricultural AB-use. The O’Neill experts (2016) 
stated that reduction targets would force farmers to move away from non-therapeutic use to 
solely therapeutic use. Secondly, in line with the 2015 O’Neill report, the experts in 2016 
urged harmonisation of definitions and classification of HP-CIAs, and identification of these 
whose use in animals presented the greatest potential risk to people. Surveillance, monitoring 
and oversight of AB use were framed as interventions to speed up control of HP-CIA use. 
Thirdly, to improve transparency, the food chain was identified as a crucial actor. By setting 
 
6 PCU is the measurement standard set by the ESVAC (European Surveillance of Veterinary Antimicrobial Consumption). The 
calculation standard estimates the weight of the animal (or group) at the time of receiving an antibiotic. The unit is now used 
across EU Member States and is an approximation of consumption, extrapolated from sales data (VMD 2018).  
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reduction targets and making surveillance data on AB-use mandatory, supply chains could 
have a real impact in driving change. Food supply chains should, moreover, agree on 
responsible AB-use standards, which could be developed as internationally recognised labels 
or used by existing certification bodies. In return, food chains could use labels of ‘responsible 
AB-use’ to help consumers make informed decisions as to how ABs have been used in the 
products they buy (O’Neill, 2016).  
The final O’Neill report (2016) provided a clear economic lens on livestock AB-use as matter 
of concern: by producing evidence of responsible AB-use, livestock supply chains could add 
value to their livestock products. Although the report identified the use of governmental 
regulation, taxation and subsidies of alternatives to lower AB-use, particular focus was given 
to investments in vaccines as drivers for change. In a similar vein, Brown and Nettleton (2016) 
argue that O’Neill, as the UK’s ex-prime minister David Cameron’s appointed economist, 
provided imaginative economic spaces of AMR as a market opportunity. The authors highlight 
the relationship between AMR and political neoliberal market agendas in the UK (Brown & 
Nettleton, 2016). Equally, the targets in the final O’Neill report of 2016 are designed to 
reinvigorate economic markets. Achieving reduction targets in food supply chains was 
positioned in the report as an economic strategy to attract consumers, while it opens up new 
pharmaceutical investment opportunities in vaccine development and diagnostic tools on 
farms. Countries, their agricultural sectors and their food supply chains have in turn taken 
responsibility for implementing antimicrobial reduction strategies. As will be discussed next, 
this enabled the UK government, agricultural sectors and food supply chains to take ownership 
of the content of antimicrobial reduction targets. 
 
4.3.5 Consolidation around ‘responsible antibiotic-use’  
Agricultural response 
In response to the O’Neill report of 2016, RUMA (2016) ‘welcomed’ on their website its 
‘main’ findings, but raised concerns about the setting of ‘inappropriate’ targets:  
 
“We also understand the report’s ambition to develop long-term targets. The industry has long 
recognised the beneficial role targets can play, but is acutely aware that inappropriate targets 
can also be counterproductive and even lead to increased risk of resistance”. (RUMA 2016) 
 
Livestock industry groups responded (and still do) with ‘animal welfare’ claims. They claimed 
that inappropriate reduction AB targets can cause danger to the health of food producing 
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animals.  
 
 “I don’t think it is about drilling down to the lowest possible number. It is about making sure 
you are using things properly, in a way that you maintain the welfare, you maintain the good 
health of your animals, and your people.” (Respondent Livestock industry organisation 1) 
 
Historically, the concept of animal welfare has been based on ethical and moral concerns 
(Harrison, 1964; Woods, 2012). A lack of unified scientific definitions over the decades on 
the meaning and measurement of animal welfare has created a ‘black box’, in which the 
internal complexity of animal welfare is obscured but which still retains a widely accepted 
rhetorical authority (Latour, 1987). Even though animal welfare remains a complex concept, 
UK consumers expect high animal welfare standards of the animal products they buy. With 
the UK livestock industries managing the health and welfare of ‘animal bodies’, the livestock 
industries use the concept of animal welfare as a defence mechanism whenever agricultural 
interests are threatened by debates. Adding animal welfare into the conceptual framework of 
responsible AB-use appropriates a degree of ownership over the proposed targets. In so doing 
the industry established a legitimate role in defining the content of the proposed reduction 
targets set out in the 2016 O’Neill report. 
RUMA (2016) highlighted on their website the importance of a ‘UK focus’ in how targets 
should be set. They announced the creation of an industry ‘Task Force’ to develop meaningful 
reduction targets together with the sectors, to ‘replace, reduce and refine’ the use of ABs in 
the UK’s livestock sectors (RUMA, 2016). 
 
Governmental response 
In 2016, the UK Department of Health published a policy report that responded to the 2016 
O’Neill report (Department of Health, 2016). In the policy report, DEFRA and the VMD as 
policy bodies, committed to support the livestock industries in reducing livestock 
antimicrobial sales (antimicrobials sold by pharmaceutical companies) to a multispecies 
average of 50 mg/PCU by 2018 (from 62mg/PCU in 2014) and restrict HP-CIA use across 
livestock sectors (Department of Health, 2016, p. 7). Individual sectors were appointed to 
design sector specific overall and HP-CIA reduction targets by 2017, supported by 
improvements in animal husbandry, stockman-ship, biosecurity practices and disease 
prevention (Department of Health, 2016, p. 7). The veterinary organisations were made 
responsible for the production of AB information and guidelines. Aside from the VMD 
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monitoring AB sales, surveillance of AB usage was transferred to the individual livestock 
sectors/food supply chains. The key targets of the policy report are presented in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.7: The UK’s livestock industry-led voluntary approach to tackle the ‘misuse and overuse’ of 
ABs in food animals 
 
DEFRA agreed to work ‘closely’ with the VMD and the different individual sectors to set 
appropriate sector specific reduction targets by 2017. By supporting sector-specific targets 
while circumventing long-term engagement with the agricultural sectors, the UK government 
was able to delegate control of responsible AB-use of antimicrobials to the agricultural sector.  
 
4.3.6 The co-construction of RUMA 
RUMA’s role on AMR has continued to grow. The interviews confirmed that through their 
AMR action plan, RUMA is viewed as leading the livestock sectors on responsible AB-use. 
 
“In essence, RUMA is leading the livestock sectors in the UK on responsible use of 
antibiotics”. (Respondent Livestock industry organisation 1). 
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 RUMA set up an industry ‘Targets Task Force’ in 2016 to facilitate the development of sector-
specific reduction targets and AMR policy objectives (RUMA, 2017). The Targets Task Force 
consisted of a leading vet and farmer from each livestock sector who had to consult with their 
respective industries to set objectives. The setting of industry-led targets in cooperation with 
the livestock industries is underpinned by the belief that change can be achieved and the 
imposition of regulation can be avoided. The Targets Task Force published their sector specific 
antimicrobial policy targets in 2017. 
In 2017, RUMA received a ‘significant amount of money’ from their members that then was 
largely invested in effective communication, including hiring a communication consultant to 
better communicate ‘responsible AB-use’ actions to the public and to the industry (RUMA 
Chairman Gwyn Jones, 2018). The money was also invested in a Farmer Task Torce and an 
Independent Scientific Group that would evaluate AMR strategies. RUMA keeps working 
closely with the VMD by providing them with updates on policy actions. RUMA argues that 
this ‘makes lives easier for the VMD and government’ (RUMA Chairman Gwyn Jones, 2018), 
confirming the UK’s government interest in delegating AMR responsibilities to the livestock 
industry. The previous discussion shows how RUMA’s position as the industry AMR policy-
lead and spokesperson has been strengthened since the O’Neill reports. This reduces the risk 
of the industry being externally regulated, while maintaining control on the content of 
agricultural AB policies. 
 
4.4 Metrics as ‘evidence’ of successful governance  
As I have demonstrated in this Chapter, the ‘overuse and misuse’ of livestock AB-use has been 
successfully translated into a matter of concern. By delegating regulatory responsibilities to 
the livestock industries and attaching economic interests to responsible AB-use in the final 
O’Neill report (2016), the economic experts established a successful alliance with 
governmental policymakers and livestock actors. The report defined identities and their 
responsibilities around responsible AB-use as OPP, ‘locking actors into place’ (Callon, 1986, 
p. 8), for which the alliance members in return were able to pursue their own agendas.  
As Callon (1986, p. 19) frames it:  
“Translation is a mechanism by which the social and natural worlds progressively 
take form. The result is a situation in which certain entities control others. 
Understanding what sociologists generally call power relationships means describing 
the way in which actors are defined, associated and simultaneously obliged to remain 
faithful to their alliances. The repertoire of translation is not only designed to give a 
symmetrical and tolerant description of a complex process which constantly mixes 
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together a variety of social and natural entities. It also permits an explanation of how 
a few obtain the right to express and to represent the many silent actors of the social 
and natural worlds they have mobilised.” 
 
The UK government has provided a policy framework within which other people have been 
made accountable for delivery, resulting in the UK’s industry-led voluntary approach. 
Although progress needs to be briefed to the UK government, it allows the industries to remain 
in control of the approaches and practices to reduce use and achieve responsible AB-use. 
Within the industry-led policy frame, metrics have become ‘technocratic’ mechanisms to make 
claims upon responsible AB-use practices: they represent the many silent actors in the AB 
agricultural networks. Moreover, the O’Neill experts re-formulated what it means to produce 
metrics on AB reduction targets: it delivers economic imaginaries to food supply chains. In 
the UK (and beyond), the production of metrics on AB-use across food supply chains in the 
UK is considered by governmental policymakers, livestock industries and consumers as a 
‘trustworthy’ source. By providing numbers of AB reduction, food supply chains can add 
value to their food products by claiming that ABs are used responsibly. This creates new 
spaces for the UK food supply chains to market their livestock products.  
Consequently, metrics as non-human actors disperse knowledge and transparency in relation 
to ‘how the industry is doing’; metrics signal progress or otherwise. Over the time period 2013-
2017, Figure 4.8 shows that overall sales of ABs across sectors has been reduced by 40% in 
2017 in mg/PCU in the UK (UK-VARSS, 2018)  
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Fig. 4.8:  The UK's veterinary antimicrobial sales in  
mg/PCU 2010-2017 (UK-VARSS 2018)
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Table 4.3 shows that HP-CIA sales have been reduced across sectors, with a 55% drop in 
fluoroquinolones (mg/kg) compared to 2013, 32% drop of 3/4th generation cephalosporins 
(mg/kg) and a 99% reduction in Colistin (mg/kg).  
 
Table 4.3: The UK’s veterinary sales of critically important antibiotics in mg/kg and total veterinary 
antibiotic sales in tonnes of active ingredient in food-producing animals between 2013 and 2017 
Sales 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Compared with 
2016 
Compared with 
2013 
All ABs (mg/kg)  
 
62 62 57 45 37       18%       40% 
Fluoroquinolones  
(mg/kg) 
0.36 0.35 0.34 0.23 0.16        30%        55% 
3th/4th generation  
cephalosporins 
(mg/kg) 
0.18 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.12        21%        32% 
Colistin (mg/kg) 
 
0.11 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.001        94%        99% 
Total sales  
(All animals, tonnes) 
436 448 408 338 282        17%        35% 
Note: Adapted from the Veterinary Medicine Directorate UK-VARSS report 2018  
 
4.5 Externalities/overflows 
The O’Neill report of 2015 uses the concept of externalities to discuss the positive and negative 
effects of AB-use to third parties. A negative externality occurs when farmers use ABs in their 
food animals that potentially increases resistance rates in society. Positive externalities occur 
when farmers introduce AB alternatives that reduce antimicrobial need. Importantly, the report 
argues lower quantities of antimicrobials used in agriculture results in positive externalities to 
third parties, such as society and markets (O’Neill 2015, p.25). AB metrics are used by the 
alliance to build trust in their ‘successful’ industry-led approach. It will however become clear 
throughout the rest of this thesis that metrics only partially present what is practiced. 
Moreover, the metrics in themselves ‘perform’, as they produce new relations across 
institutional and food supply chain settings, with intended and unintended effects. Callon 
(1998) refers to externalities as the ‘framing/overflowing’, in which he argues how overflows 
of issue framing are, however, the norm instead of exception. By studying overflows instead 
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of ignoring them, we can, potentially, manage their unintended effects. I will focus my 
attention in this next section on how network priorities results in overflows. 
4.5.1 Limitations of antibiotic surveillance policies, their governance and what 
they represent 
 
In the interviews I conducted with the key players, concerns were expressed about the 
consequences of the policy focus on data collection and the rhetoric of reduction. While a 
downward trend in AB-use could be defined as progress, there was an awareness that a disease 
outbreak could reverse this trend leading to a loss of trust by the public. 
 
“My concern about the emphasis politically we put on measurement, is when we have the next 
disease outbreak that will cause antimicrobial usage to dramatically increase. So governments 
like to put out ‘oh we are making progress, we are making progress’, but sooner or later…We 
have created a, a media and public expectation of continual reduction. And how do we, how 
are we as an industry, going to manage that scenario without a massive loss of public trust 
during the next disease outbreak?” (Respondent Pharmaceutical Company 1)  
 
The narrow focus of the debate on AB reduction was questioned, as this limits investment in 
understanding whether a reduction actually changes anything. 
 
“There is too much of a focus on collecting the information than actually the important thing 
is how are we going to actually manage and check or promote for improvement of results of 
the use of antibiotics.” (Respondent Livestock industry organisation 4)  
 
Comments were made about the responsibilities involved in data surveillance governance. The 
UK livestock sectors are responsible in the UK’s industry-led approach for designing and 
implementing a sector AB usage surveillance system. This has resulted in individual sector 
approaches across the UK livestock industries and some have been more successful than others 
up until now. The highly integrated poultry industry, guided by the British Poultry Council 
(BPC), has been able to implement an AB usage surveillance system covering 95% of the 
industry (UK-VARSS, 2018). Less integrated livestock sectors in the UK, such as the dairy, 
beef and sheep industry, have struggled to set up an overarching AB usage data surveillance 
system in their sectors, due to problems of commitment, data access and complexities involved 
with system design limit progress. Consequently, aside from the poultry industry, there is no 
other livestock sector that has full transparency in how ABs end up being used (UK-VARSS, 
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2018). In addition, it was argued that livestock sector data surveillance responsibility limits 
the spending of UK livestock sectors in terms of their time and resources to do other important 
responsible AB-use activities. Comparing the data surveillance approach in other countries, 
comments were made about government responsibility: 
 
“I think that, my own view is that, the VMD should step up and say we need to know where all 
antibiotics end up being used in the UK and therefore anybody who dispenses antibiotics 
should be prepared to send it to a national database, pretty much the same way as this happens 
in the Netherlands, Denmark or Germany and elsewhere. I don’t think that would have been 
all that expensive and indeed government could have thought to recover the costs of actually 
doing that. But instead it said well, no we will let industry decide how this data could be 
collected and present that information to us. I think without legislation it is difficult to force 
people to engage with the insistence and equally it is difficult to police when you have no 
national system. So I think the industry will try hard, but I am not sure how successful it will 
be in capturing the endues of majority of antimicrobials, and I think therefore it would have 
been achieved much easier by having a simple vet discipline framework for doing that, and 
then the industry efforts could have been focused on actually, how do we reduce the amount 
of antimicrobials being used and check or promote for improvement of results of the use of 
antimicrobials, rather than just focusing on how do I collect that information”. (Respondent 
Livestock industry organisation 3)  
 
As previously discussed, AB sales metrics need to be interpreted with caution. Figure 4.10 
shows how reduction was starting to take place from 2015 onwards prior to the publication of 
the O’Neill report in December 2015 (UK-VARSS, 2015). It can be argued that the policy 
efforts of the UK government and RUMA were already starting to translate into the reduction 
of AB sales. However, the driving force behind the reduction in sales between 2014-2015 
needs to be interpreted with caution, as it was not necessarily political pressure and RUMA 
that drove this reduction. Evaluating each individual livestock sector, the pig and poultry 
achieved together a reduction of 23% in the year of 2014-2015. In contrast, other livestock 
sectors, and also companion animal and equine sectors, increased AB sales in the same 
timeframe can be observed (UK-VARSS, 2015). An important explanation for sector 
differences is that the pig, and particularly the poultry industry, were criticised in the media 
and by pressure groups for intensive husbandry systems and their high use of ABs in contrast 
to other sectors. They were therefore already engaged with the issue before the publication of 
the O’Neill reports. This was driven from within the sectors to maintain public confidence and 
will be discussed more in depth in Chapter 5. 
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“The poultry meat sector took hold of this baton of foodborne pathogens much earlier than 
anybody else and recognised the issues developing in poultry meat. They have been collecting 
information and making policy decisions since about 2012, so they are ahead of the game in 
terms of other species groups.” (Respondent Livestock industry 1) 
 
AB sales only represent the distribution from ABs to veterinary practices. Vets prescribe and 
dispense the ABs to farmers. This is the most risky trajectory of the AB, as this will define 
how ABs will be used (animal, purpose/indication, administration route, dosage, days, etc.) 
and can pose a risk to human health if used inappropriately. Although reduction in sales of 
both overall ABs shows very promising results according to the latest VMD report (UK-
VARSS, 2018) it is hard to draw conclusive results upon what these results represent. 
 
“What are we measuring? I mean, we can measure, so can measure if we look at, say within 
a treatment class, we can measure trends from year to year in that treatment class, and we are 
measuring something. But if I am measuring, if I am adding together kilos of tetracycline and 
kilos of fluoroquinolones. What does that mean? It doesn’t mean anything at all”. (Respondent 
Pharmaceutical Company 1)   
 
At the same time, the UK’s HP-CIA sales data in food-animals presented in table 4.3 show a 
reduction in sales per class. It gives little information upon how HP-CIA’s end up being used 
in animals and whether other ABs are being used to support the reduction in HP-CIA use.  
 
“We don’t have great knowledge on much aspects on how antibiotics are used an what they 
are used for, so we lack the data we lack the detail, that means we lack the capacity to identify 
whether or not improvements are made or reductions are made on the matter how 
antimicrobials are used[…].We don’t really know for a start how much antibiotics are being 
used in the cattle industry, we have various estimates, but they really are estimates they are 
not, there is no actual data, and one of the challenges is that there are quite a lot of mixed 
farms in the UK, so when people buy drugs they are probably going to use it on sheep or beef 
or dairy, that is all to be addressed.” (Respondent Livestock industry organisation 4) 
 
4.5.2 Risky Critical Important Antibiotic (CIA) policies 
During the interviews a vet (Veterinary surgeon 7) expressed his concerns about how a rise in 
non HP-CIA use will translate itself in resistance profiles of non HP-CIAs. With non HP-CIAs 
compensating the loss of other AB classes, resistance may be more likely to develop in relation 
to these now more heavily-used classes. Consequently, if resistance to non HP-CIAs increase, 
this could lead to a higher need for HP-CIAs as ABs of last resort. Pharmaceutical companies 
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also expressed concerns about the future commercial viability of veterinary HP-CIAs. 
 
“How we access the medicines in case you need them is important in the interest of society, 
but there is a cost to industry to maintaining the medicine when they’re not used”.  
(Respondent Pharmaceutical Company 1) 
 
As Reynolds Whyte et al. (1996, p.85) have argued, ‘only what is perceived as valuable will 
become an item fit for exchange and trading’. By restricting or banning HP-CIAs from 
livestock use, the market value of HP-CIAs is reduced, which could eventually result in 
pharmaceutical companies deciding to stop producing and selling HP-CIAs to veterinary 
markets. This could pose risks to the welfare of animals which may end up suffering from 
infections that cannot be cured by non HP-CIAs. 
 
The O’Neill report (2015, p.21) challenged the ‘lack of consistency in definitions of 
antimicrobials critical to human use’ across official organisations and livestock sectors, 
because of its impact on making comparisons difficult. The report called for unification of HP-
CIA antimicrobial risk classifications, as this would increase the possibility to evaluate 
‘individual process or reports’ on the matter (O’Neill, 2015, p. 21). In the UK, national 
inconsistency can still be observed, as the British poultry industry uses the WHO HP-CIA 
classification while the rest of the livestock sectors use the EMA HP-CIA risk classification.  
 
4.5.3 Fragmented antibiotic policies 
As O’Neill (2016) had in mind, the supply chain actors are making ‘responsible medicine use’ 
into an economic opportunity. Çalışkan & Callon (2009, p.391) have introduced the concept 
of ‘economisation’ to identify and characterise how entities become ‘economised’. In this 
context each food supply chain actor has different economic concerns and interests, causing a 
different ‘economisation’ of responsible AB-use. 
 
“Retailers are given a competitive market place and they are all seeking to find whether there 
is an opportunity for commercial advantage, and so, retailers and processors have their own 
policies and strategies on this.” (Respondent Livestock industry organisation 4) 
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The fragmented AB policies have resulted in different AB practices, rather than 
standardisation. Taking the dairy supply chain as a case study, this process and its public health 
and environmental risks will be extensively discussed in the next Chapters. 
 
4.5.5  The structure of animal husbandry sectors as a barrier to policy 
In the interviews, one of the retailers highlighted the impact of different animal husbandry 
systems on the supply chains. The size and diversity within each sector were identified as 
potential barriers to the communication of responsible AB-use messages.  
 
“I mean, the poultry sector has a much easier starting position, because there are such a small 
number of businesses, and they were able to get together and address it almost as a sort of 
corporate issue. Whereas the pig sectors, there are still a number of large corporates who 
cover about 50% of production. But there are a lot of other smaller farmers who do the other 
50%. When you move into the cattle and the sheep sector, it is much smaller. The farmers are 
smaller, more diverse, and there is many more of them. I suppose beef is in a much more 
diverse position than dairy, because they have the link through the milk processors, the first 
buyers. But on the beef and sheep side, it is just a lot of disparate, small farmers, small to 
medium sized farmers, carrying out their business on a daily basis, so it is much more difficult 
to get a hold of them and to get the message across to them” (Retailer 2)  
 
4.5.6 Husbandry systems as environmental risk 
Although the beef, sheep and dairy industries use far lessquantities of ABs than the pig and 
poultry industry, they could potentially pose a higher environmental AMR risk. These sectors 
are more extensive in their husbandry systems compared to the intensive pig and poultry 
industry, which means animals spend more time outside on lands and are more exposed to the 
environment. Through their secretions and environmental contact, they could pose selective 
pressure to environmental bacteria (Fieldnotes, Veterinary surgeon 9). At the same time animal 
dung and milk waste are still entering slurry and/or are disposed on the land, which makes its 
way onto agricultural land. There is also a lack in oversight on what happens with medicine 
waste on farms. This issue has been positioned by a RUMA speaker as the big upcoming issue 
for the future (RUMA Chairman Gwyn Jones, 2018). 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Following Callon's (1986) lines of reasoning on how issues become constructed as a ‘matter 
of concern’, the analysis presented in this Chapter shows how an ‘alliance’ (livestock 
antimicrobials, economic expert committee, policymakers and livestock industry 
stakeholders), a problem-solution program or OPP (‘responsible AB-use) and continuation of 
interests, translated itself into the UK’s technocratic industry-led voluntary approach.  
The workings of the UK’s political culture manifests itself in how economic experts were 
given the responsibility by the UK government to produce ‘technical regulation’ to provide 
calculations of progress. Economists increasingly rely on measurement and information to 
capture phenomena (Barry, 2002). In the case of livestock ABs, calculation as technocratic 
intervention and trustworthy evidence was prioritised by the O’Neill economic expert 
committee. According to Callon (1998), a situation must be framed first before they become 
calculable. Hence, by taking over the international narrative of AB ‘misuse and overuse’ in 
food producing animals, the O’Neill economic experts made livestock AB-use a calculable 
concern. More importantly, this particular framing with its solutions enabled the economic 
experts to translate the political debate into the economic field (Barry, 2002). Consequently, 
AB metrics not only serve as anti-political tools that serve the UK’s agricultural neoliberal 
strategies, but also as economic imaginaries (Brown & Nettleton, 2016) by their market value 
in retailer businesses. 
The role of the farming lobby in the UK and their influence on how debates are framed and 
how scientific evidence is produced and used by policymakers has also been discussed in this 
Chapter. The rising power of RUMA as the AMR industry-lead is an example of how strategic 
the agricultural industry has been in relation to this issue. By establishing itself as a trustworthy 
spokesperson, the organisation has been used by the agricultural industry as an instrument to 
maintain ownership over livestock ABs. Whenever trust in the industry is de-stabilised by 
either public or scientific concerns, RUMA uses truth-claims about animal welfare and 
properties of ABs to re-appropriate control, reinforcing the message that it is the industry that 
should manage livestock AB-use. Hence, with the farming lobby putting their interests 
forward, precautionary AB policies that tackle the need to prescribe and use ABs are set on 
hold. 
Even though a successful alliance between experts, the government and livestock industry has 
been achieved for now, relations are continuously changing. Barry (2002) highlights the 
instability of framing and the fragility of metrological fields. Metrological regimes first of all 
increasingly rely on standardised procedures. As discussed, the standardisation of surveillance 
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mechanisms, measurement standards, and quality parameters are absent, which increases the 
vulnerability of the trustworthiness of the presented data. At the same time, metrological 
regimes are not able to capture the ‘complexity of objects and practices in actuality’ (Barry, 
2002, p. 275). They only represent knowledge about the parameters that make up the frame, 
ignoring what happens outside the frame. This is what Wynne (1992, p. 114) has referred to 
as the ‘built-in’ ignorance of science towards its own limitations. As Wynne (1992, p. 114) 
argues, scientific knowledge presents ‘a restricted agenda of defined uncertainties – ones that 
are tractable – leaving invisible a range of other uncertainties’. One way to explore what the 
metrological data actually represents is by opening up the metrics we get presented by the 
industries. Following Latour (1987, 2005), matters of fact need to be turned again into matters 
of concern in order to scrutinise their weaknesses and uncertainties. 
The following Chapters will examine how dairy supply chains do responsible AB-use in 
accordance with the logics of their agricultural networks. Chapter 5 will introduce how the 
UK dairy industry is governed in order to understand what human and non-human actors make 
up the actor-networks of dairy supply chains. Chapter 6 and 7 will next discuss how decision-
making regarding AB policies and their practices takes place as a network activity between 
the identified human and non-human actors in dairy supply chains. This will then allow a 
discussion in Chapter 8 of the public health implications in making supply chains responsible 
to govern antibiotic practices. 
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Chapter 5 
An introduction to the UK dairy sector and its regulation 
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5.1 Positioning the dairy sector 
 
The UK is the tenth-largest milk producer in the world and the third-largest milk producer in 
the EU after Germany and France (RUMA, 2017). There are currently 12,000 active British 
dairy farmers with nearly 1.9 million dairy cows who produce just under 15 billion litres of 
milk each year (RUMA, 2017). Dairy farmers produce raw milk, which is bought by milk 
processors who transform it into liquid milk and dairy manufacturing products that can be sold 
to retailers. The regulation of the dairy supply chain in the UK is complex. This Chapter will 
detail how milk processors and retailers have become responsible for milk quality control and 
milk safety in the UK dairy sector.  
The Chapter starts by introducing how the UK dairy sector was a state-producer, led by the 
UK Milk Marketing Board, up until 1994. This ensured that milk prices and milk volume were 
centrally determined (in contrast to other European countries). I then move on to discuss how 
deregulation resulted in the abolition of the UK Milk Marketing Board and how the UK dairy 
industry became regulated instead (Feindt & Flynn, 2009; Wales et al., 2006). Finally, this 
Chapter explores the impact of milk contracts on milk producers and supply chain parties.  
 
5.2 Early dairy sector regulation: From state-producer to milk 
supply chain control 
 
5.2.1 The British Milk Marketing Board (1933-1994): supply-led orientation 
 
In the early 20th century, liquid milk was considered to be the most difficult product to market 
by the agricultural sector, due to its difficulty to transport and perishable nature (Empson, 
1998). This resulted in fluctuating milk prices and unstable British liquid milk markets 
(Empson, 1998). To address the difficult market conditions of milk, the British Milk Marketing 
Board (MBB) was established in 1933, which represented a ‘state/dairy industry alliance in 
milk production and marketing’ (Cox et al., 1986, p. 478). The MBB was producer-run and 
was the sole collector of milk from producers and the sole seller of milk to the processing 
sector (Bates & Pattisson, 1997). Subsequently, the NFU became involved in 1945 as the 
organised representative of dairy farmers (Cox et al., 1986). The MMB served as the milk 
broker between producer and the milk processor companies responsible for turning raw milk 
into liquid milk, and for manufacturing products such as fresh dairy desserts, commodity 
products (such as butter, cream), or a combination of the former (Banks & Marsden, 1997). 
Milk processors either directly sold their products to consumers or sold them to retailers. The 
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MMB operated a farm allocation system through which it received detailed information about 
the farms which it licensed, offering transparency in origin of milk (Banks and Marsden 1997). 
The policing of milk safety was at that time still the full responsibility of the UK government.  
The UK 1947 Agriculture Act (Grant, 2005), introduced by the post-war Labour government, 
gave guarantees of prices and assurances of markets for principal agricultural products. 
Through annual reviews, the NFU with technical assistance and support of the Board, 
negotiated the price guarantees for milk (Grant, 2005). The British MMB and milk market 
regulation by the UK government was unique in comparison with other European countries at 
that time, where milk prices were determined by the free market. The monopoly of the MMB 
tried instead to maintain a ‘balance between the interests of UK dairy farmers and the needs 
of dairy processors’ (Bates & Pattisson, 1997, p. 50). Farmers were free to produce any amount 
of milk once they were licensed by the Board who in return collected their raw milk. The 
Board paid farmers a minimum ‘pool’ price based on the total income from all markets, 
defined monthly in cooperation with the UK government (Banks & Marsden, 1997, p. 387). 
The milk price farmers received for their raw milk was at that time solely defined by the pool 
price and its destination: liquid milk or manufactured products. Milk quality, safety (hygiene) 
and environmental parameters had no role yet in milk prices and milk contracts. The state-
producer control of milk price, production and milk markets prevented the private marketing 
of dairy products in the decades that followed (Empson, 1998). 
In contrast to the UK, European dairy markets became increasingly populated by competitive 
milk-cooperatives which collected raw milk and processed it into consumable products 
(Empson, 1998). In 1994, with the abolition of the MMB the UK dairy supply chain 
arrangements changed. The UK entered a global dairy market were milk processor co-
operatives dominated, as presented in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: The co-operative structure of the dairy industry in 1994 
% Share  Co-ops Liquid Butter Cheese Powder 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 
Holland 82 86 96 88 75 
France 50 52 51 36 53 
USA 50 16 42 42 81 
New Zealand 98  100 100 100 
Australia 70 12    
Note: Adapted from Credit Lyonnais Laing (1996); cited in Banks and Marsden (1997) 
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As will become clear in the following paragraphs, new forms of regulation, competition and 
also uneven power relations within food supply chain relations emerged. In what follows, a 
brief overview of important European events will be provided that not only incentivised but 
also shaped how the dairy industry responded to de-regulatory change. 
 
5.2.2 Europe: from market intervention to demand-and consumption oriented 
regulation  
Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)  
When the UK became part of Europe in 1973, it became part of its Internal Market and of 
Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP had been established in 1962 to 
guarantee minimum levels of production and ensure a fair standard of living to farmers 
(European Union, 2012). Market and price support was implemented to support the 
agricultural sectors and protect countries from outside import. Through subsidies from the 
CAP, farmers across Europe were able to buy equipment, renovate buildings and obtain better 
seeds and fertilisers. Supported by minimum prices, food production in post-war Europe rose 
(European Union, 2012). The control of food production systems and safety in the UK and 
other European Member Governments was largely controlled by national governments (Ansell 
& Vogel, 2006). To remove trade barriers between European members, the 1979 Cassis de 
Dijon judgment tried to harmonise food chains across Europe through a process based on 
‘mutual recognition’ (Grant, 2012, p. 1034). This meant that national Food Safety 
laws/standards of a Member State had to be accepted in other Member States, to guarantee the 
free traffic of ‘safe’ food. The free traffic of food could be denied where public health concerns 
could be objectively demonstrated (Grant, 2012, p. 1034). 
 
Milk quota 
The productivist principles of the CAP soon led to food surpluses and ‘food mountains’ with 
demand lagging behind supply (European Union, 2012). In dairy industries across Europe, 
‘milk lakes’ and ‘butter mountains’ raised increasing concerns. In response, the CAP started 
to implement specific measures to align supply with market demands (European Union, 2012). 
In 1984 the overproduction and surplus of milk products were tackled through the 
implementation by the EU of dairy quotas/milk quotas (Costa-Font et al. 2018). Member States 
had to pay a levy to the European Economic Community (EEC) if they produced more than 
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the reference quantity. The UK milk supplies became fixed at 85% self-sufficiency that is, UK 
producers were able to produce only 85% of domestic demand (Bates & Pattisson, 1997, p. 
50). This regulation resulted in structural shifts in the UK dairy farming industry, moving 
towards improving yield per cow relative to inputs with a focus on stock genetics (Banks & 
Marsden, 1997). It shaped how the UK dairy industry responded to de-regulation, as dairy 
companies had to compete to contract farmers in order to secure their milk supply.  
De-regulating food safety and food quality control 
In the 1980s, free market ideologies gained popularity across Europe, resulting in new systems 
of food safety and food quality governance (Grant, 2005). In 1989, the European Commission 
(1989) published Council Directive 89/397 on the official control of foodstuffs, in which each 
EU Member Government had to carry out food inspection controls in accordance with the 
Directive and ensure safety at every level of food production. New food supply chain 
responsibilities to control food safety and food quality started to emerge. Following this EU 
Directive, in 1990, the UK implemented the ‘Food Safety Act 1990’, in which food safety 
responsibility was shifted towards food supply chain control. The UK ‘Food Safety Act 1990’ 
embodied the principle of ‘due diligence’, which requires that every food chain actor adopts 
food safety standards and takes all reasonable food safety precautions (Bailey, Tully, & Cooke, 
2015, p. 15). This was further incentivised by the European introduction of the Single Market 
with free trade of goods, capital services and labour in 1993, which pushed for integration and 
harmonisation of food safety and quality in food production systems (Halkier & Holm, 2006; 
Wales et al., 2006). In 1992, the CAP shifted from market subsidies to producer subsidies: 
price support was replaced by ´direct payments’ (Common Agricultural Policy, 2017). A shift 
was taking place in food production governance, from State-led to supply chain-led 
governance. 
New identities: consumers and retailers 
The shift in food production governance, from State-led to supply chain-led was, however, not 
only the result of de-regulatory actions. A number of animal diseases and food safety issues in 
food chains throughout the 1980s-1990s, such as BSE (Grant, 2012), made consumers 
question institutional control mechanisms in the national and European food sectors (Wales et 
al., 2006). Consumers and media sources blamed the productivist attitude of the CAP. 
Sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992) captured this process in his concept of ‘reflexive 
modernization’, in which existing practices of risk management become challenged in 
societies. In what Beck (1992) refers to as ‘subpolitics’, ‘non-expert’ groups started to criticise 
‘expert’ risk decision-making. During the BSE crisis in the UK, public confidence in 
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governmental competence in dealing with food security decreased and consumers demanded 
more transparency and traceability regarding how their food was produced (Feindt & 
Kleinschmit, 2011; Wales et al., 2006). The food safety crisis initiated new questions on how 
to protect consumer health and food safety. The EU started to move away from economic-
oriented regulatory regimes towards regimes that could ensure consumer protection (and trust) 
in food chains (Alemanno, 2006). This turned the will of the consumer into a new important 
player in European markets. Food supply chains not only had to provide affordable food, but 
had to safeguard food safety and quality. 
In the UK, the rise in the power of consumers accompanied the emergence of the new supply 
chain positions for retailers. Whereas consumers in the Post-War period largely bought their 
products from local groceries and food processor companies, retailers became the new food 
buying locations for consumers during the 1980s. Manufacturing products (butter, milk 
powder, cream) increased in popularity while consumer expectations in relation to dietary 
issues in relation to animal fats changed production expectations of milk (Empson 1998). In 
the UK liquid milk market, retailers started to compete with home delivery systems and milk 
processors through competitive pricing (Banks & Marsden 1997). In the 1980s supermarkets 
only sold 10% of total milk, by the 1990s this had become 50% and would become nearly 
100% in the years that followed (Banks & Marsden, 1997, p. 389). Consumer-oriented retailers 
implemented milk consumer demands around their own particular interests (Grant 2012). 
Together with deregulatory actions, the emergence of consumer power and new supply chain 
positions would contribute to the redefinition of milk safety, quality and its standardising 
practices. 
Food supply chain responsibilities 
The BSE food crisis was not only a matter of how to control public health in food safety issues, 
but also how to maintain consumer trust in the food safety of the European single market. In 
2000, the EU published the ‘White Paper on Food Safety’, which formulated the 
standardisation of food safety as a process that should take place at food supply chain level. 
To guarantee principles of food safety at every stage of production, the ‘White Paper of Food 
Safety’ introduced policy based on the concept of ‘from producer to the end product’ or ‘farm 
to table’ (2000, p.3). This gave feed manufacturers, farmers and food operators the primary 
responsibility for food safety (European Commission, 2000). In this context the role of 
‘competent authorities’ was to monitor and enforce this responsibility through the operation 
of ‘national surveillance and control systems’ (European Commission, 2000, p. 8). The ‘White 
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Paper on Food Safety’ and its recommendations created a new role for European food supply 
chains and how to govern their production. 
To safeguard consumers, Europe further institutionalised food safety at the European level 
through a new set of laws: The European General Food Law Regulation (EC) No 178/2002; 
Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 ‘Official Feed and Controls Regulation’ which sets out 
responsibilities of both national and EU inspectors; Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 on specific 
hygiene rules for food of animal origin, and; Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 which lays down 
specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for 
human consumption. These regulations laid out the principles and obligations that needed to 
be implemented in the ‘farm to table’ policies, such as adherence to ‘good manufacturing 
practices’ (GMP) and ‘hazard analysis critical control points’ (HACCP) (European 
Commission 2002, p. 9). The HACCP system has become the internationally recognized ‘farm 
to table’ safety mechanism that assures food safety, food handling, processing and retail sales 
(FSA, 2017). In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, consumer interests became 
represented through the establishment of The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). EFSA 
was established as an independent ‘expert’ authority responsible for performing risk 
assessments on issues related to food safety at a European level, independent from production-
oriented policies of the CAP. 
In accordance with the above legislation, the risk management of issues became the 
responsibility of Member Governments and food chains. Food supply chains were delegated 
key responsibilities in the management and policing of the food system. 
 
5.3 Dairy de-regulation in the UK: the emergence of milk 
contracts  
As a consequence of Europe’s climate of food governance, the UK dairy industry underwent 
significant changes. EU objections to the monopoly position of the MMB, the widespread 
dissatisfaction of UK farmers with the low milk price they received from the MMB, dairy 
industry objections to the operations of a state-producer monopoly, and the high running costs 
of the MMB, all led to the abolition of the MMB in the UK Agricultural Act of 1993. The UK 
dairy industry effectively entered a free market (Banks & Marsden, 1997).  
At first, a successor body – Milk Marque – was established. This farmer-owned voluntary co-
operative initially collected and sold around 50 per cent of milk supplies across the UK (Banks 
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and Marsden 1997). Alternatively, farmers were able to contract with dairy processors directly 
rather than selling their milk to a broker. Importantly, with supplies no longer guaranteed due 
to the milk quotas and with prices no longer being fixed, this created intense competition 
between all milk purchasers (Bates & Pattisson, 1997). To secure milk supply, processors 
started to establish their own ‘milkpools’ by contracting farmers through non-aligned milk 
contracts (Franks & Hauser, 2012). To attract suppliers away from Milk Marque, many milk 
processors started to offer a fixed price premium over the Milk Marque price. The free market 
dynamics reflected the average milk price paid by dairy companies (pence per litre), which 
rose from 22.5 in 1992-1993 to 26.0 in 1994-1995 (Franks & Hauser, 2012). 
However, the pricing of milk became less transparent. The market milk price of dairy 
processors was partly based on the market value of their product mix (liquid, commodity, 
value added products) (Banks & Marsden, 1997). By breaking with Milk Marque’s pricing 
schemes, processor milk contracts started to financially incentivise milk quality parameters. 
Milk quality parameters such as production characteristics (protein and butterfat), 
stockmanship standards and animal welfare standards started to define production conditions. 
This enabled milk processors to source milk that more closely met their quality standards. Milk 
prices were also influenced by their competitors’ price and seasonal influences. In addition, 
the milk price was used to regulate the annual fluctuations in milk production effectively 
encouraging or discouraging milk supply in line with the nature of the fluctuation. Finally, 
milk quality and transport charges started to impact upon the final milk price (Banks & 
Marsden, 1997). 
Nevertheless, the milk pricing schemes offered by the processors attracted milk producers, 
with membership of Milk Marque gradually starting to fall (Franks and Hauser 2010). 
Complaints about Milk Marque’s potential ability to regulate milk prices because of its market 
share were increasing. Consequently, Milk Marque was disbanded in 2000 into three 
independent farmer owned, co-operatives with the possibility to purchase processing capacity. 
It was believed this would create a more competitive market for producers and processors. By 
2009, 137 milk buyers/processors were registered (Franks and Hauser 2010), with different 
milk processor supply contracts and pricing mechanisms. More than 50 types of contracts 
could be observed with milk price ranges from 28.58 to 24.25 pence per litre (Franks and 
Hauser 2010). 
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In the meantime, liquid milk attained the highest food sales value in supermarkets, making it 
an important strategic product in retailers ‘market baskets7’ (Mylan, Geels, Gee, McMeekin, 
& Foster, 2015). Retailers started to contract milk producers directly through aligned milk 
contracts, which meant farmers went on additional milk contracts with retailers. Milk 
producers still needed to meet milk processors standards but they had to meet an additional set 
of retailer standards for which they received a ‘fixed’ milk price from the retailer. These 
dedicated supply chains allowed retailers to increase value by selling milk under their own-
label tailored to the demand of consumers (Mylan et al., 2015). Through additional standards 
in terms of animal welfare, disease status, husbandry and environmental footprints, retailers 
add value to their dairy products in a highly competitive milk market. To milk producers, the 
long turn relationships with fixed milk prices offered economic security and opportunities for 
farmers to invest.  
By 2012, about one-quarter of the UK dairy farmers held supermarket milk contracts, enabling 
them to improve husbandry and distinguish themselves from other dairy farmers (Costa-Font 
& Revoredo-Giha, 2018). De-regulation resulted in two main types of contractual relationships 
in the dairy industry, presented in figure 5.1. Milk safety and milk quality demands will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
Fig 5.1: Contractual relationships in the UK dairy supply chain 
 
 
 
7 With modern retail industry being characterized by a customer-centric nature, retailers use market 
basket analysis to understand consumer behaviour. It identifies consumer behaviour, buying 
patterns, and relationships between products and contrent deliverly by the retailer inside the stor or 
online. It allows retailers to understand the size, quantity, and value of the customers’ market basket 
to understand how products are purchased. Liquid milk in the UK is one of the core?? Not sure this 
sentence is finished?  
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'Fixed' milk 
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5.4 Milk price fluctuations since de-regulation and the dubious 
milk pricing mechanisms of milk contracts 
The true cost of milk is not about how much milk costs in the shops but how much it costs for 
farmers to produce milk and for how much they can sell their milk on the wholesale market or 
‘farm gate’ price. The UK Farm-gate milk price is the average milk prices per litre (net of 
delivery charges) paid by dairies for all milk purchased in the month in England, Wales, 
Northern Ireland and Scotland (AHDB Dairy, 2019). Defra monitors and produces the monthly 
Farm-gate milk price to follow national and international milk market trends (Department for 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2019). Evaluating trends since 1994, the period between 
1994 and 2002 showed a fluctuation in milk prices due to the uncertainty of the milk markets 
after de-regulation (Franks & Hauser, 2012). Competitive markets and uncertainties related to 
supplies increased the milk price. It subsequently dropped; stabilising between 2002-2007 with 
settlement of UK and international markets. A peak in price in 2007 was the result of a spike 
in international prices due to imbalance between supply and demand. The low average milk 
price between 2000 and 2009 led to a decline in British milk production because the farm gate 
milk prices were lower than milk production costs. Together with an increased international 
demand for UK produced milk, due to a weakened sterling, the milk price went up again until 
2013 (Franks & Hauser, 2012). 
With milk contracts defining the milk prices, their pricing mechanisms became a topic of 
debate in dairy communities. To reduce the milk price inequalities created through the milk 
contracts, dairy farmers and processing companies in the UK agreed in 2012 upon the ‘Dairy 
Industry Voluntary Code of Best Practice on Contractual Relationships between milk buyer 
and supplier’ (the Dairy code) (Dairy UK, NFU, & NFU Scotland, 2012). The Code was 
designed to provide transparency and confidence in the milk contract between milk processor 
and milk producer. It discussed what information on pricing mechanism and price variation 
processors should provide to milk producers (Downing, 2016). While adherence to the code is 
voluntarily, it was intended to drive best practice and was meant to be adopted across the dairy 
supply chain (Dairy UK et al., 2012). But being voluntary, milk buyers would only adopt the 
code if all milk buyers were signed up to the terms. Milk contracts currently remain 
confidential, preventing detailed comparisons between the contracts besides the prices paid 
(Costa-Font and Revoredo-Giha 2017). 
Due to a price fall of 25% over the year 2014, many UK dairy farmers were being forced out 
of business, with the costs for farmers to produce milk being higher than the price they receive 
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for their raw milk (Ruddick, 2015). The drop in milk price in the UK resulted from a number 
of national and international factors coinciding: UK retailer price wars; an international decline 
in milk demand, particularly from China and Russia (a Russian ban on European meat, fish 
and dairy products due to geo-political struggles), and oversupply of milk and milk products 
in Europe resulted in a reduction in the UK milk price (Downing, 2016). The market became 
under even more pressure when the EU abolished its milk quota on the 31st of March 2015 to 
allow milk sectors to operate closer to free market conditions. The average farm-gate price for 
June 2015 was 24.46 pence per litre – the lowest price paid for five years, which resulted in 
UK dairy farmer strikes in 2015 (BBC, 2015b, 2015a). The Farmgate milk prices dropped 
even lower in 2016, resulting in farmers protesting over the summer of 2016, with cows 
paraded through the aisles of an Asda store in Stafford, in the West Midlands (Ruddick, 2015). 
In 2016, as farmers were performing below the cost-production of milk, the former NFU dairy 
board chaiman Michael Oakes called for milk buyers to pass gains in the wholesale markets 
to their supplying farmers (NFU, 2016a). Price indicators were showing prices should be 
between 25-30 pence per litre, while most of the non-aligned prices were around 20ppl. Since 
then, the farm gate ‘all milk’ price has increased to an average of 29.34 over the year 2018 
(see figure 5.2).  
 
 
NFU estimated in 2016 that the price of production for milk is around 30 ppl (Downing, 2016, 
p. 7). To evaluate how the farm gate milk price reflects the actual costs of milk production, 
AHDB regularly publishes estimates of how much it costs for producers to produce milk, in 
pence per litre. The average GB farmgate ´all milk´ price was 30.55 ppl in December 2018 
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(AHDB Dairy, 2019). Hence, tight margins exist today between the cost of production and 
milk prices locking farmers in their local realities. Importantly, with liquid milk as one of the 
central products for retailers, this thesis has focussed on the liquid milk contracts. As will 
become clear in the next Chapter, milk price shapes farmers response to dairy supply chain 
quality standards. 
 
5.5 Milk safety and quality regulation in the UK 
The former paragraphs have established the tensions that exist between milk producers, milk 
contracts, milk prices, milk processors, retailers and consumers. In order to understand how 
dairy supply chain members respond to responsible AB-use, it is important to define milk 
safety and milk quality and the mechanisms and responsibilities for assuring safety and quality. 
In what follows, I will first introduce governmental and food supply chain responsibilities in 
terms of milk safety and quality, and how milk safety and quality is defined by the different 
responsible bodies. Figure 5.3 presents a schematic oversight of the paragraphs that follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.3: Regulation of milk safety and milk quality in the UK dairy industry 
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5.5.1 National Responsibilities 
In the context of the dairy industry, EU directives require that farms and processing plants 
undertake general hygiene measures related to the microbiological, physical and chemical 
hazards (Bailey & Garforth, 2014). Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 
853/2004  require occasional official controls on milk production holdings for raw milk and 
colostrum to verify compliance with plate count, somatic cell count and residues of AB 
substances. Member States can take samples from raw milk either at farm level from the 
collection tank or at the level of the dairy industry before the bulk tank is discharged. In the 
UK, the VMD controls milk samples from milk bulk tanks on farms with microbiological, 
physical and chemical parameters. The sampling is carried out by the Animal and Plant Health 
Agency (APHA) and tested by Fera Science Ltd, UK’s National Reference Laboratory for 
veterinary medicines residues (VMD, 2016a). The VMD publishes bi-monthly the results of 
the controls, available online (VMD, 2018). Part of the VMD’s residue control program is the 
screening for AB residues to which I next turn.  
 
5.5.2 Milk residues and their Maximum Residue Levels 
Medicines used in food animals can leave traces of medicine residues in animal derived 
products. To protect human health against medicine residues in animal products, AB 
withdrawal periods have been established for each AB product and their application in food 
animals. The AB withdrawal period is the statutory period that should elapse between the last 
day of AB treatment until the moment the food-producing animal enters into the food supply 
chain (FSA, 2016). During the medicine withdrawal period, food-producing animals or their 
products cannot be used for human consumption. To ensure the withdrawal period of 
medicines used in food-producing animals are respected, regulatory authorities have 
established medicine Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs). The MRL is an official EU standard 
and is designed to protect the health of the European consumer by ensuring that food animal 
products (e.g. meat, milk, eggs) are not placed in markets if they contain residues that exceed 
regulated limits residues (FSA, 2016). MRL thresholds of ABs are meant to separate AB ‘safe’ 
from AB ‘unsafe’ animal products. The MRLs of ABs in foodstuffs of animal origin are 
detailed in Regulation (EC) No 37/2010. In addition, Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 contains 
legal European requirements on how to control medicine residues in food supply chains, at 
national and supply chain level. 
Farmers must make the results of all AB testing they undertake available for inspection by the 
competent authority under request and keep records of ABs administered to their animals for 
5 years (FSA, 2016). The FSA publishes AB residue guidelines for milk producers, milk 
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purchasers and milk to help prevent AB residues in raw milk from entering the food chain 
(FSA, 2018). The position of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 
however is that the main responsibility of residue management lies with the food business 
operators, who need to test milk at various points from farm to fork to control MRL levels of 
AB. This responsibility is milk processor driven. 
 
5.5.3 Red Tractor Private National Assurance: 
To unify transparency across Farm Assurance Schemes, the British food industry introduced 
the ‘British Farm Standard’ known as the Red Tractor symbol (Figure 5.4).  
 
 
       Fig 5.4: Red Tractor Symbol 
 
Established in 2000 as a not for profit company, Red Tractor is owned, funded and run by the 
food industry and has become Britain’s biggest farm assurance scheme across livestock 
species (together with Lion Eggs in the poultry industry, covering 90% of UK eggs). Red 
tractor as an organisation is represented by experts from the farming and food industry and is 
the only scheme in the UK that ensures food traceability from farm-to-pack. The income of 
Red Tractor comes from assured members, food businesses who pay to use the Red Tractor 
consumer logo on food they pack. The Red Tractor label stands for ‘basic’ production 
standards covering the harmonisation of animal welfare, food safety, traceability and 
environmental protection across food producers. In the Dairy Red Tractor Farm Assurance 
Scheme, safety standards refer to hygiene and equipment; residue safety is the responsibility 
of the VMD and milk processors (as will be discussed in the next paragraphs) (Red Tractor 
Assurance, 2017). The Red Tractor standards are produced in consultation with customers, 
farmer representatives and the wider industry to make them representative of the industry and 
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accountable to consumers. Red Tractor standards normally have a three-year revision cycle 
and can only be amended after consensus among industry members. Importantly, Red Tractor 
standards are species- or product-specific and involve a set of standards in accordance with 
the demands of processors and/or retailers (Bailey & Garforth, 2014). At the dairy sector level, 
95 % of the UK dairy producers operate through the Dairy Red Tractor Assurance Scheme as 
all major milk processors require that their milk producers are Red Tractor farm assured 
(Bailey & Garforth, 2014).  
 
5.5.4 Milk processor responsibilities  
The UK milk processor structure 
Roughly 79% of milk processed in the UK is controlled by 9 companies, which account for 
2% of all milk processing companies. The UK distribution of Dairy Companies by product is 
presented in Table 5.2. 
Table. 5.2: Total amount of UK dairy milk processors in 2015, specified by commodity (AHDB Dairy, 
2017c)  
2015 
Specified 
commodity 
UK Distribution of Dairy Companies by Product 
Companies Processing Milk  Volume of annual Milk Intake 
Number Thousand Tonnes 
Liquid milk  242 6490 
Cheese 95 295 
Butter 24 143 
  
 
Approximately 90% of the UK’s liquid milk output is controlled by 7 companies (AHDB 
Dairy, 2017c). Muller and Arla are the two dominant players, each having a third of the total 
milk intake. The other 20% is divided between milk processors such as First milk, Medina, 
Tomlinsons Dairy Crest and Meadow Foods. The remaining 10% is accounted for by a large 
number of small milk processors. Milk processors set standards in the non-aligned milk 
contracts in relation to milk quality/composition (somatic cell count, milk solids such as fat-
protein-lactose and mastitis pathogens such as E.-coli’s, staphylococcus) and milk safety 
(residue control). In return, farmers receive a volatile milk price that milk processors define 
through costs, profits and the market milk price.  
104 
 
Milk safety: medicine residue control  
The VMD testing regimes are complemented with sampling and testing regimes of the 
individual food business operators. At farm level, farmers need to consider AB withdrawal 
times when they use ABs to ensure raw milk from individual animals under treatment does 
not enter into the milk supply chain. Through their milk contracts, they are obliged to ensure 
that their milk is free from ABs (Interview Milk Processor 1). They can use farm test kits to 
test if the raw milk of a cow under treatment is ‘safe’ to be deposited in the milk bulk tank of 
the farm. Milk buyers, such as the milk processors, must have sufficient control mechanisms 
in place to test raw milk for the presence of milk residues above MRL level before they can 
process the milk (Interview Livestock organisation 4). It is up to the food business operators 
to determine sampling frequency on a risk basis, with reference to specific requirements in 
Regulation (EC) No 853/2004. To address levels of control at farm level and processor level, 
milk processors have two control mechanisms in place to manage the risk of milk residues.  
 
The first mechanism is indirectly paid for by farmers through their ‘quality assurance 
program’ (quality standards), which is specific to the milk processor’s milk contract 
(Interview Livestock organisation 4). When milk is collected at the farm by a processor’s milk 
road tanker, a sample of the farm milk bulk tank will be taken which will be sent to the national 
milk laboratory (NML). The NML will test the milk sample for butterfat and protein if this is 
part of the payment scheme, and test it once a week using the standard Delvo test8. Secondly, 
milk processors will have their own ‘quality control program’ in place which contains a 
sampling and testing regime based on risk assessments of their dairy supply chains. This is 
financed by the milk processors themselves (Interview Livestock organisation 4). As part of 
their ‘quality control program’, milk processors will test every milk road tanker that arrives at 
their plant, using an Immune-receptor test such as the quick SNAP Beta-Lactam test type 
(Interview Veterinary surgeon 21). This test is cheaper but more restricted in residue testing 
than the standard Delvo test. The milk from the road tankers is emptied into the processor’s 
milk silos which will be AB tested on a frequency determined by the risk assessment of the 
milk processor (FSA, 2015). 
 
 
8 Two types of tests circulate that can be used to test milk for ABs (FSA 2015, p.7).   
 1. Immune-receptor tests: their spectrum of detection is normally limited but they give a positive or negative 
result within 5-10 minutes;   
 2. Microbial inhibitor tests: they detect a wider range of antimicrobial substances, including β-lactams, and give 
a result within 3 hours or less. The Delvo test is the most well-known global dairy standard microbial inhibitor test 
used by farmers, dairies and milk control laboratories that tests for a broad spectrum of AB residues. Importantly, 
the test comes out either positive or negative, but does not specify the type of failure.    
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Where milk fails the testing, the failure can be attributed to individual farms according to the 
records which link the samples of milk to the farms from which they were collected with the 
tanker which transported the milk. Although the testing and follow up procedures (e.g. 
evaluating the farm) are paid for by the milk processor, the costs of the loss of the milk will 
be to the farmer who has a positive result. The testing procedures at farm bulk tank level, milk 
tank level and processor silo level should allow ‘full’ transparency of the milk supply chain’s 
responsibility to produce residue ‘safe’ milk products (Interview Livestock organisation 4). 
The FSA in England and Wales (FSA, 2015, p. 13) must be notified by milk purchasers and 
milk processors in case of a milk residue failure as soon as possible and at least on a monthly 
basis. The FSA will follow up actions undertaken by the milk purchaser/processors, including 
monitoring if milk is disposed correctly according to regulation (FSA, 2015, p. 13). 
 
Milk quality/composition responsibilities  
Milk processors ‘measure’ milkfat, protein, bulk milk cell count and bacteria count in order to 
define the quality and composition of their milk (Interview Milk processor 1). These 
parameters will influence the destination of the dairy product (liquid milk, cheese, butter, 
yoghurt and other products). Farmers receive a milk price in accordance with the 
quality/composition of the milk he/she produces, defined by the milk payment scheme in their 
milk contract. If the milk of producers does not meet the quality and composition standards, it 
is rejected and the milk producer will not get paid. This enables milk processors to use their 
milk payment schemes to ‘govern’ farmers in delivering a certain quality and composition of 
milk. 
 
In October 2015 milk processor Arla introduced in the UK their own quality assurance scheme, 
‘Arlagården’, on top of the Red Tractor assurance (Arla, 2015). This private farm assurance 
scheme, defined by Arla in cooperation with Red Tractor, demands that farmers comply with 
additional milk quality standards (Arla, 2015). These standards focus on milk quality, food 
safety, and animal welfare and need to be met by the 2500 UK dairy farmers who supply Arla. 
All 12,700 Arla farmers in Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg are now 
assessed to the same standards (Arla, 2015). In creating standards over and above the red 
tractor scheme Arla has differentiated itself from other processors in the market.  
 
5.5.5 Retailer quality standards  
As discussed earlier, certain retailers have started to contract farmers directly. This means 
retailers pay their ‘aligned milk pool’, a fixed milk price for on average 6 months for which 
farmers must comply with retailer production standards. These milk ‘quality’ standards focus 
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on animal welfare, environmental footprints, sustainability, and disease status. Milk 
processors have, in this situation, the task of ‘toll-manufacturer’ and will be paid the 
processing costs of the raw milk. Milk processors remain in this case responsible for the safety 
(chemical, microbiological) and composition (physical) of raw milk. 
 
Retailers will negotiate milk prices directly with their aligned farmers while negotiating 
processing costs with the milk processors they have contracts with (Interview Retailer 1 and 
Retailer 2). The fixed milk price covers labour, materials, supplies, equipment and overheads. 
In return, farmers receive security in milk price and income. Through this mechanism, retailers 
aim to ‘control’ the production standards while incentivising farmers by offering a fixed milk 
price in return. The disadvantages of aligned contracts for retailers are that they have to pay 
their farmers a higher milk price than competitors; and for farmers they can miss out on profit 
when global milk market prices increase. Thus, aligned contracts reduce exposure to market 
volatility but come with more stringent conditions attached to the contract. Independent third 
parties are involved in managing cost-production price calculations and in negotiations 
between producers and processors. The independent third party will try to set a cost-production 
price that reflects the cost of production to dairy farmers and is average for the sector. The 
liquid milk from their aligned pool of milk producers will be sold under a retailer owned label, 
which reflects the retailers’ production standards laid out in the contract (Interview Retailer 1 
and Retailer 2). 
 
An example of a retailer-producer agreement is the Tesco Sustainable Dairy Group (TSDG), 
which was set up in 2007 and comprises around 600 farmers who supply Tesco with own-
brand milk (Tesco, 2018). A cost-production price is set in collaboration with farmers and set 
for 6 months, independent from the retailer price for milk. Another example is the Sainsbury’s 
Dairy Development Group (SDDG), also established in 2007, which comprises approximately 
270 dairy farmers (Sainsbury, n.d.). SDDG members are assessed and benchmarked against 
health and welfare outcome data in order to drive improvement. SDDG also uses a cost of 
production model to provide milk price stability and promise a volume of guaranteed supply 
for Sainsbury’s (Sainsbury, n.d.). Other retailers who offer ‘aligned’ contracts include 
Waitrose, Morrisons, M&S, Asda and Co-op (NFU, 2016b). Middle ground retailers such as 
Aldi, Lidl and Budgens do not have their own milk pools and buy milk from processors instead 
directly from farmers. The price they pay indirectly to farmers follows the market price and 
does not guarantee more than the cost of production. Their milk will be farm assured against 
the standards of the milk processor, which will be Red Tractor Dairy Farm Assurance in 95% 
of the cases (Red Tractor Scheme, 2017). 
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5.6 Discussion 
This Chapter has provided details of how food supply chains have been institutionalised over 
time as the responsible actors need to ensure food quality and safety to consumers, from farm-
to-table. This process of institutionalisation was multifaceted and took place at national and 
European level. Food safety crises during the 1980-1990s co-produced new consumer profiles 
that demanded new control mechanisms to ensure food safety. At the same time, European 
integration of agricultural markets in a single market produced new ideas on how to govern 
food safety and food quality across member States. Neo-liberal agricultural regimes emerged 
which made food supply chains responsible to produce ‘safe’ food products against high 
quality control standards. In a competitive, ‘free’ European food market, food safety and 
quality merged under the ‘food quality’ umbrella. Food safety became more than ensuring 
‘safe food’; it became entangled with the ‘food quality’ marketing strategies of private supply 
chains. Consumer demands are increasingly dictating the quality standards retailers define and 
impose back up the food chain to suppliers.  
In dairy, milk contracts, milk production standards and milk prices, have not only become 
tools to standardise milk production and processing procedures in milk supply chains; they 
have become part of the commercial strategies of milk processors and retailers. More than 50 
different milk contracts currently shape how farmers manage their production units and how 
milk quality becomes ‘standardised’ across the dairy industry. The Red Tractor dairy scheme 
serves as a milk safety and quality label, through which retailers and milk processors can 
choose whether they want to add quality parameters. This raises questions about the 
responsibility the dairy supply chain has been given to drive responsible AB-use. How will 
dairy supply chain members respond to this responsibility? How do they include responsible 
AB-use as a public health responsibility in their economic futures? The following Chapter will 
explore how milk processors and retailers have responded to this responsibility and the 
consequences of this – both intended and unintended. 
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6.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 5, responsibilities in the UK dairy supply chains for milk safety and 
quality have been re-institutionalised over the decades. Important human actors (UK food 
safety authorities, consumers, retailers milk pools, milk processor cooperatives) and non-
human actors (milk contracts, milk prices, milk quality standards, milk markets, farm 
assurance schemes, milk residues, AB tests) emerged that have influenced how the UK dairy 
supply chains have come to operate in competitive markets. I will explore these actors in this 
Chapter to understand their contribution to dairy AB decision-making, on paper and in 
practice. I will however first introduce how the UK dairy sector defines policies of 
antimicrobial governance in their sector. 
 
6.2 Initial denial 
In contrast with the pig and poultry industry, the UK dairy sector has only recently started to 
tackle AB-use. One explanation for this difference is that according to the UK-VARSS reports 
published over the last decade, the dairy and other food producing sectors use significantly 
less AB than the pig and poultry industry: 
 
“AMR and antibiotic usage in the dairy industry isn’t such a big problem. If you look at the 
use of drugs per kg of meat product or whatever, the big issue is the pig and poultry. They are 
the ones that are having a problem, and then behind them, comes the dairy sector and behind 
them comes the beef sector, so we are not actually responsible for a great deal of antibiotic 
usage.” (Respondent Livestock organisation 4) 
 
The British media have also played an important role in shaping the debate (Morris et al., 
2016). The ‘factory farms’ in the pig and poultry industry were framed as the the most 
drugged-up food animal sectors (Fenton, 2016; Levitt, 2016). It was claimed that the overuse 
and misuse of ABs was driven by the need of intensive livestock systems to reduce their 
disease burden thereby reducing production costs. This negative media attention and the public 
concerns it produced pushed the UK pig and poultry sector to undertake voluntary action to 
reduce sector AB-use (Respondent Livestock organisation 1). Less intensive farming sectors 
escaped public scrutiny, which allowed those sectors to continue with their AB practices. 
Today, pig and poultry are considered by the agricultural industry as front runners in AB policy 
progress (Respondent Livestock organisation 1). They have established national electronic 
surveillance systems in which producers register their AB usage activities. They have 
significantly reduced overall AB sales and usage, banned or restricted prophylactic use and 
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restricted the use of HP-CIAs. The latest UK-VARSS report (2018) shows the differences in 
AB sales reduction between the livestock sectors over recent years (Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1: The UK’s veterinary antimicrobial sales in tonnes of active ingredient per livestock species 
from 2012 to 2016 
Species 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Pig and poultry   235 217 235 214 127 
Cattle 14 14 13 14 18 
Fish 2.1 0.8 2.4 0.7 1.6 
Sheep 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 
 
Note: Adapted from UK-VARSS 2018 
 
6.3 The UK dairy sector action plan 
The publication of the O’Neill reports (2015, 2016) challenged AB-use in both humans and 
animals. The UK livestock sectors were urged to make AB-use transparent, consider the 
volume of ABs used (prophylactic and growth promoting use) and the types of ABs used (HP-
CIA’s) (O’Neill 2016). In 2017, the UK dairy sector highlighted the difficulties of establishing 
a ‘true and accurate picture’ of how ABs actually get used on farms, but stated it would work 
towards the collection of more ‘robust and representative’ AB usage data (RUMA, 2017, p. 
14). In the RUMA task force report of 2017, they presented their Dairy Action Plan, in which 
they committed to a 20% reduction of overall AB-use while halving the use of HP-CIAs by 
2020. The dairy sector identified 4 areas where there would be scope for change (RUMA, 
2017): 
 
Focus 1: Overall reduction in the use of Highest Priority Critically Important ABs 
Focus 2: Selective dry cow therapy (SDCT)   
Focus 3: Pneumonia/respiratory issues in young stock  
Focus 4: Foot baths 
 
In order to co-ordinate and implement the targets set in the Dairy Action Plan, the Dairy 
Antimicrobial Stewardship Group (DASG) was established in April 2017 by the NFU and 
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Dairy UK (UK’s dairy trade organisation) (RUMA, 2017). DASG is the first dairy 
organisation to represent the whole industry. As the co-ordinating body, the DASG represents 
farming, processing, veterinary and supporting partners of the dairy industry. The DSAG was 
set up to reduce AB-use and increase transparency in the recording of dairy AB-use. To 
achieve this, DASG is responsible for designing AB data surveillance systems; dispersing 
knowledge on responsible AB-use; and aligning dairy industry members with their strategies. 
They identified the following key areas to deliver, promote and co-ordinate the Dairy Action 
Plan (RUMA, 2017):  
 
• Improve data collection on antibiotic usage 
• Antibiotic training 
• Optimise on farm antibiotic use 
• Supply chain initiatives 
• Preventatives/alternatives  
• Communication of strategies with farmers 
 
In line with the UK Government’s policy recommendations and RUMA’s overarching policy 
framework, the dairy key areas are designed either to provide evidence-based information on 
AB usage activities or to transfer evidence-based knowledge to farmers and vets. 
 
6.3.1 Statistical realities: surveillance systems 
AB usage data collection serves as a central pillar in the strategy as it is believed this data 
will provide accurate oversight of use and qualify AB performance. It can therefore be used 
to stimulate the self-governance of farmer and veterinary AB-use: 
 
“Tools such as medicines audits allow us to better quantify the use of medicines on 
our farms and to compare changes we might make going forward, or to benchmark 
veterinary surgeons or farmers use of medicines against one another for continued 
comparison, as well as to prove what is possible […] A great use of accurate 
records helps both farmers and veterinary surgeons to keep track of how they are 
doing and compare that to how others are doing, benchmarking can be very 
powerful” (Reyher, Barrett, & Tisdall, 2017, p. 67) 
 
To move from sales to usage data, dairy farmers are encouraged, at the moment, to record 
their AB usage data electronically by milk processors and retailers. A central co-ordinating 
data hub will be the next step forward (RUMA 2017). 
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6.3.2 ‘Evidence-based’ knowledge programmes and herd health informants 
The vet/farmer relationship is considered as paramount to drive responsible AB-use by the 
Dairy Action Plan (RUMA, 2017, p. 15). To strengthen evidence-based communication and 
decision-making between both professions, several knowledge tools have been implemented. 
AHDB dairy, RADBF9 dairy and Dairy UK are the organisations that provide dairy producers 
with voluntary programmes to optimise AB-use and herd health management. At the 
veterinary level, the British Cattle Veterinary Association (BCVA) promotes responsible AB-
use of medicines to vets (BCVA, 2016). To control and/or eradicate endemic diseases, the 
BVCA runs a BVD10 and Johne’s11  training program for vets (RUMA, 2017, p. 16). According 
to the UK dairy sector  (see the next quote),  these AB training programmes are trusted to 
transfer evidence-based AB knowledge to farmers and vets and stimulate the self-governance 
of responsible AB-use (RUMA, 2017, p. 16).  
 
“Raising the awareness of the issues has already triggered a willing and strong 
response from the sector; with many farmers attending workshops and courses to 
improve their own knowledge; they are going back to basics to learn which 
antibiotics are classified as HP-CIAs and to start asking the ‘why’ question. This 
has led them to look at their protocols and infrastructure on farm and develop 
strong working relations with their vets, which will be fundamental in the delivery of 
these reductions […] Through proposed farmer and vet training packages, as well 
as academic syllabuses, the next generation can be educated to ensure that both 
understanding and responsible antibiotic use of antibioticss becomes second nature”  
 
6.3.3 Dairy supply chain responsibilities: driving change 
The O’Neill report of 2016 requested that food supply chains be transparent in their AB 
practices, to ‘enable consumers to make more informed purchase decisions’ (p. 26). Retailers, 
milk processors and the industry-led Red Tractor Dairy Farm Assurance Scheme are 
responsible for driving change in AB usage across their supply chains and providing 
transparency of these activities. Dairy supply chains are expected to work with their farmers 
to reduce HP-CIA use, to implement Selective Dry Cow Therapy (SDCT) strategies and to 
deliver transparency in AB usage activities of their farmer pools (Interview Retailer 2). Their 
 
9 RABDF is a UK charity focused on the needs of milk producers. They have relationships up and 
down the whole supply chain focusing on four areas: 1. Influencing and lobbying, developing young 
talent, improving business resilience and identifying and showcasing ground-breaking innovation.  
10  BVD (Bovine Viral Diarrhoea) is an endemic viral disease in the UK caused by the pestivirus which 
infects cattle but can also infects sheep and other ruminants (AHDB Dairy, n.d.).  
11 Johne’s Disease or Paratuberculosis is a chronic, contagious bacterial disease of the intestinal tract 
caused by Mycobacterium avium subsp paratuberculosis and can be found in sheep and cattle (mostly 
dairy) and other ruminants (AHDB Dairy, n.d.-b).  
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activities will be discussed more in depth in the following sections.  
 
6.4 Dairy antibiotic policies and the practices of the policies as 
actor-network activity 
The UK Dairy Action plan and its expectations were designed and published during the course 
of my fieldwork. Dairy supply chain actors had already started to implement AB policies in 
response to the O’Neill reports (2015, 2016) and the government response report to O’Neill 
(Department of Health 2016). Importantly, following the recommendations of the ‘Alliance’, 
the dairy sector used technocratic policy instruments, such as measurement and evidence-
based training programmes, to drive responsible AB-use by UK dairy farmers. Dairy supply 
chain members were therefore being made responsible for implementing these measures and 
delivering evidence of their success. What dairy sector actors and their policies have in 
common is that they consider AB-use by farmers and vets as a behavioural problem, which 
needs to be rationalised. This reasoning positions farmers and vets as ‘free’ autonomous actors 
who need to be standardised in their decision-making from their social, economic, and/or 
political-ecological context. Consequently, farmers and vets are the targets of AB policies. 
Questioning the autonomy of farmer decision-making, Gray & Gibson (2013) have explored 
how farmers incorporate new technologies into their daily practices. Instead of focusing on 
individual farmer behaviour as a site of interest, they use Latour 's (2005) Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) to study how the agricultural relations of farmers influence their decision-
making. Farmer’s agricultural networks were examined as a heterogeneous mix of human (off-
farm experts, peers) and nonhuman (fertilizers, technologies, farm equipment, pesticides, farm 
credits) components. The authors show that the configuration of heterogeneous agricultural 
actors both expands and constrains farmer AB decision-making (Gray & Gibson, 2013). 
Following Gray and Gibson (2013), the next two sections in this Chapter and Chapter 7 will 
demonstrate how AB policy decisions and their practices take place as an agricultural network 
activity. Which actors matter in dairy supply chain networks? What is at stake? How does this 
shape dairy supply chain AB policies and their practices? These questions will be used to trace 
how AB decision making across dairy sector actors is either constrained or expanded by their 
agricultural networks. The intended and unintended effects or ‘overflows’ of dairy agricultural 
network activities will be furthermore discussed to evaluate the public health and 
environmental impact of dairy policies. 
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6.5 Taming antibiotic milk residues: milk processors battle to 
deliver ‘safe’ milk 
6.5.1 Risky antibiotic residues as ‘matter of concern’ 
As will become clear, AB residues are ‘co-producing’ milk processors AB strategies and 
farmers’ AB practices.  
 
“There are two elements; you have responsible antibiotic use. This is the sexy subject, you 
know, everyone is interested in that thing, whatever that means. And then you have the 
residue management side of it, which is traditionally the area that I need to manage and 
have concern over. And this is the one that people don’t like to talk about and it becomes 
quite dry and boring in effect. But actually, the two are inter-related.” (Milk processor 2) 
 
Evaluating the VMD national residue surveillance schemes over 2015, 2016 and 2017, they 
reveal there have been only 3 non-compliant samples/AB milk residue failures at farm bulk 
tank level of over 4300 tested farms. According to NOAH (NOAH, n.d.), farmers and vets 
have an excellent track record of ensuring food is free from medicine residues. However, milk 
processor test results divert from the VMD results. 
 
“The numbers of failures we get here as a company is about, let’s say 33 a month, or something 
like that across all our farms.” (Milk processor 2) 
 
An explanation for the difference is the higher frequency in sampling and the number of farms 
that milk processors screen. However, the most important indicator to evaluate whether 
farmers are compliant to MRL levels is the control point of sampling. This will determine 
whether a medicine residue is detectable or not. The VMD and milk processors start testing at 
farm milk bulk tank level (FSA, 2015). The farmer is responsible for ensuring that the raw 
milk of the individual cow is safe before it enters the milk bulk tank (FSA, 2015). But as the 
milk in the tanker travels from farm to farm and to the milk processor plant, it gets diluted 
with milk from other cows. A similar effect happens with milk residues, which get diluted 
when travelling from the cow to end product (see Figure 6.1).  
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The dilution effect can cause milk samples to test in accordance with their MRL levels at farm 
milk bulk tank level, even when they may exceed MRL level at an individual cow level.  
 
“So natural dilution, it is not deliberate dilution but it is an operational consequence. We can’t 
dilute out residues deliberately, it will be illegal to do that.” (Milk processor 2) 
 
“If you buy milk on supermarket shelves, because it is diluted out with lots of other farms, the 
milk is almost certainly going to have residues below the MRL for everything.” (Veterinary 
surgeon 21) 
 
Fig 6.1: Antibiotic milk residue testing and the dilution effect 
Presence of milk residues in raw milk at 
individual cow level
Farmer self-testing
Milk residues dilute through increase in 
volume when entering in the farm milk bulk 
tank
VMD
Milk processor (Quality assurance: weekly delvo test)
Milk residues dilute with milk from other 
farms  when entering in the  milk processor 
tanker
Milk processor  (Quality control: daily AB snap test)
Milk residues dilute further when entering in 
large processor milk silos
Milk processor  (Quality control: frequency varies: AB 
snap test)
Milk gets processed into liquid milk or 
manufacturing products
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From a food safety perspective, the EU MRL legislation requests that products which tested 
MRL positive at individual cow level should be recalled and destroyed (FSA, 2015). However, 
when milk processors receive a positive test result the milk from this farm has often already 
been processed and is on its way to the supermarkets. Although the milk at processor level can 
test below MRL levels and is as such considered as ‘safe’, milk processors are officially still 
in breach of the EU MRL law. Recalling every positive result at farm milk bulk tank level 
would be a logistic and economic nightmare resulting in a large number of dairy products in 
UK supermarkets being destroyed. In the past, to protect dairy supply chains, the FSA has 
previously tolerated the ‘dilution-effect’ of milk residues by turning ‘a blind eye to it’ 
(Interview Veterinary surgeon 21).  
The recent international politicisation of the public health risks of AB-use in food animals has 
however renewed attention on how the UK dairy industry manages AB residues. The FSA has 
now begun to exert pressure on milk processors to increase their milk residue controls 
(Interview Veterinary surgeon 21). This has turned milk residues into a matter of concern to 
milk buyers, not only from a milk safety perspective, but also financially: the costs milk 
processors spend to investigate milk failures are significant (Interview Milk processor 2).  
 
“What the milk buyers do, they always investigate a bulk tank failure and they spend huge 
resources doing that.” (Veterinary surgeon 21) 
 
More stringent controls on milk residues mean a need for stricter controls on milk failures. For 
milk processors, responsible AB-use by farmers can reduce the risk of AB residues entering 
the milk supply chain. Hence, the milk processors are working with two responsibilities in the 
design of their AB policies: responsible AB-use and milk residues. In what follows, 
responsible AB-use policies by some of the bigger milk processor companies are discussed, 
explaining the focus on SDCT and Dairy processors use of Red Tractor. Next, milk residue 
policies will be discussed in the following order: farmer training, milk penalties and milk self-
testing. The overflows of the former strategies will be finally discussed.  
 
6.5.2 Selective Dry Cow Therapy (SDCT) 
The ‘dry cow period’ is the part of the cow’s lactation cycle during which the cow’s milk 
production is stopped for at least 40 days until the next parturition (AHDB Dairy, 2017b). This 
allows for the mammary glands of the udder to be restored to achieve maximal milk production 
after a new calf is born. It is also considered to be the best period in the lactation cycle of the 
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cow to treat subclinical cases of mastitis12 (AHDB Dairy, 2017b; Biggs, 2017). Previous 
guidelines recommended the ‘blanket’ treatment of cows with ABs in the dry period, and it 
has since become the biggest hotspot of prophylactic AB-use. The aim of dry cow therapy was 
to reduce the prevalence of mastitis by treating existing intra-mammary infections (IMIs) and 
to protect new IMIs emerging (Scherpenzeel et al., 2016). Practically, this meant every cow 
was prophylactically treated with a long lasting AB (e.g. Cepravin, Urbor Red, Orbenin Extra) 
in each teat of its udder (Biggs, 2017). However, research has shown that cows with a low 
somatic cell count (SCC) at drying off who receive AB dry cow tubes are actually at increased 
risk of having E. coli type mastitis in the first 100 days of the next lactation (Cafre, n.d.). 
Pharmaceutical company Zoetis introduced Orbeseal in 2002, a non-AB internal teat sealant 
that could be used in healthy cows instead of an AB teat sealant to reduce the risk of new 
infections in healthy cows. Blanket dry cow therapy has been reappraised over the years in 
which Selective Dry Cow Therapy became the new golden standard (Biggs, 2017; 
Scherpenzeel et al., 2016). Instead of blanket use of ABs in all cows who are drying off, 
Selective Dry Cow Therapy (SDCT) was introduced as method that selects only those cows 
with evidence of an udder infection to be eligible for AB treatment. All cows receive an 
internal teat sealant (Orbeseal) irrespective of whether they receive AB dry cow treatment or 
not (Biggs, 2017; Scherpenzeel et al., 2016). Selection criteria for SDCT are herd specific 
(Cafre, n.d.) so information must be available. This includes individual SCC data over past 
few months, clinical mastitis history in current lactation, bulk tank SCC trends and ideally, 
bacteriology available from milk samples taken from clinical/sub-clinical mastitis cases. 
Hygiene is critical during drying off with teat sealants to avoid infection. Screening for 
infected quarters is equally important to avoid increased risk of infection (Cafre, n.d.) 
In the responsible AB-use of ABs industry discussion, UK milk processors see SDCT as the 
most important strategy to reduce AB usage of their farmers and with it, the risk of milk residue 
failures. Milk processors started to implement SDCT strategies from 2015 onwards.  
 
“The drive to reduce overall antibiotic use has taken place over the last twelve to eighteen 
months, and that is pretty much focused on selective dry cow therapy. So our view is that 
probably over half of all antibiotics that are used are drying off. So if you can influence the 
 
12 Mastitis is the inflammation of the cow’s mammary gland and udder tissue and is one of the most 
frequent diseases in dairy cattle (AHDB Dairy, n.d.-c). Because of its endemic presence across national 
dairy herds,  it has important economic implications as there are large costs associated with reduced 
milk production and milk quality, treatments, premature culling (Laven, 2018) and animal welfare 
implications (Martin, Barkema, Brito, Narayana, & Miglior, 2018). In the UK, mastitis treatment and 
control is one of the biggest costs to the dairy industry and there has been much debate over the years 
how to structure and co-ordinate mastitis problems across UK farms (AHDB Dairy, n.d.-c).  
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strategy that farmers use in drying off, that is the way you can have the biggest impact on 
antibiotic usage.” (Milk processor 1) 
 
“There has been a real push for selected dry cow therapy from the local dairies” (Veterinary 
surgeon 5) 
 
Milk processors also differ in their SDCT approach. While milk processor Arla request their 
farmers perform SDCT in at least 10% of their herd (Arla, 2017), other milk processors chose 
to ‘work with farmers’ to achieve SDCT (Interview milk processor 1). Milk processors have 
organised training events on SDCT practices and to some extent on husbandry management 
to facilitate the exchange of information between farmers and vets with a view to improving 
on-farm practices. It is believed this will mobilise vet and farmer communities. 
 
“We introduced selective dry cow therapy over here. We introduced it and thought about it 
[…]. And basically, the conclusion was, it is not for us to say how you do it. It is for the vets. 
We must not interfere with that. We should facilitate and try and create a momentum so that, 
a farmer tries it, will influence the next farmer, and the next farmer and the next farmer. But 
we can’t influence all of them. So, how it works, vet practices would influence another vet 
practice by association. There is still some resistance out there, but the changes are quite 
incredible. We haven’t got enough facts and figures to know what the usages are. How do you 
measure it? But certainly, anecdotally, in the feedback we are getting, you know it is 
happening.” (Milk processor 2)  
 
This milk processor relies on anecdotes to evaluate whether their role as policy facilitator has 
impact. Interestingly, milk processors therefore do not appear to have focussed on getting the 
metrics to demonstrate whether their SDCT ‘snowball’ training events have succeeded, but 
instead, rely on anecdotes of farmers and vets. The ‘success’ of policy interventions is 
‘covered’ in AB sales/usage metrics in the UK-VARSS report. There is however a gap in 
knowledge how these interventions are done in practice by farmers and how they reduce 
farmers need to use ABs.  
 
6.5.3 Milk residue governance: training farmers 
Across milk supply chain stakeholders, farmers are considered as the ‘biggest risk’ to milk 
residues (Interview, industry livestock organization 3). In particular farmer’s off-label use of 
ABs causes problems as this changes AB milk withdrawal periods. Going ‘off label’ with AB-
use means using medicines outside the terms of the licence. A classic example is the use of 
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Tetra Delta tubes (Beta-lactam) during mastitis treatment. This treatment has a milk 
withdrawal of five days when dosed at treatment day one and complemented in some cases 24 
hours later with another dose. However, most farmers will go off-label by prolonging the Tetra 
Deltra Tube treatment with five consecutive days or topping up the Tetra Deltra Tube 
treatment on day one with an AB injection (Interview Veterinary surgeon 18). This prolongs 
the original withdrawal time of the Tetra Deltra tube with a minimum of seven days according 
to cascade use of ABs. One vet suggested that some farmers are not aware of these mechanisms 
or misuse, which increases the risks of raw milk residues entering the milk supply chain 
(Interview Veterinary surgeon 21). Farmers, therefore, are considered by milk processors as a 
risk to the production of milk residues, as they do not always know how to use ABs 
responsibly.  
 
“They don’t necessarily know what going off-label is, because they might have never actually 
read what the on- label treatment is. And they also don’t always realise that by going off-label, 
they are increasing the risk of residues because of the topping-up effect.” (Veterinary surgeon 
21) 
 
To reduce the risk of milk failures, Dairy UK, in cooperation with the British Cattle Veterinary 
Association, designed a training program for farmers and vets (RUMA, 2017, p. 17). This 
training program is called MilkSure and has been launched recently. The aspiration is to put 
every farmer who has an AB test failure through that training course, ideally with their own 
vets. The programme involves guidance on how to use AB test kits on farms, training on how 
to perform SDCT and how to use teat sealants, with the whole aim to minimize medicine 
residues (Dairy UK, n.d.).  
“The UK Dairy antibiotic working group is charged with, basically, finding a strategy to 
reduce residue failures. One of the key things out there was the professional training for 
farmers, which is how MilkSure came about.” (Milk processor 2) 
 
‘Milksure’ as a training opportunity has become part of the Red Tractor Assurance Dairy 
Scheme (2017, p. 20). It is recommended that at least one member of staff undertakes a 
medicine training course (including, but not limited to, MilkSure) and holds a certificate of 
competence (Red Tractor Assurance, 2018). It is believed these training programmes will 
‘optimise’ farmer’s AB-use.  
Some milk processors have introduced milk price penalties for milk residue failures to 
‘manage’ farmers’ AB behaviour.  
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“If we collect some milk that is contaminated with antibiotics, we don’t only not pay anything 
for that milk, we actually charge the farmer 10p per litre for that milk.” At the end of the day, 
it is the stick and carrot isn’t it? If you hit them financially, they will change their behaviour.” 
(Milk processor 1) 
 
Milk processors push their farmers to use ‘AB test kits’ on farms, to test the milk of individual 
cows in case ABs have been used. On farm rapid AB screening tests are commercially 
available. This allows farmers to test if raw milk that comes from cows that underwent AB 
treatment is ‘safe’ from AB residues and/or to test milk from the farm bulk tank. The self-
governance of milk residues at individual cow level by farmers is an important part of milk 
purchasers/processors agendas.  
 
“So we work very hard with our farmers to ensure that, if they use antibiotics, they actually 
make sure they test their own milk before that milk goes into the milk factory for collection by 
ourselves. And there are some very heavy penalties for farmers who have an antibiotic failure 
on collected milk.  So, it puts the emphasis on them to do the test before we collect it…I think 
probably over 80% of farmers will test their milk, either with a quick or full Delvotest every 
day now.” (Milk processor 1) 
 
6.5.4 The Dairy Red Tractor Scheme  
Red Tractor farm assurance standards are positioned as a trustworthy mechanism to drive 
change and standardise farmer practices.  
 
“Red Tractor Farm Assurance Standards are a very powerful instrument for achieving 
change on farms because they have achieved 95% coverage in the dairy industry which is 
much higher as in other sectors, so changes in dairy are red tractor standards, ensuring the 
entire industry moves together simultaneously.But to do that, there have to be consensus 
among the industry to what those standards should be, but red tractor recognises that the 
whole issue of AMR and antibiotics is becoming more and more important, and instead of 
waiting for the normal 3 year revision cycle, they are prepared to amend and change their 
standards, in order to address this issue in a much shorter interval”. (Respondent Livestock 
industry organisation 4) 
 
 Milk processors request their contracted farmers be Red Tractor farm assured, which covers 
AB and herd health quality assurance standards. During my fieldwork in 2017, the Dairy Red 
Tractor AB quality standards were under revision. Since March 2018, all Red Tractor dairy 
farmers are now required to undertake an annual review of their medicine records (written or 
digital) with their vets. The farmer’s’ total AB usage is evaluated between the farmer and the 
vets, so the vet can come up with responsible AB-use recommendations without compromising 
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animal welfare. AB failures, overall use of dry cow therapy and AB protocols also need to be 
discussed. These quality standards are believed to foster responsible AB-use communication 
between the farmer and the vet. In addition, HP-CIA’s as defined by the European Medicine 
Agency (3th and 4th generation cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones and colistin) can only be 
used since June 2018 as a last resort after sensitivity or diagnostic testing.  
Having introduced the milk processor policies and Dairy Red Tractor Farm Assurance 
Standards, I will next discuss the practices of these policies and the overflows they generate. 
 
6.5.6 The overflows of milk processor-led antibiotic policies:  
SDCT: problem of translation 
The vets in this study had a range of different dairy farmer clients with whom they had 
differing relationships. They reported that this affected their ability to communicate AB 
policies across farmers. Equally, knowledge transfer tools such as protocols, training, and 
videos were not always adopted by farmers as expected by industry policymakers. 
 
“One of my farmers is drying off during milking rather than separating the cows out and 
drying off after milking. You could talk to him about that until you are blue in the face and 
show him all sorts of videos of farmers drying off as a separate group and they will find all 
sort of ways to critique him […] The nature of farmers as well is you are dealing with people 
that have been doing things for a long time but don’t always think what they are doing is 
wrong. So trying to take people, farmers, who see that they have a problem in the first place, 
seeing where that problem might be coming from, seeing that they could do about that problem 
and then actually doing something about it is a…you have farmers on many different stages 
in that process.” (Veterinary surgeon 5) 
 
“Sometimes people are just very, very busy. Like it is hard to change your protocol and 
policies […] that is why we have always done it cause dad did it. But it is hard to change that 
because it takes time and effort and thought and if you are already working at full capacity…it 
is really difficult to change that. And some of them just don’t have the money. I think for some 
people, you know, there is farmers where that is not an issue. They are actually very profitable. 
[…] I think there is also a massive percentage of farmers who genuinely don’t necessarily 
want to engage with the information and don’t always see it as their problem, because there 
are some farmers who basically want their vets to sell them drugs. It is hard to change that.” 
(Veterinary surgeon 2) 
 
Farmers identified the differences between artificial workshop settings and farm realities. 
While artificial ‘classroom’ settings fostered communication and knowledge exchange 
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between farmers it did not reflect the reality of working on a farm.  
 
“You need to get mud on the boots. They need to be out. They need to see it.” (Farmer 1) 
 
At the same time, during my fieldwork farmers talked about their solitude, how sometimes not 
seeing other people for days, makes them susceptible to the continued use of habits in their 
day to day work. With nobody to question these farmer’s work routines, the risk increases of 
irresponsible AB usage practices slipping in their practices. One of the farmers highlighted the 
need for continued on-farm support.  
 
“Arla and some of the other dairy processors have offered workshops to their farmers about 
the physical act of dry cow tubing. But what they haven’t done is…support them in the whole 
process. You know, they have focused on ‘that is the issue’. But that is just one point in the 
process, there is a lead up and a follow on […] oh they are talking about huge failures? You 
know, some people are saying oh you need to use the medicated wipes. You might as well 
throw them in the bin as soon as they arrive. (Farmer 1) 
 
Another problem of translation concerns the lack of National Milk Recording by farmers. 
Farmers can pay UK’s National Milk Recording (NMR) organisation to supply them with milk 
recording services. This provides farmers with management information on an individual 
cow’s performance in terms of milk quality, yield and fertility. NMR are UK’s market leader 
in the provision and support of dairy software and produce records for 60% of UK’s milk 
(National Milk Recording, n.d.). NMR provides farmers with insights upon the Somatic Cell 
Count (SCC) of their individual cows which is crucial in SDCT adoption. As previously 
discussed, the history of a cow’s SCC is one of the most important parameters to start SDCT 
or not. Farmers who are not milk recording lack opportunities to safely adopt SDCT without 
compromising welfare or losing cows.  
 
“In some ways it is quite difficult, so in this area, the herds are much smaller for the dairy 
herds. So maybe they have 70 herd, you know. And they don’t do milk recording, to therefore 
it is really hard to do targeted antibiotic therapy. Because we don’t have individual somatic 
cell counts for those cows, which actually in itself can be a bit of a welfare issue because if 
you are not doing it sensibly, it is how you are picking your guys. And there is a cost 
implication for those farmers. They are already the small guys. They are already the guys who, 
you know, it is really difficult.” (Veterinary surgeon 2) 
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NMR is not obligated across the dairy supply chain, which puts farmers in charge of this 
economic decision.  
 
“We are thinking about doing, like with Orbeseal, we have always done dry cow just as blanket 
coverage across the herd really. We have quite a low cell count really, so whether we need to 
really…we don’t’ do NMR test the cows or record, whether we should be doing that really 
[…] perhaps we should look into that sort of thing .” (Farmer 2) 
 
As NMR is a cost added to the daily bill of a farmer (rather than seeing it as a long term 
investment), farmers may choose to stop recording in less prosperous times to save money. 
 
“When the milk price drops, many farmers tend to drop out of NMR to save money” 
(Veterinary surgeon 18) 
 
SDCT adoption by farmers is not a matter of simple knowledge transfer; actors in the farmers’ 
network such as NMR, milk prices and the milk contracts (with whom and its conditions) all 
shape farmer decision-making. In this context farmers produce their own ways of doing SDCT. 
 
“They ask you online if you do SDCT, and I say I do because I do some, but I don’t do SDCT 
in general. And some farmers fill in they do SDCT but they don’t.” (Fieldwork notes, retailer 
meeting Ardingly) 
 
“Issues you see in SDCT is that farmers now use 1 antibiotic tube in 2 teats. This lowers 
antibiotic use but actually, increases risks of infection and in the end, antibiotic usage. So 
SDCT is actually failing to be executed, but they are trying to mask it. (Veterinary surgeon 13) 
 
The perverse incentives of milk residue policies 
Farmers are driven by different pressures in their agricultural network. Since milk processors 
began to tighten milk residue control in raw milk, farmers are increasingly testing milk that 
originates from medicated animals to avoid the uncertainty of milk residues entering their milk 
bulk tank. Farmers are using the AB self-test as an opportunity to evaluate how they can use 
ABs without the risk of testing milk residue positive. Instead of evoking a sensible risk 
behaviour towards AB-use, it develops into a culture of what farmers can get away with. 
“Farmers just don’t keep the milk out of animals that had a non-antibiotic treatment, and they 
also know there are certain antibiotics they can get away with. So it is a trial and error. A lot 
of farmers have the Delvo tests themselves on the farm and they know what they can inject the 
cow with betamox, and it won’t fail the Delvo test. So they let the milk in the tanker, which is 
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quite a bad common practice that has slipped into the industry…what a lot of farmers are 
doing is that ‘well we use the Delvo test in order to play a game of fruit machine’, find the 
earliest data when I can put the milk back in the tank, therefore I am not having to throw away 
milk unnecessarily, because it is costly, so I will pay for the Delvo test now.” (Veterinary 
surgeon 21)  
 
As highlighted above the penalising systems and control systems of milk processors create a 
reactive response of farmers instead of structural changes in their AB practice  
 
“The payment system where we test farmers and penalise if they fail, it is a bit like speed 
cameras. They work because they suppress but they don’t improve if you see what I mean. 
They just prevent it from getting worse. The only way you can improve if you have arguably 
less cars on the road. If you have less cars than the failure rates of speed cameras will go 
down. No matter what you are going to do, you will keep things maintained but not make it go 
any worse, with the payment and penalties, and I hear it when I am talking to the farmers, it 
is all about the penalties.” (Milk processor 2) 
 
The penalty systems introduced by milk processors and the use of on farm milk residue tests 
have resulted in farmers disposing of more ‘waste’ milk into the environment than before. 
Before the introduction of AB policies, AB ‘waste’ milk was fed to calves. However, under 
Red Tractor guidelines ‘waste’ milk should not be fed to calves anymore to avoid risk of ‘AB 
residues’ in another part of the food supply chain (Red Tractor Assurance, 2017). As a result, 
some respondents suggested that farmers now dispose the waste milk on their lands or in 
slurries, which creates a new ‘uncontrollable’ pathway of milk residues. Consequently, by 
creating a system that ‘protects’ the food supply chain from milk residues, a potential 
‘environmental’ cost is ‘co-produced’ at the same time.  
 
“We see massive changes of attitudes with regards to ABs and farmer. The truth is, they are 
probably disposing more milk than they have ever before. If they have an accident, it is much 
more beneficial for them to just get rid of the milk, as opposed to be charged 10p if they are 
found to be in breach.”(Milk processor 1)  
 
Red Tractor as ‘paper reality’ 
The Red Tractor scheme represents minimal standards of animal welfare, food safety, 
traceability and environmental protection (Red Tractor Assurance, 2017). The next quotes 
demonstrates however both limitations of Red Tractor Farm Assurance and its advantages 
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 “We recognize that one of the weaknesses of red tractor standards is that they are processed 
based standards, they essentially check whether the farmer has a correct procedure, 
equipment and processes in place to deliver on requirements. Now, what they don’t always 
emphasize is outcomes, whether or not they are actually delivering on those standards, that’s 
why there was some evolution by the Red Tractor towards outcome based data, and, so there 
is a perpetual discussion going on in the industry how you can make the implementation of the 
standards much more effective, that it actually achieves the outcomes you want to see. But 
most people regard the standards of Red Tractor as quite a good scheme, and certainly the 
government is quite happy with it. It is seen by the industry, retailers and customers as 
providing the necessary baseline from which they can differentiate standards if they want to. 
And overall, it’s also I think, delivered confidence to the consumer, the industry is operating 
at relevant standards or appropriate standards of animal health and welfare, because there is 
very little pressure to change.” (Respondent Livestock organisation 4)  
 
The industry recognises that there is uncertainty in whether Red Tractor Standards actually 
deliver on what they promise on paper. Nevertheless, the Red Tractor Scheme has established 
itself in the UK as biggest farm and food standards scheme, recognised by the UK government 
and trusted by consumers. By incorporating responsible AB-use standards in the Dairy Red 
Tractor Farm Assurance Scheme in 2018 (Red Tractor Assurance, 2018), the established 
credibility of the scheme makes the UK government and consumers believe that ABs in dairy 
farms are used in a responsible manner. Various respondents (farmers, vets, consultants, milk 
processors) with whom I spoke during my fieldwork were keen to emphasise some of the 
limitations of the Red Tractor as farm assurance scheme. Any change to the Red Tractor 
standards has to be approved by the National Farmers Union and therefore farmers. Industry 
respondents argued that the standards are designed to impact as little as possible on the farmer 
production costs. The Red Tractor scheme was therefore seen to be largely responsive to 
pressures than proactively tackling issues - which might help explain the time it took to get 
HP-CIA standards implemented in their quality assurance scheme. Respondents also 
suggested that the Red Tractor scheme allows farmers to approach their Red Tractor 
obligations as a ‘tick box’ exercise rather than as a tool that supports innovation. 
 “When you do your Red Tractor assessment they don’t measure any barrier space or cubicle 
space. They don’t count your cows or your cubicles. They have all recommendations of what 
should be but nothing is actually controlled. It is a paperwork exercise, tick a box, as long as 
you meet the major compliances. It is not good. Red Tractor is not good. It is the basic 
standard.  Which a lot of farmers would say ‘well yeah, but don’t burn yourself with cost’. 
That is a fair comment, because cost drives down profit.” (Farmer 2)   
 
“That is one of the problems with farm assurance, you know, a lot is a tick box exercise […]. 
And if they do it by tick boxing they are probably not doing it for the right reasons. And we 
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have people like that, of course we have that. It’s hopefully at the time it will be less and less 
of them.” (Milk processor 2) 
 
“We have a system for recording medicines that is legally mandated in the UK by Red Tractor, 
which is the medicines book. That, at the moment, is a paper based record system which is 
completely and utterly useless. If anyone can give an example of when a product recall was 
based around going into a farmers ’medicine book and checking batch numbers, I will be very 
surprised indeed.” (Veterinary surgeon 21) 
 
The lack of proper assessment of Red Tractor standards moreover seduces farmers to falsify 
records. 
 
“What really struck me was, this farm was filthy. The house was filthy, the bathrooms, 
everything was absolutely filthy, he was filthy. This record book was immaculate, absolutely 
immaculate, not a spillage, nothing on it. Same pen and that was really good. I said about this 
when I went back in. So he showed me the calving issues, it was on the computer and I looked 
at it and he had written it out in the wrong month. So he had obviously written it before we 
came, done all the right cows and everything else, all the treatments but done all the records 
in the wrong month. So he transcribed it wrong. So that was the end of that. It was falsified 
records.” (Milk processor 2) 
 
The Red Tractor scheme represents as such a ‘paper reality’: there is a difference in what 
farmers say on paper and what they do in practice. 
 
Competing interests 
Milk processors operate in competing markets and have economic relationships with farmers 
and retailers. As farmers are able to choose where and how they contract with milk processors, 
there is now competition between milk processors to recruit farmers. To maintain their dairy 
supply to their contracted retailers, milk processors will want to keep farmers contracted. 
Consequently, milk processors will in most cases work with farmers in order to co-construct 
policies and remain transparent to their farmers. 
 
“I just can’t see who is going to push it forwards. So the milk buyers are nervous about 
imposing it on their farmers, because none of them wants to be seen to be the bad guy. Again, 
farmers have a lot of power.” (Veterinary surgeon 21)  
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“We would like see this dealt with as an industry issue, but on the other hand, milk processors 
are under pressure from there retailer customers to see if there is any commercial advantage 
to have from it, so they are trying to find a way to reconcile that commercial pressure.” 
(Respondent Livestock industry organisation 2) 
 
Political pressure of responsible AB-use has forced milk processors to engage with AB 
strategies and improve their milk residue management. Milk processors use SDCT as the main 
strategy to achieve responsible AB-use. HP-CIA policies and recording strategies are 
transferred to Red Tractor farm assurance. The reason that their main focus is on SDCT, is 
that it offers a strategy to both cut AB-use and milk residues. Milk processors are concerned 
with what matters most to them: milk residues.  
 
“At the end of the day, we are a milk processing company that supplies liquid milk to retailers. 
Our main focus has to be that there is absolutely no antibiotics in the milk that we process, 
and that is our main focus. So, while we are working with our farmers to reduce their overall 
use of antibiotics, our main primary focus is to ensure that we process antibiotic free milk and 
supply antibiotic free milk to our customers.” (Milk processor 1) 
 
6.6 Retailers economisation of dairy quality standards  
As previously discussed (Chapter 5), retailers in the UK are increasingly dictating the quality 
assurance schemes under which food supply chains produce. At the same time, a rise in 
consumer agency has pushed retailers to incorporate consumer demands into their food market 
strategies. Buller & Roe (2014) highlight the retailer-consumer relationship by discussing the 
consumer-led commodification of animal welfare in free-range layer chickens. Using Çalışkan 
& Callon (2009) concept of ‘economisation’ and ‘marketisation’, they show how consumer 
values are translated in welfare-friendly free-range layer eggs and new market opportunities. 
To meet market demands, food supply chains have been pushed to innovate their technologies 
(for example dimmer lights) and practices (labelling of products). ‘Doing animal welfare’ from 
‘farm to fork’ by food chain actors is represented by a range ‘procedures, technologies and 
performances’ that ‘add’ welfare standards to the chicken body (Buller and Roe, p.142). In 
this way, the food chains’ interpretation of consumer concerns shapes new markets and 
increases retailer’s power over the bodies of animals (Buller & Roe, 2014). 
 
Equally, consumers expect animal welfare, milk safety and milk quality husbandry standards 
to be translated into the production process of dairy products. In return for a milk price, 
retailers set out standards in their milk contracts that farmers have to implement in their daily 
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practices.  
 
“They have to mobility score their cows in terms of mastitis incidents, metabolic disease etc. 
etc. And so, then, part of that platform involves benchmarking. So you are able to say to 
farmers ‘look, it is not normal to have 150 cases of mastitis, you are right out on a limb here’. 
And try and use that as a way of facilitating improvements”. (Veterinary surgeon 20) 
 
Importantly, with consumer profiles driving dairy quality assurance standards, customer 
profiles will determine a retailer’s product differentiation strategy from other retailers. 
Whereas some retailers in the UK will have customer profiles with high expectations of 
food/dairy quality, other retailers have customer profiles who expect affordably priced 
products.  
 
“It is more of a brand issue, so consumers expect higher standards of some retailers more 
than others.” (Retailer 1)  
 
Most of the major UK retailers will have customer profiles who expect food/milk products of 
a certain quality.  
 
“From a retail public facing point of view is that, the public is only interested whether you use 
antibiotics or you don’t. I think in dairy that is a challenge, but what we are   
 doing now is restricting it and having the evidence that we actually have restricted it  
 you know, so you always have it in your toolbox.” (Retailer 1) 
 
From 2010 onwards, media and public concerns have made responsible AB-use of concern to 
retailers. In response, some of the major retailers started to implement AB policies from 2010 
onwards, with policies mainly focusing on AB usage recording (Interview Retailer 2, 
Veterinary surgeon 2). The publication of the O’Neill report in 2015 and the media concerns 
that came with it renewed retailer’s attention to the issue. Retailers feared media messages that 
threatens consumer trust in food supply chains. 
 
“I could hear from a retailer perspective what was important. And for them it was important 
to demonstrate that they are doing something, because everyone is sort of dreading the Daily 
Mail story of antibiotis found in milk, or breaking the story of 99% of calves receive 
antibiotics’ orally for the first week of their life, something like that. ” (Veterinary surgeon 21)  
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From 2016 onwards, to avoid negative publicity on the issue, most UK retailers have 
implemented antimicrobial policies across their food supply chain. The dairy industry is 
considered as a particular risk to retailers, as the industry lacks oversight in how dairy farmers 
operate. 
 
Retailers feel they have a far more vulnerable relationship with their dairy supply chain than 
they do with their beef and chicken supply chain for example […]. There is a massive range 
of dairy farmers. You’ve got some really good operators, and you’ve got some shit operators. 
So that makes them feel vulnerable. So retailers want to be able to show they are doing 
something, working with their farmer suppliers to reduce the routine use of antibiotics. 
(Veterinary surgeon 21)  
 
Retailers have four focus areas in the dairy industry through which they operate: AB usage 
monitoring; HP-CIA reduction strategies; Selective Dry Cow Therapy; and Herd Health. In 
what follows, the four focus areas in dairy will be discussed. It will be argued how responsible 
AB-use policies driven by market demands, result in intended and unintended practices of the 
policies. 
 
6.6.1 Antibiotic monitoring  
 
What matters to every retailer in the AMR discussion is that they are able to provide 
transparency on AB-use in their milk supply chain. Metrics on AB reduction numbers are of 
particular interest to retailers, as this visible evidence provides accountability towards 
consumers that responsible AB-use is being done by their farmers. With the AMR food debate 
gaining publicity over the last decade, some of the major retailers had started to monitor AB 
usage data from their dedicated farmers’ milk pool. 
 
“A lot of the retailers started monitoring the amount of antibiotics being used about seven 
years ago, and then it has really been a slow build from there.” (Milk processor 1) 
 
Through online data systems operated by the retailers, farmers are asked to fill in their AB 
usage. Retailers use their own technologies and experts to analyse the AB usage data. Some 
of the major retailers use the AB usage data to benchmark one farm against another. In case a 
farmers’ AB usage is higher than the average they are pushed to undertake initiatives that lead 
to reduction in use (Interview Retailer 1). In addition, retailers use the AB surveillance data to 
stimulate farmers self-governance of responsible AB-use.   
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6.6.2 HP-CIA reduction strategies 
 
Retailers have responded to the concerns of HP-CIA use in dairy by implementing HP-CIA 
policies that restrict their use. During my ethnography of retailer-farmer meetings in 2017, I 
observed the introduction of new HP-CIA policies. As previous HP-CIA restriction initiatives 
had failed, ‘interactive’ sessions across the country were organised in order to transfer the new 
policy to farmers and vets. The interactive sessions involved a presentation by the retailers in 
which the evidence-based HP-CIA policy was introduced. Farmers and vets were able to pose 
questions afterwards. Importantly, farmers received points for attending the meetings. It was 
believed that these interactive meetings fostered farmers’ adoption of the HP-CIA policy. 
 
“Since 2011 was the first time that famers had to start to report their use of HP-CIA and had 
a plan to reduce that. What we have done in January is that we focused on the mind of farmers, 
we don’t believe that we have moved far enough yet and therefore we should encourage 
farmers to make further steps to improve […] even though the farmers have been aware of it 
the last 6 years, there hasn’t been a massive swing away from HP-CIAs, that we could show 
in our results. So the feeling was we needed to communicate back and re-focus our efforts in 
trying to encourage farmers before there was legislation”. (Retailer 2) 
 
This was one of the first retailers to introduce culture and sensitivity (C&S) testing as 
diagnostic test to legitimate HP-CIA use. Through a sample of the cow’s body fluid (urine, 
blood, milk) the sample can be cultured to test what ABs the infection is sensitive to. HP-
CIA’s can only be used as a last resort in those cases where resistance is observed against 
every other AB. At that time, farmers and vets were allowed time to transition to these new 
mechanisms and to understand the resistance profiles on the farms. Farmers and vets were still 
allowed to use HP-CIAs, but accompanied with a C&S test to see whether it was necessary to 
use a HP-CIA. The use of C&S tests prior to HP-CIA use gradually became the norm across 
retailers, and since June 2018 was also incorporated in the Dairy Red Tractor standards (Red 
Tractor Assurance, 2018).  
 
“CIA’s in dairy cows is part of  farmers medicine toolbox but there is a pretty strict protocol 
you must follow, to ensure it is their last resort. You look at the history of the farm, you do 
your C&S, you’ve tried all the other antibiotics before you refer to a CIA. And that needs to 
be sort of coupled with reporting back on CIAs just so that we can clearly have the 
transparency about demonstrating that we’ve restricted them, here are our results, guess what, 
we don’t use them anyway”. (Retailer 1) 
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Other initiatives included the physical separation of HP-CIA’s from non HP-CIAs through a 
separate medicine box in order to put barriers in place to prevent farmers easily accessing HP-
CIAs.  
 
6.6.3 SDCT transparancy 
On top of milk processor initiatives, retailers also encouraged their farmers to start 
implementing SDCT. As HP-CIAs were the first drug of choice in udder related issues, this 
supported the reduction in HP-CIA use by farmers. In cooperation with milk processors, 
retailers organised SDCT workshops around the country to introduce SDCT. Although RUMA 
guidelines forbids the prophylactic use of ABs, the retailer in the next quote frames SDCT as 
‘targeted prophylactic’ use.  
 
“I mean in dairy, the big issue there is DCT. We are sort of moving that into what I guess you 
could call targeted prophylactic use. We have only just started this now, but basically farmers 
have targets of cows they aren’t giving DCT, so rather just being a routine thing you do, right, 
there’s at least some sort of a thought process going into, do you need to do it or, don’t we do 
it. So that’s the route for 6 month.” (Retailer 1) 
 
The SDCT trials are accepted across industry policymakers as a transition period to move 
away from propylactic dry cow therapy. With farmers being inexperienced with SDCT, this 
gives farmers the time to get used to SDCT procedures.  
 
“I make sure that it is benefit to farmers to record the information around health and welfare 
and recording the use of ABs, and other medicines, and recognize health as a responsibility, 
but also as a benefit to the farm, so they can benchmark themselves, and understand where 
there are areas to improve.” (Retailer 2) 
 
6.6.4 Herd Health quality score   
 
Retailers have their own teams of experts who will translate consumer expectations into milk 
contract expectations. As previously discussed, retailers define herd health through the 
performance of farm assurance standards set out in milk contracts. These farmer assurance 
standards exceed the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme and are used by retailers to ‘design’ exclusive 
milk pools and actively compete against each other in competitive milk markets. Retailers 
increasingly push farmers to record herd health and welfare activities on their farms. The herd 
health performativity of farms is used to identify areas of improvement. Retailers can use this 
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information to promote good husbandry practices in their food supply chains to consumers. 
Herd health performativity has become increasingly linked with AB performance on farms by 
retailers.  
 
“We develop our dairy health index score based on the AB-use in calves and cows, and a 
number of other parameters as well, but primarily, that information is stored within our 
centicate. They number crunch the information and that gives us a score of each farm. We can 
than benchmark each farm one against another, and use that information to develop strategies 
for those farmers who we believe and we can identify using far more ABs than the average or 
good dairy farms.” (Retailer 2) 
 
By improving the body and environment of the cow, it is believed farmers will reduce their 
use of ABs. This enables new commercial platforms to emerge for those retailers who are 
chasing differentiation in milk ´quality with their ‘dedicated’ milk pool. 
 
“I think it’s also important to understand that, although this is a pre-competitive issue, there 
is competition internally between retailers to make sure that they stay ahead of their 
competitors in terms of animal health, welfare. This might not be something that they 
communicate with the public because no one walks out of that looking good. But they will 
always want to point at differentiation, to talk to their shareholders about why they are 
different. So to think that they will all comply with one single standard and say, you know, it’s 
a bit like animal welfare. So, all dairy suppliers in the UK are Red Tractor standard. But 
obviously, each individual retailer has a welfare or health standard that exceeds Red Tractor 
requirements. They want to press on and push forwards and they want to point at 
differentiation. So, you’re never going to come to them and say, “Right, here’s Red Tractor 
Plus, can you all sign up here and this will be for, if you like, a next tier up.” They won’t all 
do that because they want their own schemes, they want their own control, they want their 
points of differentiation. And I think, to a certain extent, that will be true, er, you know, of 
antimicrobial usage policy.” (Veterinary surgeon 20) 
 
Other retailers with customer price sensitive profiles may not have a ‘dedicated’ milk pool. 
This means they are not directly involved with the production standards under which farmers 
produce. In this case it is the milk processors who set the quality assurance of milk production. 
However, recent media attention upon the lack of transparency in responsible AB-use policies 
and levels of AB usage across retailers has pushed retailers to come up with data surveillance 
strategies. Where retailers do not have a contracted pool of farmers, a milk processor 
respondent suggested, that retailers ‘work with’ farmers in a softer way to encourage 
responsible AB-use and recording. 
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“If you take Asda, they don’t have a contracted pool of farmers, but they do development and 
workshops, and McDonalds are similar actually. So they don’t set a standard like Tesco would 
or Sainsbury would have. It is more working with them on certain things, like AB 
recording.”(Milk processor 2) 
 
As such, the retailers will have evidence of AB policies in place, but farmers are responsible 
for implementing them in their daily practices without supportive and/or control systems in 
place to know whether this is actually happening.  
 
6.6.5 Overflows of retailer-led antibiotic policies 
Antibiotic usage data: paper realities 
During my fieldwork and interviews, it became clear that most industry members are aware 
that farmers use ABs ‘off the record’. Farmers themselves revealed that farmers as a group 
have access to prescription drugs through their secret stocks, black markets, neighbours and 
double milk contracts.  
 
“We arrive at one of the top farmers in the area who is on a retailer milk contract. I get the 
chance to  speak with the farmer and to ask him some questions. The farmer argues he is happy 
with his milk contract and he works hard to reduce antibiotics as much as possible. He is 
however not happy with how other farmers are dealing with the antibiotic policies of the 
retailer. He says that farmers are not filling in the files correctly. They complete online retailer 
quality assurance forms as the best performers but in the meantime, they use different billing 
systems for their antibiotic registration or use their secret stocks. The farmer himself registers 
everything correctly, but he says how the practices of these other farmers make him look bad. 
He becomes rather agitated and says he has had enough of those practices and will start to 
name and shame those farmers”. (Fieldnotes Veterinary practice 3)  
 
The reliance of retailers on statistics creates ignorance to practices outside the reality of data. 
When I asked one of the retailers about the differences between what farmers reported doing 
and what they actually did, he framed this divergence as the ‘anecdotal evidence’ of jealous 
farmers, which was contradicted by his auditors.  
 
“I think anecdotally, farmers like to critise other farmers for their accuracy, because it makes, 
I think to some degree, makes them feel better with regards to them maybe having a higher 
level than they would like to think of usage. So I think there is some anecdotal evidence of that, 
certainly my auditors who are out there and not reporting back to me substantial difference 
between antibiotic use reported and antibiotic actual use recorded, so reported and recorded, 
ehm, I am not getting back feedback that there is a significant differential between the two.” 
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(Retailer 2). 
 
The retailer in the above quote trusts his auditors to verify the validity of farmer anecdotes. 
Auditors and their operating procedures are trusted by this retailer to deliver an accurate  
picture of what happens on the farm. Although I have not been able to observe the operating 
procedures of auditors, fieldnotes suggests that farmers say and write down different practices 
to what they actually do. Auditors come announced to farms, which gives farmers time to 
prepare for their visit. They discuss with farmers the quality assurance standards as defined in 
the milk contract, but it remains difficult to police what happens with ABs during daily farm 
practices. At the same time, retailers all have their own data collection methods and expert 
teams who analyse the data. This makes the interpretation of how evidence reflects practice 
rather obscure. 
 
“Retailer x do their workshops, have their aspirations and their rules, but who collects their 
data and who is actually analysing this data and seeing whether or not it is 
accurate?”(Veterinary surgeon 21)  
 
Antibiotic policies as ‘tick boxing’ event 
I encountered different opinions among farmers about how retailers operate. Many farmers 
were happy to be on retailer aligned milk contracts, as this offered them security and support. 
At the same time, some farmers argued fiercely against retailer contracts, feeling constrained 
by their demands. Some of the farmers argued that they perceived the retailer quality assurance 
standards as a bureaucratic hurdle rather than a driver for change.  
 
“Their policies involve a lot of tick boxing but nobody actually reads the documents. We don’t 
feel understood, included in the program. I feel it is us against them. We have a lot of extra 
paperwork, we almost need a new secretary for all the paperwork.” (Fieldnotes Retailer-
farmer meeting Cannington) 
 
Some farmers also expressed fear of losing their milk contract if they did not fulfil the 
expectations of the milk contract quality standards. One farmer reported that he had seen a 
farmer losing his milk contract when he raised his opinion during a retailer meeting. The fear 
of losing their milk contract potentially pushes farmers to find ways to get ABs without 
prescription and recording.  
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“That is the mentality of farmers they are just trying to tick the box and keep Tesco’s happy” 
(Farmer 2) 
 
Although AB training and workshops were popular methods to inform policy, industry and 
supply chain actors about policies, farmers saw attendance as an obligation associated with 
their milk contract. 
 
“At the moment we seem to have series of workshops where we go to a nice hotel and we have 
a nice lunch and we have four speakers who talk to us about varying things. And we all fill a 
form in after, and we all go home and carry on and do what we were doing before. It was 
described to me the other day as: “Are you confident in what you’re doing?” This was another 
farmer. He said, “Are you confident in what you’re doing?” He laughed as he said it. I said, 
“Well, yes.” He said, “Well, do what I do.” I said, “What’s that?” He said, “Let it wash over 
you, tick the box, move on.” (Farmer 2) 
 
As they get points on their milk contracts for attendance, farmers will take the effort to show 
up at meetings. But instead of engaging with the knowledge-transfer programmes, some 
farmers see the retailer farmer meetings as a nuissance that disrupts their day. Although 
retailers then believe they have succesfully transferred their policies through interactive 
sessions, farmers will still continue with their daily routine practices. 
 
Culture & Sensitivity testing: object conflicts 
During my fieldwork observations, problems about C&S adoption were expressed by farmers. 
Firstly, farmers feared the economic costs of C&S testing. Secondly, farmers described C&S 
testing as time consuming because they had to wait for the results while their sick animals 
needed to be treated ‘hard and fast’. Farmers argued that C&S testing limited their ability to 
treat the sick cow quickly, which could mean they end up with a bad cow. Thirdly, farmers 
did not trust the C&S results due to anecdotes circulating in the veterinary and farmer 
communities that the tests were not accurate. Situations were discussed in which the C&S test 
showed sensitivy toward certain drugs, but in practice, the drugs were reported not to work. 
This made farmers and vets reluctant to work with the results of C&S. Although C&S testing 
was meant to be a barrier to CIA use, farmers argued that it could push their use so it was off 
the record. 
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SDCT: problem of translation 
During my fieldwork I observed many conflicts in SDCT communication and implementation 
by retailers. Some retailers trained local vets and obligated their farmers to do NMR. This 
facilitated the implementation of their quality assurance standards such as SDCT. However, 
other retailers announced SDCT as a new AB policy to their farmers without providing any 
understanding of the complexity of the procedure.  
 
“If farmers are hearing from the supermarkets in their contract that, “Oh right, we have to, 
we have to start doing selective dry cow therapy or, or at least have a look at it”, and they’re 
not adequate in their teat preparation and hygiene, well...we’ve had plenty of farmers that 
have lost cows as a result of that.” (Veterinary surgeon 5) 
 
Analysis of my fieldwork identifies vets and NMR as important actors in the agricultural 
network of farmers in support of the correct adoption of quality standards. Many farmers 
expressed uncertainties about how to implement or practice SDCT.  
 
“What is the cut off level of SDCT? Suppose I have 175,000 SCC but 600,000 in one quarter 
and the other 30,000, what do I do? Orbecyl? A longer dry-of period?”(Fieldnotes retailer 
meeting Ardingly) 
 
“We have tried SDCT but I still feel very uncomfortable doing it.” (Fieldnotes retailer meeting 
Devon) 
 
“ If vets had been involved beforehand then perhaps we’d’ve implemented some, some 
proper SDCT training.” (Veterinary surgeon 5) 
 
The public mis-representation of farmer friendly cost-production milk contracts 
Although the cost production milk price model offers farmers at least the cost-production milk 
price, farmers are worried that it could be used against them. According to farmers, the main 
goal for retailers of the cost-production model is to encourage farmers to invest in their farm 
so they become more efficient. This lowers farmers’ costs of milk production and 
consequently, allows retailers to lower the milk price they pay to their farmers. Although 
retailers advertise the cost-production model to consumers as a model that supports their 
farmers, farmers argue that retailers aim to reduce the milk price in the long term. Some 
farmers also argue that some of the retailers keep the milk prices down by their fixed milk 
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prices, disrupting the volatility of the milk prices.  
 
Antibiotic policies as competitive issue 
The different circulating milk contracts (retailer aligned or milk processor non-aligned) 
translate into different approaches of how dairy supply chain members approach responsible 
AB-use. Most vets I encountered identified the power of retailers to drive change and improve 
activities related to responsible AB-use.  
 
“If you’re looking at trying to make change in, in whatever aspect of, you know, animal health 
welfare and antimicrobial usage, getting retailers who will, will make decisions, hopefully the 
right decisions, and get things instituted and policy in place and make change very, very 
quickly. Whereas, I think if left to other industry representatives, certainly if left to government, 
those changes won’t take place in any timely fashion.” (Veterinary surgeon 20) 
 
But as retailers are only responsible for a quarter of the UK’s farmer populations, they lack 
the power to drive the dairy industry as a whole.  
 
“Retailers, they set a marker, which pulls the greater pool a bit, but it only influences a 
relatively small percentage of the farmers directly. They have probably taken the 20% of the 
engaged ones anyway. So I mean, it is not very helpful” (Milk processor 2) 
 
In addition, spokespersons from across the sector and dairy organisations involved with AB 
policies argued that industry members use AB policies as commercial instruments.  
 
“Retailers are given a competitive market place and they are all seeking to find whether there 
is an opportunity for commercial advantage, so retailers and processors have their own 
policies and strategies on this. Some of them are more advanced. Those who have their own 
dedicated milk supply chains, they are in a position to put on their own obligations on their 
supplying farmers, and some of them have gone much further down the road than the entire 
industry. We do have concerns how this issue may be exploited commercially when we prefer 
to have it dealt with on a common uniformly industry basis […] It is a dilemma the industry is 
facing on a number of issues. Especially when the industry’s reputation is being dealt with. It 
is a massive challenge if you can address it uniformly on an industry level or does it become 
a massive commercial advantage.” (Livestock industry organisation 4) 
 
“Tesco tries to create a group of farmers that is ‘better’ than other farmers.” (Fieldnotes 
Retailer farmer meeting Lanarkshire) 
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In addition, instead of driving innovation, the competition between dairy supply chain actors 
hampers communication on how to roll out certain AB policies. 
 
“We have the technology, we just don’t have industry agreement on how to actually roll that 
out. I realise I’m getting on my soap box again, but it’s something I think is incredibly 
important. And I think, until we’re at that position, we’re not going to really have a good grip 
on what is actually happening on farms.” (Veterinary surgeon 20) 
 
Not only market interests have turned responsible AB-use into a competitive issue. In 
November 2017 an article appeared in The Guardian newspaper comparing supermarkets on 
their publicly available policies on the use of ABs in its farm supply chain (Harvey, 2017): 
Waitrose scored best, followed by M&S, Sainsbury’s and Tesco, while third from bottom were 
Asda, then Aldi, and Lidl was the worst performer. In response to this publication, in 
November 2017, M&S was the first UK supermarket to publish information on their website 
about the quantities of ABs used on livestock by farmers that supply their meat, eggs and dairy 
products. Waitrose followed and became the second largest UK supermarket to make AB 
usage data available. Regardless of whether statistics are considered as trustworthy sources, 
the impact of the media on retailer antimicrobial policies was clear: what matters to retailers 
is to be able to provide evidence of reductions in AB-use. 
 
6.7 Chapter discussion 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated how responsible AB-use has resulted in different matters of 
concern to dairy supply chain members. Although the agricultural networks of milk processors 
and retailers overlap, they operate in different markets with different responsibilities (see 
Figure 6.2). Milk processors need to ensure their milk is ‘safe’ to keep the trust of official 
authorities (FSA) and the retailers they supply; while retailers need to ensure they fulfil 
expectations of their consumer profiles. Milk processors are under pressure from the FSA to 
improve their milk residue management, while retailers are pressured by the media and 
consumers to deliver transparency in their AB policy activities. AB milk residues have become 
their main priority, which drives the focus of milk processers’ AB policies. Farmers are 
considered the biggest risk for AB milk residues to enter into the food chain. Consequently, 
milk processors spend their resources on AB practices on farms that pose the biggest risk to 
AB milk residues: AB dry cow therapy. Some of the milk processors also incentivise the use 
of AB self-test kits by farmers or use milk price penalising systems to make AB-use less 
attractive. Most of the UK’s milk processors mainly rely on the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme to 
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improve animal health and welfare. Problematically, the findings of my fieldwork illustrate 
that the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme is a paper reality, rather than reflecting true practice. Most 
dairy supply chain actors require farmers to be Dairy Red Tractor farm assured, but farmers 
do not get financially rewarded in return. Consequently, farmers see the Red Tractor Scheme 
as a tick box exercise to get them milk contracts, rather than a mechanism they can use to 
innovate their farms. The quality of Red Tractor auditing is critiqued by farmers, making the 
scheme prone to falsification by farmers. As a result, farmers on non-aligned contracts with 
volatile milk prices are less driven to invest in their husbandry systems. Uncertainties of milk 
prices make farmers reluctant to invest in long term husbandry solutions. This results in 
difficulties to successfully implement SDCT, as this practice also involves good husbandry 
practices. In addition, some of the farmers use the policies to continue their AB practices. This 
results in responsive rather then preventative animal health and welfare actions. Finally, 
farmers might dispose of more milk in the environment rather than let milk residues enter into 
the food chains, although the environmental AMR burden of this practice is as yet, unknown. 
So although milk processor policies might result in less AB residues in the food chain, 
irresponsible AB practices on the dairy farm continue with unknown veterinary/public health 
and environmental effects. 
Retailers in turn deliver dairy products that correspond with their consumer expectations. They 
are expected to deliver transparency in responsible AB-use activities. Providing AB usage 
surveillance data safeguards their market position. In addition, some retailers have started to 
align their herd health performance metrics with low AB usage numbers. By claiming that the 
healthy bodies of their dairy cows need less ABs, new market opportunities emerge. Market 
interests drive, in this case, the content of retailer AB policies. Different issues arise however 
when evaluating the practices of the AB policies. As retailer aligned milk contracts are 
popular, farmers will try everything to look good on paper. They will ensure they tick the 
boxes, but there is a lack of transparency in how farmers do the quality standards in practice. 
In other cases, farmers struggle with the complexity of the AB policies, such as SDCT and 
C&S tests. With a lack of veterinary engagement, this might result in counterproductive 
effects, increasing the need for ABs. Nevertheless, retailers strongly believe in the 
effectiveness of their methods of science - the numbers and metrics are trusted as accurate 
representatives of practice. The policies are therefore considered as sufficient, despite ignoring 
some of the structural issues related to AB-use on farms. Although the economisation of dairy 
AB standards by some of the retailers has the potential to improve the herd health status of 
dairy herds in the UK, this only accounts for a small part of the industry. The different focus 
of retailers and milk processors, together with Red Tractor Farm Assurance, segregates the 
dairy farmer landscape in their AB practices rather than unifying them (See Figure. 6.2). 
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Fig. 6.2: Dairy antibiotic use as ‘matter of concern’ to milk processors and retailers  
 
The different content and practices AB policies across the dairy supply chain can result in new 
public health, food and environmental risks. Problematically, both milk processors and 
retailers are dependent upon farmers for them to implement their policies. Even though there 
is awareness across the dairy supply chain that farmers very often do different things to what 
they say they do, this is silenced when evaluating the impact of policies. The AB surveillance 
data of retailers and the latest annual UK-VARSS report of 2018 shows progress is being made 
and knowledge exchange programmes have been successful. Numbers contribute to the 
maintenance of irresponsible AB practices. This leaves structural problems in the agricultural 
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networks of farmers that contribute to AB to be unexplored. In the next Chapter, I will examine 
the agricultural networks of farmers and vets more in depth to better understand what makes 
farmers do different things than they claim. 
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Chapter 7 
Dairy antibiotic decision-making in practice 
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7.1 Introduction 
In the ´misuse and overuse´ policy framework, farmers and vets are blamed for their 
‘inappropriate’ AB practices. Evidence-based knowledge transfer programmes that stimulate 
the individual self-governance of responsible AB-use by farmers and vets are seen as one 
solution. This Chapter demonstrates how AB decision-making results from network activity 
rather than an individual act. Instead of exploring why ABs are used on farms, this Chapter 
will use Actor Network Theory (ANT) to study how AB decisions are made by farmers and 
vets in construction with other human and non-human actors in their agricultural networks 
(Latour, 2005). Actor-networks of farmers and vets will therefore be studied to understand 
which actors are most important during the AB decision-making processes on farms. This will 
provide insights in which actors can be used in policies to achieve responsible AB-use.  
 
7.2 Disease informants  
Dairy organisations and the RUMA task force plan (2017) have focussed on implementing 
disease protocols, workshops and training to improve farmer’s management of disease with 
the expectation that this would reduce the need for ABs. However, these initiatives ignore 
other important actors in the network of the farmer that co-produce a farmer’s approach to 
disease management. How farmers make sense of diseases within their actor-networks on 
farms ‘co-produces’ AB decision-making processes. The following discussion will discuss 
disease informants I encountered during my fieldwork and their role in a dairy farmer’s AB 
decision-making process. 
 
7.2.1 Lay protocols  
When farmers sense that a cow is feeling ‘off’, it is often on the basis of a sense arising from 
vision, palpation, smell, or knowledge of that cow’s usual behaviour. This may lead the farmer 
to undertake a more formal assessment of the cow - examination of the posture of the cow, 
appetite, milk production, vaginal discharge, ruminate activities, palpation of the temperature 
externalities such as ears, the type manure produced, breathing rhythm, abnormalities in milk 
secretion and udder consistency. On this basis the farmer might arrive at a preliminary idea of 
where the problem is situated in the cow and what the problem might be. The farmer might 
also take the temperature of a cow to evaluate if AB therapy is required. 
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“Basically just watery, yellow mastitis with a hard quarter and a sick cow with a high 
temperature was the farmer’s main use of Marbofloxine.” (Veterinary surgeon 5) 
 
An elevated temperature is associated in the mind of the farmer with infection inside the cow’s 
body, which to them then legitimates the AB treatment. This allows farmers to experiment 
with treatment before a vet is called.  
 
Farmer 2: “If they are feeling down, check the temperature, you know, depending on what 
you think about the cow, get the vet involved as well”  
Interviewer: “At what point do you invite the vet?”  
Farmer 2: “If we think it is something we can’t treat. If its past the point where we think 
ehm…what shall I say? Ehm…you get to know the cows, your own individual cows you get to 
know when they are not doing well.”  
Interviewer: “So it is a lot of experience?”  
Farmer 2: “Yes really, experience, you get to know what is going on really, and you get to 
know when you should call the vet out.  
 
Through past experience farmers come to trust their own clinical judgment, and only call in 
vets when they encounter a situation with which they are unfamiliar or which they cannot 
resolve. 
 
7.2.2 Phone advice 
Previous research suggests that vets are a dairy farmers most important knowledge source to 
manage issues related to herd health (Jones et al., 2015). But, as previously discussed, vets are 
not routinely called in when a cow first presents with health problems. In many cases farmers 
will ring their vet to discuss a cow’s disease presentation with a view to being given an opinion 
over the phone and perhaps a treatment plan. Together a decision will be made as to whether 
the problem can be managed by the farmer or whether the vet needs to attend. 
 
Farmer 2: “We had one vet who used to say ‘Betamox is quite good for any feet problems, 
like an abscess’. But we had one the other day that wouldn’t clear up and the vet said ‘well 
perhaps you should try them on Tylan’, a stronger antibiotic, and it seemed to, touch wood, 
seemed to work tidy actually”.  
Interviewer: “And this is phone advice?”  
Farmer 2: “Yes phone advice” 
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7.2.3 Farmer organisations and their diseases protocols 
AHDB dairy is designing strategies to improve animal health and reduce farmers’ AB usage 
practices. They have recently published a mastitis program (AHDB Dairy, n.d.-c) and they 
have a ‘Healthy Feet Programme’ available to help farmers improve management techniques 
that can help reduce the number of lame cows on farms (AHDB Dairy, 2017a). These 
voluntary programmes serve to influence farmer’s behaviour in how they manage their farms 
and improve animal health. They are designed to govern the quality of livestock management 
techniques including the use of ABs in dairy. But some of the farmers in this study questioned 
whether AHDB dairy was too far removed from the lifeworld of farmers to understand what 
farmers needed. 
 
“AHDB is a waste of time. It is levy funded but in old terms it is an agency, and it doesn’t 
really reflect real life. We are spending 300 pounds a month, which we can go and get a 
professional in for a morning on a specific subject and do a one to one. I mean, the AHDB 
mastitis plan, a bloody waste of time, unless you are really crap at the job and you can’t 
actually deduce where your problem is coming from. But unfortunately, people expect 
somebody to come along and tell them what to do. And they are prepared to pay over the odds 
for a magic bullet that they think is going to sort to the problem out rather than doing the plain 
stuff. Keeping the cows clean and you know, keeping the cows happy and give them a low 
stress environment.” (Farmer 1). 
 
This farmer also suggested that farmers wanted quick fixes to solve husbandry issues, instead 
of taking responsibility by themselves. However, as farmers were paying AHDB through a 
levy, it was suggested that AHDB were therefore constrained in what it could do by the need 
to deliver what farmers expected (Farmer 1). 
 
7.2.4 On-farm staff 
The responsibility for disease management in dairy farms is often controlled by the ´ herdsman´ 
of the farm. Depending on the size of the farm, dairy farmers will employ a dairy herdsman 
who is responsible for monitoring and maintaining the health of the dairy herd and may also 
manage other co-workers on the farm. The herdsman is expected to have knowledge on cattle 
physiology, reproduction, milk production and nutrition. Farmers are dependent on their 
herdsman for the management of health and disease of their farm. Vets therefore do not always 
deal with the farmer but with their herdsman. During the retailer-farmer focus groups, farmers 
identified the difficulties with this reliance on their herdsman. The farmers argued that their 
herdsman often had insufficient knowledge of hygiene and lacked up to date medicine 
146 
 
knowledge. In particular, it was suggested that the older generation of herdsman refused to 
implement new herd health management practices to improve the herd health status, which 
would then reduce the need for ABs. Farmers suggested that some herdsman worked with their 
own disease protocols. Data from the retailer focus groups 1 and 2 supports this view.  
 
“They like to treat animals and are ‘looking for things to treat’. And if they don’t know what 
to do with it they just jab it with antibiotics.” (Retailer-Farmer focus group 2, Farmer 11).  
 
7.2.5 Peer support 
There is a belief, as identified above, that farmers will exchange knowledge and experiences 
with their peers. Indeed, during the retailer-farmer meetings, farmers discussed with each other 
their views on the policy initiatives and problems they encountered. Nevertheless, during my 
fieldwork observation, I encountered farmers who talked about their isolation. Farms were 
often geographically isolated, sometimes difficult to reach. Bad wheather conditions and 
insufficient infrastructure on farms contributed to isolation. In addition, some farmers argued 
that UK farmers are competitive rather than cooperative. As one farmer said:  
 
“Farmers in the UK are very competitive. They know each other’s businesses but do not 
necessarily work together. We do not share our knowledge, which is different than farmers in 
other countries.” (Fieldnotes, Retailer-farmer meeting) 
 
Thus the environment in which farmers lived and worked restricted their ability and inclination 
to be co-operative. Even though most farmers know their neighbouring farmers and their 
businesses, they don’t necessarily engage with them.  
 
7.2.6 Antibiotics as normalised response to disease 
Reynolds Whyte et al. (2003) have studied the ‘symbolic nature of medicines’ in their 
anthropology of medicines across contexts and argue that to understand the intentions of those 
who administer them we should explore the ‘perceived efficacies’ of medicines. When 
medicines enter people’s lives, they do not remain neutral medical objects as the perceived 
efficacies start to shape socio-material relations (Reynolds Whyte et al., 2003). Although ABs 
are regulated as prescription only by vets, farmers were (and still are) able to stock pile ABs 
on farms and make decisions about when and how to administer ABs to their animals 
independently of vets. Over the decades, the availability of ABs on farms and their therapeutic 
effects have enabled them to become a farmer’s standard response to herd health issues. ABs 
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enable farmers to ignore the underlying causes of disease ecologies and move straight to 
treatment. 
 
“I suppose it is almost a generation thing. Like dad was brought up with using antibiotics, 
whereas the next generation, you know, we are moving on now and the next generation will 
actually think about doing other things, like what we said, ventilation in the sheds that sort of 
thing. Before it would have been a blanket coverage of ABs really.” (Farmer 2) 
 
In the context of a busy farm, ABs’ predictable ‘fixing’ properties offer farmers a sense of 
control over the individual body of the cow, clinical problems and maintenance of its economic 
value, without necessarily having to engage with the complexity of diseases itself. 
 
“The problem with farmers is that they think it fixes everything.” (Veterinary surgeon 3) 
 
It was also suggested that farmers disliked change leaving them reliant upon ABs. 
 
“The problem is that we as farmers don’t like change and are reliant on the drugs. We as 
farmers are our worst enemies.” (Fieldnotes, Retailer-farmer meeting Shropshire)  
 
7.3 Antibiotic informants 
Jones et al. (2015) undertook a survey of 71 dairy farmers to explore the drivers and barriers 
to reducing AB-use. They found vets were key sources of information for farmers to reduce 
their AB-use. RUMA’s task force report (2017) with the Dairy Action Plan positions the vet-
farmer relation as the fulcrum for driving responsible AB-use forwards. However, as can be 
seen in this study, the fieldwork data and interviews clearly indicate that there are additional 
human and non-human actors that can be identified in the agricultural network of farmers that 
influence their AB choices. Although vets definitely play an important role, the use of vets by 
farmers is constrained by other actors and vets are also influenced by their own agricultural 
networks that shape how they transfer knowledge to farmers.  
 
7.3.1 Veterinary surgeons 
Vets have contributed over the years to farmers’ belief about the corrective ability of ABs to 
tackle the disorder of disease. 
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“Our vets seem to treat everything with antibiotics, and that is the best way to look at it. You 
know, what else would you do with the animal otherwise?” (Farmer 2) 
 
Vets use ABs to manage the uncertainties and farmer expectations that come with diseases. 
During my fieldwork observations in Veterinary Practice 3, I regularly witnessed some of the 
vets prescribing an AB to control the situation, rather than wait and potentially risk the health 
status of the cow. The cows or calves often presented with vague symptoms which the vets 
struggled to diagnose. ABs were being used to manage the uncertainty of the vet as well as the 
expectations of the farmers. One vet expressed to me that he would rather prescribe an AB 
than risk ending up with a bad cow and an unhappy farmer (Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, 
Veterinary surgeon 10). Previous successful AB treatments of similar clinical situations also 
shaped the AB negotiation between farmers and vets (Fieldnotes, Veterinary Practice 3). In 
many cases, vets used the AB that they viewed as the safe intervention; however, this was not 
always in accordance with good clinical practice. When weighing up the value of the cow and 
the vet’s reputation against AMR, the vet went for the AB that they felt would work. This 
decision was often an economic decision, rather that it would make the world ‘a better place’ 
(Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 10).  
When vets refused to use the AB the farmer expected, farmers would express their 
disappointment. When I was out with one of the younger vets, he told me how he had 
previously refused to prescribe a CIA and the farmer had strongly disagreed with this decision 
(Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 13). The farmer had phoned the 
veterinary practice to discuss his disappointment, and openly bullied the vet when we delivered 
medicines to his farm (Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 13). In another 
situation, I observed a vet who was called to a farm to perform a caesarean section on a cow 
(Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 12). During the procedure, the vet was 
about to insert his last suture when the cow panicked and fell on the surgery wound. The farmer 
was very concerned about the wound getting infected and wanted the vet to give the cow a 
CIA injection. The vet was, however, not too concerned, cleaned the wound, and gave the cow 
a non-CIA. When we said goodbye to the farmer and drove away, the vet reflected that the 
farmer was probably running to his medicine cupboard to ‘top up’ the cow with a shot of 
whatever CIA he had available.  
It became clear over the course of the study that dairy farmers differed in how much they 
valued veterinary knowledge in relation to disease management and choice of medicines. 
Some farmers felt very satisfied with their vets and involved them in their decision-making 
processes related to AB-use and herd health management on farms. They invested in veterinary 
advice to prevent diseases and to achieve the best results in herd health. Other farmers were, 
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however, less convinced by veterinary knowledge and only used vets to prescribe them ABs 
or to deal with complex technical procedures, such as surgery.  
 
“I think there is also a massive percentage of farmers who genuinely don’t necessarily want 
to engage in the information and don’t always see it as their problem, because there are some 
farmers who basically want their vets to sell them drugs.” (Veterinary surgeon 2) 
 
Some farmers also expressed distrust in veterinary AB-use believing themselves to be more 
judicious in their use. 
 
“We manage our own antibiotic use. We only use our vets to prescribe them but we decide 
ourselves how we use them. My father prefers to make his own decisions as veterinary 
surgeons are taught to prescribe antibiotics for animal health and welfare, but we have a 
business to run as well. And vets prescribe too quickly, while our mentality is to prescribe as 
little as possible as this means less costs to medicines and less problems with milk 
withdrawal.” (Fieldnotes, Retailer-farmer meeting Neston) 
 
“The farmer does not feel that vets are doing much about responsible antibiotic use and 
argues he does not have much confidence in the honesty of vets who prescribe drugs. He 
thinks they prescribe antibiotics to earn money on the drugs they sell.” (Fieldnotes, Retailer-
farmer meeting Lanarkshire) 
 
As will be discussed in section 7.4, vets have to engage with several actors in their agricultural 
network that then shape their AB decision-making.  
 
7.3.2 Economic informants: Antibiotic milk withdrawal times and milk residues 
 
What matters to farmers when choosing the type of AB to use is that the cow can be put into 
milk production as quickly as possible while ensuring that the milk is safe from milk residues. 
Farmers weigh up the milk withdrawal times of ABs. This reflects the time necessary for 
animals to metabolise an administered product and the amount of time necessary for the 
product concentration level in the tissues to decrease to a safe and acceptable level. The 
quicker the milk is safe from AB residues, the quicker the milk can be sold again. 
 
“The fact that cephalosporins have no milk withdrawal time was actually a really big driver 
for dairy farmers, and for beef farmers the meat withdrawal. That dictates often what they 
would want, so even if it would be the right drug to use, they won’t want to use it because of a 
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long milk or meat withdrawal.” (Veterinary surgeon 17) 
 
7.3.3 Antibiotic metaphors  
 
Reynolds Whyte et al. (2003) have emphasised the importance of studying metaphors when 
exploring how people with non-medical backgrounds make sense of diseases and the 
medicines that cure them. Reynolds Whyte et al. (2003) observe, metaphors are practical 
linguistic tools that help people to communicate about experiences they encounter. They 
enable people with a non-medical background to make disease and medicine effects graspable 
and exchangeable (Reynolds Whyte et al., 2003, p. 45). Over the decade, CIAs have become 
constructed by farmers as the ‘big gun’, as they deliver the ´ strongest’ physical recovery which 
is then translated into economic fitness of the cow in comparison to other ABs. 
 
“Imagine if I have a calf dying, I want the big gun and not wait and see my costs rising while 
ending up with a bad cow.” (Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3) 
 
“The farmers says to me he is worried about stopping the use of CIA, as they are the big 
guns in the cupboard. He had a case lately that he wanted to treat with marbocyl, a CIA, but 
he gave it synulox instead. However, the animal responded less well.” (Fieldnotes Veterinary 
Practice 3) 
 
Without having to understand diseases or their pharmaceutical mechanisms, CIAs deliver 
quick and successful recoveries in multiple disease conditions. Where AB policymakers are 
concerned with the “right drug, right bug, right dose, right route” (Interviews Pharmaceutical 
Company 1), farmers want ‘the strongest’ drug to manage disease problems. 
 
“Farmers just see marbocyl as the strongest but don’t understand the pharmacokinetics and 
where or why the use it for, they just give it a shot.” (Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, 
Veterinary surgeon 13) 
 
What further builds the CIA as a ‘big gun’ aside from its therapeutic properties, is that they 
have a short or no milk withdrawal, contributing to economic efficacy on the farm (as 
previously discussed).  
 
“The use of other antibiotics costs us 2-3 days of milking at 2 pence a litre; get money from 
someone else’s pocket but not from mine! If it costs me my milk than I will keep using CIAs. 
There are just too much costs involved in longer milk withdrawal periods.”(Fieldnotes, 
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Retailer-farmer meeting Preston) 
 
The therapeutic and economic properties of HP-CIAs have driven their popularity in use and 
have contributed to their construction as the ´big guns´. AB metaphors enable ABs to move 
between actors and settings, as they are based on associations with the power of the AB and 
in which scenarios to use them. During dirty clinical presentations of a sick cow, whether this 
be a wound, milk, or vaginal discharge, farmers prefer to use a HP-CIA. Very sick cows or 
calves are also believed to need ‘strong’ treatment by farmers, resulting in HP-CIA use. The 
economic situation, such as the value of the animal and milk price, contribute significantly to 
a farmer’s HP-CIA decision-making.  
 
7.3.4 Pharmaceutical companies 
Before UK regulators banned direct pharmaceutical advertisement to farmers in 2015, 
pharmaceutical companies were responsible for distributing information on the therapeutic 
effects ABs.  
 
“Years ago, there was a campaign by pharmaceutical companies where Marbocyl was 
promoted for use in cows with E. coli mastitis. Now everyone knows they don’t really need 
antibiotics, do they. It is the toxins that are killing them. By definition, the antibiotics are 
therefore not doing very much. But farmers generally still believe Marbocyl is the best thing 
for E. coli mastitis and it is really hard to change that.” (Veterinary surgeon 2) 
 
“I think one good thing that has changed is that about 2 years ago, you are not allowed to 
talk about antibioticss to a farmers, unless you are their vet, but still, some pharmaceutical 
companies would push the boundary. They may not say our drug is wonderful, in front of 
farmers, but they would have afterwards when people had tea and coffees, they would speak 
individually to each one and still settle some things.” (Veterinary surgeon 18) 
 
Pharmaceutical companies also shape the economic value of ABs in relation to veterinary 
business models. Depending on the number of medicines veterinary practices buy and how 
loyal they are in their orders, veterinary practices will receive discounts on their orders. 
Pharmaceutical companies will send sale representatives to veterinary practices to promote 
products and sell package deals. Veterinary practices are able to make deals with 
pharmaceutical companies in which sales of their products are rewarded. Importantly, 
pharmaceutical companies make better deals on ABs than on vaccines, making it more 
attractive for veterinary practices to buy ABs than vaccines. 
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“All pharmaceutical companies have rebate schemes with the vet practices, and these rebate 
and pricing schemes are unbelievably complicated, and often confuse vets. When the sales vets 
are going through the schemes with vets, they get the practices better discounts on antibiotics 
than on vaccines, and I think that is still for the pharmaceutical companies, that antibiotics 
have better margins on them than the vaccines do. If practices sell much more of this 
antibiotics, they will get heavily rewarded for it, but if they would do the same for vaccines, 
they wouldn’t.” (Veterinary surgeon 18) 
 
Pharmaceutical companies shape the AB behaviours of vets while limiting alternatives to ABs, 
such as vaccines. In addition, as already highlighted, vets not only receive discounts but also 
rewards for selling quantities of product. The rewards range from attendance at CPD events in 
exotic locations to receiving tickets to big rugby matches.  
 
“There is one company that takes senior vets out to the Lion’s tour, like the big rugby teams. 
And the countries that the Lions tour in are South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, and 
they will take 40 vets with them, and they would have like 2-3 hours of CPD, than go on safari, 
have all their food and drinks paid for and go to games of rugby.” (Veterinary surgeon 18) 
 
Countries differ in how the pricing mechanisms of pharmaceutical drug selling are legally 
institutionalised. In the UK, pharmaceutical companies are able to offer discount prices on 
drugs to veterinary practices. There is no transparency or oversight in the pricing mechanisms 
of pharmaceutical companies. In contrast, France has forbidden discount prices on drugs by 
pharmaceutical companies. Prices on drugs are transparent, with the intention to better regulate 
veterinary medicine markets.  
 
Respondent pharmaceutical company 2: So in France there are no discounts, the price is the 
price. It is completely transparent now in France.  
Interviewer: And that is not the case in the UK  
Respondent pharmaceutical company 2: No there are still discounts in the UK 
 
7.3.5 Supply chain milk contracts  
As discussed in the previous Chapter, milk contracts between farmers and supply chain actors 
(dairy processors or retailers) dictate the amount and type of ABs farmers are allowed to use. 
By signing a milk contract, farmers are legally bound to the supply chain AB standards. Vets 
in their turn are responsible for administering and/or distributing ABs to the farmers that fit 
with the milk contract of the farmer.  
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“Retailer contracts do influence choice in that you need to justify your use. If you know the 
retailer contract and expectations, you adapt your choices…what is good is that farmers are 
becoming more open to different drugs. Although you do keep having farmers who say ‘why 
can’t I use the same drug as my neighbour’ and then you have to explain they are on a different 
contract.” (Fieldnotes Veterinary practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 13) 
 
Most dairy sector actors believe that the best way to change farmer AB behaviour and get 
compliance is to impose financial penalties on non-compliance as the milk contracts do. 
However, the former quote shows that this will not necessarily improve farmers’ 
understanding of ABs. At the same time, some vets critique the narrow focus of the retailer 
AB protocols, shaping social and natural orders of AB-use and AMR. 
 
“Supermarkets are very limited in their antibiotic  protocols. They focus on HP-CIA’s 
restriction but nothing else. This means that if HP-CIA use must be restricted or even stopped 
on a very short time span, other uses of antibiotics will rise which might impact on clinical 
resistance to these antibiotics.” (Fieldnotes Veterinary practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 7) 
 
7.3.6 Red Tractor farm assurance standards 
 
The Dairy Red Tractor Scheme requires in its annual Herd Health Plan a medicine record 
review between the vet and the farmer, including HP-CIA use, AB failures, dry cow therapy 
and protocols and recommendations on responsible AB-use for the next year (Red Tractor 
Assurance, 2018). The aim of the Herd Health Plan is to stimulate a discussion between the 
farmer and the vet about on farm AB-use. It is expected that this will help farmers reflect upon 
their AB choices and implement the advice that is set out by the vet in the farmer Herd Health 
plan.  
 
“So you have farm assurance and they request us to do herd health plans with the farmers. We 
need to discuss what protocols they have for what drugs and what they are supposed to be 
using first line, second line for mastitis, lameness and for all these different things. But that 
doesn’t mean what they do it. In practice, it is always dictated by what goes on in the health 
plan, as I am sure you know.” (Veterinary surgeon 5) 
 
The Dairy Red Tractor Herd Health plans deliver on paper what is expected of farmers, 
although what farmers do in practice may differ. At the same time, herd health discussions 
tend to focus on what the farmer has done rather than working towards herd health planning 
that can reduce farmers need for ABs.  
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“I think Herd Health Plans probably more often look at “what have you been doing this past 
year” than “what are you going to do this next year.” Herd health plans tend to be a little less 
about looking to the future than they should be and they are obviously not bound. But at least 
there is a little bit of thinking as to ‘this is what the farmers tends to use for this particular 
clinical situation.” (Veterinary surgeon 5) 
 
“Farm assurance systems don’t care how much you use or what you use, as long as you store 
it properly. It is supposed to stop people from using antibiotics that are out of date.” 
(Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 11) 
 
7.3.7 Antibiotic surveillance mechanisms  
 
AB usage data collection is believed to represent ‘evidence-based’ information providing 
transparency in AB usage activities. Currently, electronic dairy AB usage data is available for 
roughly one third of the national dairy herd (UK-VARSS, 2018). This data stems from the UK 
dairy Farm Vet System, which is a veterinary data set that collates delivery data to dairy farms 
from Practice Management Systems. It covers over 3000 farms which accounts for 33% of the 
UK dairy industry and is used by industry policymakers to evaluate dairy veterinary AB usage 
data (UK-VARSS, 2018). Some major UK retailers have set up their own data bases of AB 
data collection through which they can monitor and benchmark farmer AB usage. This data is, 
however, not synchronised with other data sets but used for retailer farmer AB benchmarking 
purposes. There is as such no unified national digital AB surveillance system available yet in 
the dairy industry at veterinary and/or farmer level (in contrast with the pig and poultry 
industry). There is a growing critique about the trustworthiness of the AB data collection 
systems itself. 
 
“In our practice, stock is very well registered. However, in my former practice, there was no 
control at all. What is in your car or not, they did not bother. Farmers register their own use, 
or they ‘should’ do. There is a variety in registering drugs in both vets and farmers.” 
(Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 11) 
 
The vet in the above quotes argues how some of the vets and farmers fail to accurately register 
AB usage activities. Although policymakers believe surveillance data represents AB practices, 
the practices of antibiotic policies differ from numerical realities. 
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7.3.8 RUMA guidelines 
Although RUMA positions itself as an industry lead, adoption of their guidelines by veterinary 
practices and vets is not a straightforward process. Most of the vets I encountered had heard 
of RUMA and their guidelines. Some of the vets had actively read the RUMA protocols and 
appreciated their content. 
 
“We have discussed selective dry cow therapy, which is RUMA, and I think most of us have 
read that, because it actually is a reasonably practice document. It has recommendations 
which are basic. It’s got your three recommendations, and I found that quite useful.” 
(Veterinary surgeon 2) 
 
However, other vets chose not to work with the RUMA guidelines and some did not have 
knowledge of them. 
 
“I have not really heard of initiatives of RUMA.”(Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, 
Veterinary surgeon 8) 
 
“It is good to have a controlling body that sets antibiotic standards to refer to or look up if 
needed. But I find they are too far removed from practice. We define our own antibiotic 
protocols.”  (Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 9) 
 
Guidelines and protocols are often produced with the intention to influence the decision-
making capability of individuals (Berg, 1997). However, by advising individuals to take 
sequential step by step actions, the protocol ignores contextual factors at play that drive 
processes of individual and collective action (Berg, 1998). This not only results in a 
discrepancy between protocol intentions and practice, but also an ignorance of the protocol as 
expressed by Veterinary surgeon 9.  
 
7.4 Tensions between antibiotic prescribing and dispensing 
As I have been highlighting, the veterinary prescribing-dispensing-administration of ABs has 
become more than an evidence-based therapeutic act. Although veterinary ABs in the UK are 
on a prescribing basis only, farmers are able to administer ABs to their animals without the 
intervention of a vet. In turn, veterinary industries are able to dispense ABs to farmers without 
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always having to perform a physical examination of the animal/herds. Consequently, farmers 
have their own medicine stock on their farm, which is beneficial to both professions: farmers 
are able to manage their own herd health while vets earn money on the medicines they sell. 
Instead of exclusive veterinary objects, ABs have become part of a farmer’s toolkit, used to 
manage all types of herd health problems on the farm. In what follows, several ‘actors’ will be 
discussed that co-construct the commercial route from prescribing to dispensing. 
 
7.4.1 The demystification of the prescription  
In human medicine, the prescription represents an act of communication between the patient 
and the practitioner. The prescription as a ‘script’ represents the expertise of the practitioner 
through which the patient can receive medicines that will make him or her better (Reynolds 
Whyte et al., 2003, p. 124). The medicines themselves are ‘tokens of concern’ that are 
symbolic representations of the doctor, which add to the perceived efficacy of medicines by 
patients. As Reynolds Whyte et al. (2003, p.124) argue, the prescription and the medicines are 
metonymic extensions of the doctor. The authority of the doctor is present all the way through 
the process from reviewing the symptoms of the patient, who is physically in his/her practice 
to the doctor’s clinical examination, through to the administration of the prescription and the 
medicines. This reassures the patient that he or she is being treated within the conventionalities 
of medical expertise. The medical pathway, therefore, involves a physical interaction between 
the key actors: the patient, the doctor, and the prescription that contains the medicines.  
As previously discussed, ABs can be prescribed over the phone by vets to farmers, unlike 
practice in human medicine. In these cases the prescription is mostly an administrative act for 
the official medicine record for the veterinary practice. This practice blurs expert boundaries 
between the veterinary profession and the farmer. Moreover, farmers expect vets to prescribe 
ABs. Equally, for vets the prescription represents a business transaction rather than an expert 
intervention. By prescribing, they are establishing a particular relationship with their farmers 
and most importantly, maintaining this relationship. If vets refuse to prescribe ABs at the 
request of farmers, vets could lose their client to other vets in the same practice or to other 
veterinary practices. 
 
 “It’s the difficulty of if someone’s ring you up and says, ‘I need these tubes X, Y and Z’. Most 
people would be like yeah, that’s fine, sign the prescription, and if you then start asking too 
many questions the farmer might get pissed off and might call in at another time when another 
vet is there, because all they want is their same order of antibiotics.” (Veterinary surgeon 18) 
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The prescription as metonymic expression of veterinary expertise has lost its symbolic power. 
 
“Farmers can generally find ways around prescriptions.” (Veterinary surgeon 3)  
 
“In the UK, obviously the farm culture is very much to have a stock of drugs on farm, which 
is largely down to their choice on how they are given. Obviously, they have to have things like 
a Herd Health Plan, they have to have theory advice from their vets on how to use antibiotics. 
But in reality, er, as you probably know, they choose what they do with those drugs. And 
sometimes what they do is, er, at the very least inappropriate and sometimes disturbingly 
creative. So, I think it would be nice to see vets, sort of, strengthening their position to provide 
a lot more restricted access to medicines, only with, not necessarily going in to administer on 
farm, but to have a lot more control over, or be forced to take a lot more control over what 
they are used for.” (Veterinary surgeon 20) 
 
The prescription is officially the only barrier to farmers to get access to ABs. Once prescribed, 
ABs circulate freely. As discussed, there are no clear policing systems in the dairy sector yet 
that can track record the destinations of antibiotics. Farmers can experiment themselves with 
the repertoire of ABs held on the farm.   
 
7.4.2 Blurring of expertise boundaries  
As discussed vets appear to have lost control over ABs as objects of their expertise. Fournier 
(1999, p. 70) has extensively discussed how professions gain their authority by ‘isolating’ 
knowledge about their objects and techniques of expertise. Through their own fields of 
knowledge, professions build their ‘authority and exclusiveness’ (Fournier, 1999, p. 60). 
Boundaries between professions and clients are established by making professional practices 
rather a ‘mysterious’ act and as such inaccessible to clients/lay people and clients (Fournier, 
1999, p. 75). But when the boundaries of professions are dismantled by clients and markets, 
their goods and services becomes available to these groups which shifts the professional 
boundaries of expertise (Fournier, 1999). Due to the accessibility of ABs to farmers and their 
widespread use as economic tools in agricultural systems, vets have been unable to maintain 
monopoly on ABs as their fields of expertise. With farmers trusting their own AB protocols, 
vets negotiate AB actions with farmers rather than dictate what to use and how to use them. 
 
“I had a client recently who, I was there for something else and he said, “while you are here 
can you see a calf with pneumonia” and he said that it needed some Micotil. I was like, ‘I 
don’t think it does actually. Have you given it anything’? And he said ‘Yes I gave it some 
Alamacyne, so ehm Oxytetracycline, I gave it 10cc’. And I was like,’ So that is enough for a 
158 
 
100kg calf, this is a 250kg calf’, ‘Yes but it was all I had’. Ok. ‘And then I gave it some Resflor’. 
‘How much Resflor did you give it’? ‘5’. ‘So basically that is less than a 50kg dose and now 
you want me to give it some Micotil 12 hours later’? We agreed that he could have more 
Alamcyin, a full dose of Alamycin, you know.” (Veterinary surgeon 2) 
 
I observed farmers requesting additional ABs of certain types as they were ‘running out’ of 
stock. This was in most cases agreed upon by vets, with some vets asking for more explanation 
than others. Another route through which vets lose control over their expert knowledge and 
practices is by delegating the management of common herd health problems to farmers. 
Farmers were given authority by vets to self manage certain issues, such as superficial wounds 
or lameness issues. Whenever farmers consulted vets, on the phone or on the farm, vets were 
often asked by farmers to prescribe a couple of extra bottles of ABs in order for farmers to 
self-manage ‘easy’ problems. Consequently, farmers were not only able to take over the part 
of the expert role of vets but were also allowed to get ABs prescribed. 
 
“I suppose the vets in the UK, in the way that they prescribe, it is a bit of an unusual one 
because you prescribe for…let’s say you get called out to see a sick cow, you would write a 
prescription for that sick cow per cause and likewise, you would probably prescribe a 
prescription for let’s say, 5 bottles of penicillin to keep on the farm so that the farmer has 
something. If there is something that needs to be treated, that does not warrant a vet to be 
called, for like a lame cow, or a cow that had cut himself, than the farmer can use it without 
having a vet called out. Or if you were out on the farm for let’s say, your fertility visit, you 
would potentially leave a few bottles of drugs there, that you would write a prescription for, 
but you would not necessarily know what really…what happens with it… that would be an 
exceptionally difficult thing to try to change because the farmers are so used to it being, as it 
were, in control of their drugs… yeah I think if they had to call out a vet for every single time 
they needed an antibiotic they would just stop calling the vets.” (Veterinary surgeon 17) 
 
The AB interventions themselves also stimulate the blurring of boundaries between farmers 
and vets. Many training and educational programmes have been designed to teach farmers how 
to use ABs ‘safely’. 
 
“There is a lot of initiatives going on about trying to train farmers in how to use medicines on   
farms. I am thinking…well that’s not, you know, yes that’s fine, and the vet should actually be, 
it is his responsibility actually to ensure they are used properly on farms.” (Retailer 1) 
 
Vets also critiqued the expert knowledge of agricultural consultants who are increasingly used 
by dairy supply chain members such as the milk processors and retailers, who help farmers 
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with their cost-production farm models.  
 
“There are at the moment too many consultants with too many different stories and different 
tick boxing to do. The Promar guys and Kite who are the agricultural consultants that work 
for Tesco are  young guys who don’t know what they are talking about. During one of their 
talks at a farm where a collegue was as well,  they give very basic information, which was 
quite embarrassing.” (Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 7) 
 
An important recurrent theme was the veterinary concerns about the drug dependent nature of 
their business model. Veterinary consultancy fees are relatively low and the geographical 
dispersal of farms means that travel consumes a large proportion of each day, constraining 
their ability to generate revenue other than through sales. 
 
“Vets are kept responsible by policymakers and the industry as we earn a lot of money on 
medicine. In the meantime farmers expect us to give them free advice. Yes indeed, 30-40% of 
our income is medicine, but look at our hourly rate: 120 pounds and a start fee of 30 pounds 
is 150 pounds an hour in comparison with other consultants who earn 300 an hour.” 
(Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, round table discussion with partners) 
 
“Of the 10 hours we work only 3 hours is effectively charged to the practice.” (Fieldnotes 
Veterinary Practice 3, Veterinary surgeon 13) 
 
Vets felt they had little scope to change their business models from a drug-fee financed model 
to a consultancy-fee financed model due to farmer pressure and competition with other 
practices. Farmers expected vets to give them free advice over the phone or prescribe ABs at 
their behest. The freedom of farmers to choose their veterinary practice on the basis of the best 
medicine deal and/or drug prescribing policy was reported to create price wars between 
veterinary practices as they battled to sell the most drugs for the cheapest price. In this context 
farmers were free to shop around to achieve the best deal. 
 
“How do you say to someone who perceives their vet as a shop, which some farmers do, you 
can’t have this you know. That has to be regulated because there will always be that practice 
that is willing to give it out.” (Veterinary surgeon 2) 
 
Vets and their practices were reported to feel trapped in their economic power relation with 
farmers. 
 
“One of the major problems I think exists at the moment is that drugs are used as a threat by 
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some farmers. So, farmers have an idea of what they want. If the veterinary practice puts 
restrictions on- for example, says, “Right, I’m afraid, no, you can’t have six bottles of, er, 
marbofloxacin because that’s not an appropriate use. It’s a critically important antibiotic that 
we want to reserve,” etc. etc., the farmer only has to go to the next veterinary practice down 
the road and say, “Will you give it to me?” and suddenly they’ve lost that business. And there 
is no doubt that that is a huge concern for a lot of vets who I’ve spoken to. Many of them feel 
like they’re held over a barrel.” (Veterinary surgeon 17) 
 
Many vets reported that farmers were not interested in the veterinary advice that comes with 
AB prescribing, contributing to a lack of oversight with what happens to ABs once they are in 
the hands of the farmers. As a result of this ease of access and lack of oversight, the vet in the 
following quote argues how ABs have turned into commodities to farmers, rather than 
therapeutic objects. Farmers feel entitled to buy and to administer ABs, without understanding 
how to actually use them. 
 
“Farmers see antibiotics as commodities, they have lost all therapeutic value to them. They 
don’t enjoy other opinions and if they buy medicines they feel they have the right to use this 
medicines. A problem is that farmers have no idea of doses and compliance, which then 
impacts again on resistance.” (Fieldwork Veterinary Practice 3, round table discussion with 
partners) 
 
I previously discussed the therapeutic value of HP-CIAs to farmers. The therapeutic value of 
CIAs to farmers is that it gives a quick, reliable recovery with cows quickly available for 
milking again. What matters to farmers is that they have an easy accessible tool to quickly 
cure their sick cows. However, farmers lack the knowledge of what the HP-CIA is for and for 
which situations it is actually meant to be used. To vets, the therapeutic value of ABs is more 
than just delivering cow recovery; it represents expertise and knowledge practices of how to 
use the AB in each situation.  
Vets discussed the tension between the commodity status of ABs to farmers and ABs for them 
as objects of expertise. Losing control over their objects of expertise appeared to vets as de-
professionalising the veterinary profession and ultimately contributing to antimicrobial 
resistance. In addition, the veterinary dependency on drug income can cause conflict between 
their professional duties versus their economic interest. 
 
“I think it’s an odd relationship that most practicing vets in the UK have with drugs, because 
they are dependent upon their, their sale for income, but at the same time, ultimately, most 
vets are motivated by a professional interest and the science is held in higher regards than the 
sales. So as long as they feel that something’s appropriate, and there’s a good, scientific 
evidence for it, and it might be that their, their thresholds for scientific evidence might be a bit 
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low, but they won’t consciously, I think, prescribe a drug that they didn’t think was necessary.” 
(Veterinary surgeon 20) 
 
During my fieldwork, younger /newly qualified vets reported on more than one occasion that 
veterinary practices financially incentivised veterinary surgeons to sell ABs by providing them 
with a bonus if the sales of ABs reached an identified level.  
 
7.5 Farmers’ access to antibiotics  
When farmers need ABs, they can either order them over the phone with the vets/veterinary 
practice or farmers can go themselves to the veterinary practice. Although dispensing rules in 
many veterinary practices are becoming stricter (no more dispensing of CIAs to farmers), 
farmers can still enter a practice at any moment and ask for ABs. The receptionists or 
veterinary assistants will often dispense the ABs based on the previous records of the farmer 
and the types of ABs they ask for. Officially, receptionists need to discuss the request of the 
farmer for ABs with vets. What may happen in practice is that receptionists will dispense the 
medicines farmers ask for with prescriptions signed retrospectively by the veterinary surgeon. 
Differences exist between veterinary practices and individual vets in how they work with 
receptionists. 
 
“Say it is about 10-11 o clock in the morning, all the vets are out doing visits, you have got 
the receptionist staff there, a farmer comes in, and says…or is on the phone..’I need X, Y Z’ 
and the receptionists would write things down, and then, it would totally depend upon the 
practice of what happens next. Some practices would ring a vet up, and be like, ‘Mr. Jones 
has rang up and ordered X, Y and Z, is it ok for him to have it?’ and verbal consent on the 
phone is enough to prescribe and then they will sign the prescription later when they are back 
in. Or other practices will wait for a vet to come back into the practice, to do it properly, or 
like I said earlier, the receptionist in that one branch, the receptionist would just have given 
those drugs, and then got the vet to sign it later, so they were dispensing without any authority, 
but they knew that the vet would be quite happy to sign it later.”(Veterinary surgeon 18) 
 
Veterinary assistants, in some cases, also take on an ‘expert role’, advising farmers what to 
use. 
 
“Where I was working, there were 3 branches, and in one of the branches, the receptionists 
would prescribe drugs, and I caught them doing that and obviously told them off, but they’d 
obviously been doing that for years, and the vet in that branch had no problem with them, and 
they were giving the farmers active advice of…if this antibiotic tube isn’t working, use a 
different one, and they didn’t see anything wrong with what they were doing. So I think to 
change THAT culture would be really quite…difficult.”(Veterinary surgeon 18) 
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Farmers were reported to be aware of the prescribing and dispensing mechanisms in veterinary 
practices and sometimes used this knowledge to get the drugs they wanted. 
 
“My last practice where I worked, farmers called the girls and they asked for Marbocyl 
because they had an E. coli mastitis, as they knew that this was going to get them the drugs 
they wanted. Vets then only sign the prescription retrospectively. Farmers were able to buy 
drugs in bulk orders. That still happens as well in this veterinary practice. It was not recorded 
properly either. Farmers can get it online as well. They just don’t understand the 
pharmacokinetics, but if they want it they will get it.” (Fieldnotes Veterinary Practice 3, 
Veterinary surgeon 11) 
 
Online pharmacies have become an important actor in farmer AB transactions. These online 
pharmacies are either run by veterinary corporations or pharmaceutical companies. Although 
the ABs need to be prescribed by the responsible vet/practice/corporation who run the 
pharmacy, there is a lack in oversight over what happens with the drugs after prescribing. 
 
“The existence of online pharmacies, I don’t think they help the prescribing process at all…as 
the farmer can go on there and create his shopping list, of what he wants, and then, well there 
still needs to be prescription at the end of it. So I think, how it currently works, is that the local 
vet authorizes the farmer that they can use it and signs a general prescription for everything 
that has to be done once a year. The farmer orders whenever they want, and there is a vet that 
works for the online pharmacy that signs each order as a prescription. I just can’t see how 
this is helping…at all […] the farmer can just shop and change, choose what he wants, without 
any understanding necessarily of the differences. So, for example, like vaccines, he could 
decide to use one year one IBR vaccine and next year the other, because one’s cheaper, 
without necessarily…he won’t start the course properly again, he won’t know the slight 
differences between them,  and…likewise with antibiotics, he may just choose what is on offer. 
There will be a vet signing it along the way, but, yeah, and I have never agreed with it, because 
I don’t think, it is not right. I think…it’s the…there is a complete loss in…well they claim there 
is still control but I think there is a loss of control, because the farmers on the whole are 
signing up for it. So there is one practice that owns it, and all their farmers have to use it as 
their ordering system, but other, like, farms who are not members of this practice can, freely 
use it, if they want it, and I think those farms they have then less contact with their vet, because 
they are going to the website to get drugs. They are getting less health advice, and obviously 
the, that website is just there for profit, nothing else.” (Veterinary surgeon 3) 
 
Another important access route of ABs to farmers are other farmers in their networks. This 
could be either neighbours or actual off the record trade. 
 
“We hear that farmers are buying antibiotics from other farmers as well. Because, you know, 
one farmer might get 100 bottles from his own vet but then sell on some to another farmer. 
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And that is really difficult to police. I guess the thing is, you have people buying drugs from 
wherever they are getting it.” (Veterinary surgeon 3)  
 
“There will always be that person who says ‘oh you can have some of mine’ and there are 
farmers who import it from Ireland as well” (Veterinary surgeon 2) 
 
As a result, various AB access routes enable farmers to stock ABs on their farms. This is 
confirmed by a recent ethnographic study performed by Rees et al. (2018) on the content of 
medicine cupboards on farms. The authors undertook a qualitative study to study the 
knowledge gaps surrounding prescribed veterinary ABs and farmer’s decision making about 
AB treatment in the absence of vets. The aim was to study whether veterinary medicines are 
used by farmers in the way the prescribing vet intended, or if there are other influences on 
post-prescription use. Data was collected from 27 dairy farms in England and Wales in the 
autumn of 2016, during which medicine cupboards were audited. The cupboards stored a broad 
range of different antimicrobials, with a median of 9 injectable antimicrobials. One of the most 
frequent kept antimicrobials was Ceftiofur, a HP-CIA for humans. A large number of the 
farmers had expired antimicrobials, some of which were over 16 years out-of-date, but were 
still intending to use them. It was also found that the quantity of antimicrobials stored by 
farmers was not linked to the number of animals at risk of treatment, suggesting there were 
other reasons for the storage practices found (Rees et al., 2018). I observed similar findings in 
my fieldwork. Although I was not able to always look into the medicine cupboard of farmers, 
most farmers’ stored antimicrobials on their farms. Whenever an AB was prescribed, the vet 
always asked if the farmer still had enough stock of the prescribed drug.  
 
7.6 Discussion/conclusion 
 
The ‘misuse and overuse’ of ABs in agriculture has been reduced to a behavioural problem by 
UK policymakers: farmers and vets are blamed for their deviant AB practices and/or ignorant 
AB knowledge. Appropriate training and support is believed to encourage the uptake of 
responsible AB practices and to strengthen the vet-farmer relationship (RUMA, 2017). 
Protocols and guidelines are implemented to support veterinary and farmer AB-decision 
making. Problematically, these interventions ignore the complex agricultural networks in 
which ABs circulate. As discussed in this Chapter, AB decision-making is more than an 
individual act. I identified 4 important actor-networks that ‘co-produce’ how ABs are 
prescribed, dispensed and ultimately end up in animals.  
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First of all, disease informants shape the decision about whether ABs will be used by farmers 
or not. Lay disease protocols, veterinary phone calls, farm staff, and ABs as normalised 
response to diseases on farms co-constructs farmers decisions. These actors tend to overrule 
evidence-based protocols, such as AHDB disease protocols. Second, AB informants influence 
what type of AB will be used: the vet-farmer relationship, AB metaphors, the AB milk 
withdrawal time, milk contracts and pharmaceutical companies have been identified by 
informants as influential. In contrast, the Red-Tractor Standards, AB surveillance systems and 
RUMA guidelines have had less impact on how ABs end up being used in dairy cows. These 
evidence-based standards and protocols were either partially adopted or ignored. Third, 
tensions between veterinary prescribing and dispensing affect the AB pathways. The act of 
veterinary prescribing has become a formality rather than an act of expertise. Most farmers 
expect vets to prescribe the ABs they want. As a result, vets feel under pressure to either 
prescribe or risk losing the client. This limits the ability of the veterinary practices to change 
their business models from drug financed to consultancy financed models. Fourthly, farmers 
have various AB access channels through which they can get ABs prescribed and/or dispensed. 
There are multiple veterinary practices to choose from, who are willing to prescribe. It was 
also found that: veterinary assistants contribute in the veterinary prescribing-dispensing 
process; there is an increasing availability of online pharmacies linked to veterinary practices 
or pharmaceutical companies; farmers dispense to other famers; and finally, it was suggested 
farmers sometimes import medicines from abroad.  
This Chapter discussed how actor-networks of ABs constrain farmers and vets in their ability 
to change their AB-use. A major issue of concern identified in this research is the access to 
drugs by farmers and their ability to stock them on their farms. This empowers farmers, 
trusting their own expertise, but results in difficulties in transfering knowledge. Using 
Chandlers and Hutchison’s (2016) concept of antimicrobials as ‘infrastructures’, I argue that 
antimicrobials have become integral to farmers understandings and practices of animal health 
and animal performance. ABs are embedded in the daily practices of farmers, supported by a 
vast array of human and non-human actors that confirm their importance. As a result, vets are 
unable to reclaim their exclusive expertise over ABs, and remain dependent on their income 
from selling AB. Educational strategies and training programmes will have a limited impact 
in changing farmers’ behaviour, as long as these antimicrobial infrastructures remain intact.  
Importantly, these economic actor-networks have already proved to be resistant over time to 
voluntary policies that focus on behaviour change. Instead, policymakers should address their 
gaze towards the structural issues on farms and in veterinary practices I identified in this 
Chapter. By understanding what actors drive AB-use, policies can be better targeted at these 
actors. Empowering farmers in their AB knowledge could result in unwanted effects, such as 
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farmers feeling even more entitled to contribute to AB decision-making. Instead, we need to 
first understand what actors drive farmer AB decision-making in the first place and address 
these structural problems. Second, we need to tackle farmers’ access to ABs and their ability 
to stock ABs on farms. Third, vets need to be supported in their business model transition by 
regulations that re-distribute authority over ABs to farmers. Fourth, the government should 
reconsider legislation around medicine pricing by pharmaceutical companies.  
The next and final Chapter will discuss the findings of this thesis in more depth, elaborate on 
the policy interventions proposed and the public health implications of the findings.  
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Chapter 8 
Discussion and conclusion 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
With AMR as one of the most complex public health risks of the 21st century, human and 
animal AB-use has been internationally problematised to define urgent areas of action. The 
central issue, with regard to both humans and animals is how to reduce AB-use. Since ABs are 
used by farmers and veterinary surgeons, international and national policy narratives have 
focussed on the ‘misuse and overuse’ of ABs by these particular actors. In 2016 in the UK, the 
O’Neill economic expert committee, UK governmental policymakers and agricultural 
policymakers consolidated around a voluntary industry-led approach to achieve responsible 
AB-use. By framing the use of AB-use in food producing animals as ‘excessive’ the problem 
became calculable and amenable to intervention. This resulted in technocratic interventions, 
such as the installation and standardisation of AB surveillance systems, AB guidelines and 
educational strategies to ‘rationalise’ farmer and veterinary AB-use. Consequently, 
agricultural policy, education and research responses have focused less on the workings and 
needs of livestock industries themselves, and more on quantifying AB usage and sales 
activities, to deliver public evidence of ‘progress’. 
This study questioned the ‘misuse and overuse’ policy frame in favour of studying how 
responsible AB-use was executed from within the inner workings of the UK dairy industry. 
Instead of studying farmers and veterinarians as ‘the problem’, I studied responsible AB 
policies and practices in the UK dairy industry as a socio-material agricultural network 
activity. I showed how tensions between policy and practice emerge, and the overflows this 
generates. In the dairy AB-actor networks, responsible AB-use was found to be a negotiated 
and embedded process, contingent upon associations or ‘assemblages’ (Latour, 2005) of dairy 
actors and their relationships within dairy supply chains. These included government and dairy 
AB policies, milk producers, staff, husbandry procedures, diseases, milk quality, milk safety, 
udders, hygiene procedures veterinary surgeons, veterinary business models, pharmaceutical 
companies, milk processors, milk residues, MRL levels, AB self-tests, consumers, labels, farm 
assurance, national milk recording, medicines books and more. Together, these human and 
non-human actors defined how farmers, veterinary surgeons, and dairy supply chain actors 
performed responsible AB-use according to what mattered in their ontological surroundings. 
This illustrates that AB-use in the dairy industry is less of a behavioural problem; resulting 
from ‘cultural drivers’ that produce ‘irrational’ AB-use. Instead, choices in dairy AB policies 
and their performances are the result of collective actor-network activities, with humans and 
non-humans defining action. 
Understanding dairy AB policies and their practices as actor-network activity has ontological 
implications. Dairy AB policies and their practices also ‘co-produce’ new social and natural 
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orders of AMR, thereby potentially producing new public health risks. Taking ABs as centres 
of interest and studying their ethnographic trajectories, I have provided an important 
methodological, conceptual and practical re-interpretation of livestock AB-use as a ‘problem’, 
which has to date isolated understandings of AB-use in terms of farmer and veterinary 
behaviours. I will discuss these findings further firstly, by examining how the UK’s political 
culture has come to such a limited understanding of how to govern responsible AB-use and 
secondly, to explain how this has led to the production of particular supply chain-led AB 
policies in the UK dairy industry. Finally, I explore the wider contribution of this research to 
the complex area of AB policy governance.  
 
8.2 Implications of international framings 
The international narrative of AB ‘overuse and misuse’ in agriculture has shaped the UK’s 
industry-led AMR strategy. The adoption of the international narrative, I would argue, has 
removed the need to question the inherent assumptions and commitments within this narrative 
(Wynne, 1992, p. 115). This thesis has demonstrated that, although selectivity and cultural 
conditioning are inevitable in the construction of policy frames, certain knowledges are 
prioritised over others (Jasanoff, 2005b, p. 25). With the WHO consistently framing AB 
‘misuse and overuse’ in agriculture as the main risk from the late 1998s onwards, it has become 
normalised across political, scientific and public settings to blame the users of livestock ABs 
as the main problem. The ECDC, EFSA and EMA published a report in 2015 in which they 
linked quantities of AB-use in humans and animals with increased risks of AMR. In some 
cases, they found a positive link between AB consumption in animals and resistance in bacteria 
from humans. The increasing need for AB surveillance data has pushed nations to either 
implement or improve their human and animal AB surveillance systems. 
Problematically, AB surveillance data, on which organisations such as the WHO, ECDC, 
EFSA and EMA rely to make claims on the impact of policies, tend to provide only a snapshot 
of the totality of the story (Jasanoff, 2016). Internationally, the available data on animal use is 
based on pharmaceutical veterinary sales data (ABs sold to veterinary practices). AB sales 
data does not provide any insight into how ABs end up being used by vets and farmers. AB 
sales data leaves important actors out of the understanding of AB-use. Key actors left out 
include, pharmaceutical product interests, food supply chain agreements, husbandry systems, 
trade positions, governmental support to local agricultural systems, the existence of national 
knowledge institutions (universities – industry – consultancy – NGOs) and their alignment 
with agricultural sectors. Moreover, classical risk assessments, used by the WHO, ECDC, 
EFSA and EMA to study trends and patterns of AB sales activities across countries perform 
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new ontological practices; by deciding what versions of progress come to matter and which 
are excluded, they shape new social and natural orders of AB-use and potentially, AMR.  
 
8.3 The role of science in the UK’s governance of antibiotic use 
in agriculture 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the human and animal AB ‘misuse and overuse’ narrative became 
the centre of attention in scientific, political and media discussions in the UK. The O’Neill 
expert committee (2014-2016) was appointed by the UK government to deliver impartial 
evidence and a fresh perspective on the social and economic consequences of the issue and in 
so doing de-politicise concerns. Criticising the ‘excessive’ use of ABs in agriculture, these 
economic experts used the ‘built-in’ assumption (Wynne, 1992) of international narratives that 
the users of ABs are the main concern. This resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy: the O´Neill 
2015 report performed a systematic literature that focused on the measurable aspect of AB-
use. Instead of interpreting the boundaries of the established ‘misuse and overuse’ WHO 
policy frame in the first place, the systematic literature contained explicit assumptions on the 
‘misuse and overuse’ of ABs in agriculture. A complex problem was reduced to a binary 
question: is the ‘excessive’ AB-use in agriculture a risk to human health? The problem was 
made governable and calculable. Scientific legitimacy became the basis for UK political 
decision-making around agricultural AB-use. The 2016 O’Neill proposed three main pillars in 
the transformation of excessive use in agriculture into responsible use: AB reduction targets; 
AB measurement, and; AB education around use and alternatives. These responsible AB-use 
policy pillars (O’Neill reports; 2015, 2016) were adopted by governmental and agricultural 
policymakers, but the UK livestock sector was made responsible for implementing the 
recommendations and developing AMR strategies to tackle misuse/overuse of ABs. 
In Chapter 4, I also demonstrated the existence of competing concerns in livestock AB-use 
across political and agricultural settings. These concerns influenced how evidence about 
livestock AB ‘misuse and overuse’ ended up being used to inform political debates. For 
instance although the 2015 O’Neill report recommended regulation, taxation of ABs and/or 
subsidies of alternatives to support policy, these recommendations were not adopted by 
governmental and agricultural policymakers. AB legislation such as delinking vet payments 
and profits from prescribing ABs was not favoured by either the UK livestock industry or the 
government. Demonstrating how commercial interests and political interests can become 
aligned, I will elaborate next on how the process of framing is situated in a nation’s political 
approach to science governance. Who frames livestock AB-use as a risk and how evidence is 
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negotiated and by whom matters; this framing provides insight into how nations deal with 
uncertainties and what gets lost or simplified in the process.  
 
8.4 Dealing with uncertainty: the expert-lay gap in the UK’s 
political culture 
 
In Chapter 3, I showed how the Swedish consensus-oriented policy culture framed the risks of 
agricultural ABs differently from other countries, from the 1980s onwards, by taking a 
precautionary risk approach towards livestock AB-use. Instead of waiting for more scientific 
evidence to clarify the uncertainties involved with AGP-use, the Swedish government 
broadened the discussion incorporating different views and multiple concerns beyond those of 
the scientists. Taking into account farmer, veterinary and consumer concerns, Sweden 
undertook a precautionary approach and banned AGPs in 1986, instead of waiting for more 
conclusive evidence. This was in contrast to other countries, in which dominant groups such 
as pharmaceutical and agricultural lobby groups used the absence of conclusive evidence to 
continue with AGP-use. Today, we find in Sweden a strong collaboration between the Swedish 
government, farmers and vets, working together to improve the agricultural sector collectively. 
Callon et al. (2009, p.192) emphasise the usefulness of taking a precautionary approach to 
uncertainties involved with technological risks. They argue it offers an ‘active, open, 
contingent, and revisable approach’ and is ‘exactly the opposite of a clear-cut definitive 
decision’(Callon et al., 2009, p. 192). Precautionary approaches give the opportunity to deepen 
knowledge, taking into account views beyond scientific disciplines. Indeed, the Swedish 
government democratically used complementary kinds of knowledges to identify danger and 
define precautionary action. In the UK, experts, government (DEFRA, VMD) and agricultural 
policymakers (RUMA) ‘collectively’ assessed ‘evidence’ of the O’Neill reports (2015, 2016). 
The debate was, however, not opened up to extensive public review and alternative voices. 
UK policymakers deferred to established experts and institutionalised spokespersons of the 
agricultural industries, effectively distancing any other concerns  
I showed how the UK still heavily relies on expert committees to assess risk, rather than 
opening up the scientific debate to lay publics. In the UK’s governance of livestock AB-use, 
farmers and vets are controlled by the world of the specialists, who keep their monopoly on 
the production of knowledge. Specialists (researchers and agricultural representatives) have 
the task of producing ‘objective’ knowledge by implementing technologies that will tell us 
what to do (Callon et al., 2009, p. 43). The UK’s industry-led policy model has come to rely 
on the exclusiveness of science and its methods to govern the issue of agricultural AB-use. 
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This belief in scientific progress, creates a false belief that science and its methods are able to 
provide us with accurate information (Jasanoff, 2016). The limitations of trusting scientific 
methods to drive change and evaluate policy impact will become clear in the next paragraph. 
 
8.5 The ‘thin’ reality of surveillance data 
The quantification of AB sales and use has become central in national and international 
discussion: metrics are used by policymakers to inform policies and evaluate the impact of 
these policies. In the UK, the latest UK-VARSS 2018 report claims significant reduction in 
AB-use across and within livestock sectors. From 2013 onwards, the UK has achieved a 40% 
reduction in veterinary sales (sold by pharmaceutical companies to veterinary practices). 
Within the dairy industry, the veterinary usage data shows a reduction of 35% between 2016-
2017, although the percentage only represents 30% of the total dairy veterinary community 
(UK-VARSS, 2018). The latest data available on veterinary sales data across 30 European 
countries over 2016, in mg/Population Correction Unit (PCU), shows a large difference in 
sales between the countries (EMA, 2018). Between the most-and least-selling country, a range 
can be observed from 2.9 to 434.2 mg/PCU, with an average sale of 135.5 mg/PCU. 
Comparing Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK (see Fig. 8.1), they all rank below 
the European average sale of 135.5 mg/PCU, and have achieved reductions in veterinary AB 
sales 2010–2016 (EMA, 2018).  
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Importantly, the data presented in Fig. 8.1 is veterinary antibiotic sales data, based on 
pharmaceutical sales to veterinary practices. There is still a gap in knowledge across European 
countries about their veterinary and on-farm AB usage data. Nevertheless, according to the 
data, the UK appears to be one of the better performers in Europe in terms of a reduction in 
AB sales. However, this data is sales data and does not say anything about responsible use. 
Nevertheless, this numerical evidence of AB reduction is both trusted and used by scientists, 
governmental and industry policymakers to claim progress and settle controversial debates.  
However, what is not taken into account in the previous data is the complex interactivity 
between science and human’s, which became ‘visible’ during my fieldwork. In 2016 the dairy 
industry was left in charge of implementing a sector surveillance system. This resulted in a 
rather chaotic approach. While the dairy sector was and still is debating how to design an 
overarching system, supply chain members had already started to implement their own AB 
usage systems. With different ‘expert’ teams in charge across supply chain members, different 
systems circulated, producing a lack of transparency on how the AB data are collected, 
processed and evaluated. In addition, the Red Tractor Dairy Farm Assurance has its own 
‘medicine book’ system, which requires farmers to provide written or digital medicine 
recording and is evaluated on an annual base. With different AB usage systems circulating in 
the UK dairy industry, designed by different groups, collected through various routes, and 
analysed by different expert teams, there can be no certainty about the nature of the data used 
to report a reduction in AB-use. As Jasanoff (2016, p. 58) asks, ‘can numbers capture the 
accuracy and reliability, or the honesty of the suppliers of the technology or of the information 
needed’ to assess a situation properly? 
At the same time, I have evidenced in Chapter 6 and 7 how AB surveillance data only partially 
represents practice. Moving beyond boundaries of science and its policy matrix, I found that 
medicine recordings and their claims are thin descriptions of responsible AB-use, and do not 
reflect what is happening in practice. Their paper realities make believe how the livestock 
industry is doing, however, they fail to grasp how AB-use is driven by milk prices, milk 
residues, lack of consistent milk recording across farmer landscapes, online pharmacies, AB 
pricing competition between veterinary practices, financial problems with farmers, the 
veterinary business model, and more (see Chapter 7). The gap between data and actual practice 
moreover questions the meaning of responsible AB-use; a reduction in sales/usage does not 
necessarily mean that ABs are used in responsible manner. My fieldwork highlighted a number 
of risky AB practices, ranging from disposal of ABs in slurries, falsification of medicine 
records, misuse of milk residue tests, dubious dispensing routes, lack of farmer understanding 
of AB withdrawal times, farmers dispensing ABs to top up courses and more. These practices 
fall outside the statistical realities we have come to trust and which inform the UK’s future 
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policies. As I will discuss in the next section, the actor-networks in which ABs circulate come 
with different matters of concern, and consequently, different AB practices.   
 
8.6 Antibiotic policies and their practices in the UK dairy sector 
 
8.6.1 Different matters of concern 
 
The dairy supply chain is expected to drive and standardise responsible AB-use across dairy 
farmers. The formulation, implementation and adoption of responsible AB-use within the UK 
dairy industry, however, is far from a linear process; instead, it is interactional and 
interpretative, located within and across dairy supply chain actor-networks and their concerns. 
This means there are limitations when we assess policies only from within the policy 
framework. Chapter 6 discussed how dairy supply chain actor networks do not act in a vacuum 
when responding to their AB-use responsibilities as food supply chains; there are economic 
opportunities attached to the evidencing of responsible AB-use activities. Although dairy 
supply chain actors produce the data that is expected within the UK’s industry-led policy 
frame, such as AB sales reduction targets, they tailor dairy AB policies and practices as well 
to interests outside policy frames. Consequently, what matters outside policy frameworks 
shapes how responsible AB-use is practiced. It is the combination of the dairy supply chain 
performativity within and outside UK’s industry-led policy framework that shapes how ABs 
travel in dairy cows, in their milk and enter food supply chains and the wider environments. 
Where policymakers want to see evidence of AB reduction, milk processors want to avoid 
milk residues in their milk supply chain and retailers want to differentiate themselves to 
consumers. Responsible AB-use in the dairy supply chain should therefore not be solely 
evaluated from metrological results presented in the annual VMD UK-VARSS surveillance 
reports.  
In this thesis I have provided new methodological insights into how metrological results can 
be complemented by other types of knowledge that emanates from the actors themselves. By 
interviewing dairy supply chain actors and observing AB practices, I let dairy supply chain 
actors define boundaries and expectations of responsible AB-use. Moreover, I have come to 
understand how their actor-networks define the content and translation of responsible AB-use. 
What I found is that the milk supply chain response to responsible AB-use is a multi-actor 
decision-making process; a negotiation, in which human and non-humans determine how 
policies are rolled out. As discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, the milk contracts between either 
farmers and milk processors (non-aligned) and retailers (aligned), define the farmer production 
standards, including AB standards, for which a milk price is received in return. Different 
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interests drive the content and expectations of these standards, set out in the milk contracts and 
translated into milk prices. In the following section, I will describe how the actor-network of 
each dairy supply chain shapes policy, and the intended and unintended effects (overflows) of 
dairy supply chain policies in practice.  
 
8.6.2 The ‘overflows’ of dairy supply chain-led antibiotic policies  
Overflows of milk processors’ antibiotic policies 
What matters to milk processors is that the milk they collect and process does not contain milk 
residues that exceed their MRL. According to EU legislation, milk of individual cows cannot 
enter the food supply chain if it contains milk residues that exceed their MRL (FSA, 2015). 
When milk processors collect raw milk from farms, milk gets diluted with milk from other 
farms when it moves from the individual cow to the milk processor plant. The same happens 
with milk residues. This is referred to as the ‘dilution effect’, and is sometimes deliberately 
used by farmers to avoid milk waste. Other farmers lack awareness of how to work with milk 
residue withdrawal times and thus allow residues to pass in to the food supply chain. Milk 
processors consider farmers the biggest risk to excessive milk residues, and use the responsible 
AB-use debate to implement policies that increase farmers’ understanding of milk residues. 
However, overflows of these milk processor policies can be observed.  
Milk processors advocate the use of Selective Dry Cow Therapy (SDCT) in order to stimulate 
the transition from Dry Cow Therapy (prophylaxis) to SDCT (therapeutic). As more than 50% 
of dairy AB-use takes place during DCT, it is believed SDCT policies will lower AB-use and 
consequently, milk residue risks. Milk processors offer their farmers SDCT training and 
workshops, so farmers can improve their understanding of the SDCT procedure. However, 
discrepancies can be observed between the content of the SDCT training programmes and 
protocols and the situations on the farm that shape the format. Farmers argue that the training 
programmes fail to consider the bigger picture of the farm, while vets argue they are not 
included enough in the policy programmes. Moreover, vets discuss the limitations of protocols 
as an educational method, as farmers have their own creative ways of implementing protocols, 
not always corresponding to its intentions. SDCT policies fail to work as ‘boundary objects’ 
(Fox, 2011) between milk processors, farmers and veterinarians; the policies fail to incorporate 
the lifeworld of the farmer and veterinary profession. 
To tackle the risk of milk residues in the dairy supply chain, milk processors have introduced 
milk price penalties to farmers when milk residues are found to exceed their MRL levels. The 
high penalties attached to milk residue failures, together with a new industry guideline that 
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forbids feeding wasted milk to calves, encourages farmers to dispose of milk into the 
environment. This potentially increases environmental AMR pressure, threatening farmers, 
other living entities on the farms, and other ecological equilibriums on or near the farm. The 
penalties applied by milk processors with regard to residues which exceed the MRL have 
stimulated farmers’ use of on-farm milk residue tests to evaluate whether their produced milk 
is safe. Although these interventions might improve milk safety in the food supply chain, it 
does not mean that ABs are used more responsibly, nor AMR risks are reduced. Instead, new 
social and natural orders are ‘co-produced’, with new uncertainties around AMR.  
On-farm self-testing of milk residues by farmers has other unintended consequences. Farmers 
become more knowledgeable about how to use ABs instead of re-thinking why they use ABs 
in the first place. Instead of changing on-farm practices to become less dependent upon ABs, 
farmers will either start using ABs that are not detected by regular tests or use the tests to limit 
the risk of milk residue failure. The interventions lead to reactive policies, rather than changes 
that reduce farmers’ need for ABs.   
 
Overflows of retailer’s antibiotic policies 
The customer profile of each UK retailer, shapes the retailer’s AB policies. Retailers with high 
customer profiles who expect high quality products will have aligned milk contracts with a 
‘farmer milk pool’. In this situation farmers receive a fixed cost-production milk price for 
meeting certain quality standards. This milk price mechanism, which steers farmers’ practices, 
offers retailers the possibility of including consumer expectations in dairy production 
standards. To farmers in return, an aligned milk contract with a fixed milk price means 
economic security; for retailers there is an opportunity to market products with added value 
for example, high animal welfare standards. In contrast, retailers who have low customer 
profiles (customers interested in low priced products), will prioritise affordable products and 
are less inclined to engage themselves with the quality of production. These retailers will only 
contract milk processors with whom they have supply agreements. The customer profiles 
equally impact upon the AB policy strategies of retailers. Retailers with customers who expect 
high quality products have AB standards defined in their farmer aligned milk contracts.  
Retailers who do not contract farmers directly will divert responsible use strategies to the milk 
processors. 
Retailers are seen by farmers and veterinary surgeons as potential drivers for responsible AB-
use, however, Chapter 6 demonstrates how farmers implement the retailer AB standards in 
accordance with their own actor-networks. Farmers fear the loss of the aligned milk contract, 
as it provides them economic security. Consequently, farmers will ensure standards are met 
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on paper, but will find ways to circumvent the system. My fieldwork shows that farmers invent 
new pathways through which they can continue their AB-use, by for example, administering 
two ABs but recording only one, using multiple milk contracts, having secret medicine boxes, 
and using ABs from their neighbours. Hence, farmers cover their practices instead of changing 
them. Some farmers perceive the workshops and meetings organised by retailers as ‘tick box’ 
events: they tick the box to show good behaviours, but go home and continue with their day-
to-day business.  
Retailers with farmers in aligned milk contracts represent only 20% of the farmer population. 
The other 80% of the UK dairy population has non-aligned milk processor contracts. Since 
2016, retailers who buy non-aligned milk from processors have been working on a voluntary 
basis with the farmers of these milk processors, to implement AB surveillance systems. There 
is however, limited oversight on how this actually takes place and takes shape in practice. The 
different aligned and non-aligned milk contracts with different AB standards and milk prices 
shape different farmer practices, and potentially, bacterial responses.  
 
Overflows of Red Tractor antibiotic policies 
The Dairy Red Tractor Scheme is the UK’s private national Farm Assurance Scheme, covering 
95% of UK’s dairy farmers. It is considered to be a powerful mechanism to standardise UK 
dairy farmers in their husbandry and AB-use. The Dairy Red Tractor Scheme (Red Tractor 
Assurance, 2018) builds on trust, in which it is assumed that dairy farmers perform the 
standards in accordance with the Scheme expectations. Importantly, the standards are 
produced in co-construction with farmer organisations. It is this co-construction which raises 
concerns about the quality of the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme. It is argued that the AB standards 
embedded within the Scheme are designed to benefit the farmers rather than foster innovation. 
Interestingly, the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme has only recently, in 2018, amended its standards. 
Since July 2018, the Scheme requires farmers to perform culture and sensitivity testing before 
using CIAs. Farmers must record their total medicine use and use of SDCT in their Herd Health 
Plan, which must be evaluated with their vets on an annual basis. In cases of milk residue 
failure, farmers and their vets are expected to follow a training course how to use ABs 
responsibly. 
In common with how farmers respond to supply chain standards, farmers have their own 
interpretations of the Red Tractor Dairy standards. From my fieldwork these interpretations 
include falsification of records, tick boxing of husbandry standards, and sometimes stubborn 
responses to veterinary consultation, rather than proactive attitudes. Although the Herd Health 
Plan of the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme is meant to strengthen the veterinary-farmer 
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relationship, vets express little confidence in this mechanism. The veterinary-farmer 
relationship is still troubled by the AB power relationship, in which both professions are 
trapped. There are several pathways through which farmers have access to ABs, which gives 
farmers power to constrain vets in their prescribing choices. At the same time, disease 
informants and AB informants in the agricultural network of farmers – see Chapter 7 – 
continue to contribute to farmers’ perceived need for ABs. As long as these actors dominate 
in farmers’ agricultural networks, training programmes will have limited power to overrule 
these actors and drive the change they claim to make.    
 
8.6.3 Antibiotic decision-making in practice:  
 
When farmers encounter a clinical problem in their herd, the agricultural network of the farmer 
will shape farmers’ response to disease. Existing disease informants, AB informants, the 
contentious veterinary-farmer relationship and farmers’ accessibility to ABs, are actors that 
contribute to farmer’s AB decision-making. In many cases, a process of trial and error will 
take place, which includes the use of ABs, before a vet will be asked to visit the farm. First, 
actors such as the clinical presentation and value of the cow, the opportunity for farmers to 
discuss issues over the phone with vets, staff on the farm, and lay/official disease protocols, 
create the context within which farmers decide how to engage with the problem. Second, AB 
informants will steer farmers’ choice in what type of AB to choose for the particular clinical 
condition. Third, the accessibility of drugs on farms makes it easy for farmers to grab an AB 
to start AB treatment. Consequently, the recommended policies, such as AB reduction policies, 
AB training/education, and the veterinary-farmer relationship as mechanism to drive change, 
have to battle against the actors discussed above. A major tension in the proposed agricultural 
policy recommendations is the responsibilisation of vets to support farmers in their transition 
towards responsible AB-use. Vets are expected to educate their farmers, but they are still 
trapped in economic relationships with farmers, colleagues and competing veterinary 
practices. Farmers’ access to ABs constrains vets in their AB decision-making process. This 
limits vets to change their business model from mainly drug financed to consultancy financed, 
and with it, their prescribing practices. Vets will often obey the logics of farmer actor-networks 
to remain profitable as a business. The veterinary authority on its knowledge and objects is not 
evident, and is often ignored in AB policy models. 
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8.7 Case study: An ANT intervention built into the Dairy Red 
Tractor Scheme. 
 
The study and management of dairy sector actor-networks can enable us to examine why the 
UK dairy industry fails to innovate. With 95% of UK dairy farmers contracted by the Dairy 
Red Tractor Scheme, it has the potential to drive change. But as previously discussed, the 
Dairy Red Tractor Scheme is heavily embedded in dairy supply chain agricultural networks. 
This constrains the performance of the Scheme. How can we achieve good animal health and 
welfare in practice while strengthening the economic position of farmers and veterinary 
practices? What is needed for the dairy industry to enable innovation against a fair cost-
production price of milk? As discussed, practising animal health and welfare involves more 
than a set of standards; it involves dealing with actor-networks of consumers, policymakers, 
farm assurance, food supply chain actors, farmers and veterinarians, who each come with their 
own interests and performances. What the consumers and export markets expect travels all the 
way down to farmers’ husbandry practices and the veterinary-farmer relationship (See Figure 
8.2). These actors ‘co-produce’ animal health and welfare and consequently, AB practices. We 
therefore need to engage with every level and evaluate how they influence each other practices, 
instead of treating them as silo’s (see Figure 8.2).  
 
Consumers/export 
markets
Government
Farm assurance
Retailers
Milk 
processors
farmers
vets
Fig. 8.2:  Responsible dairy farming as multi-layered performance 
   
 
179 
 
Interventions need to focus on actor-networks from farm to fork: In order to do so, I am using 
the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme as a case study to demonstrate the ways in which it could be 
´re-assembled’ using ideas drawn from ANT to develop a more robust set of responsible AB-
use practices (Latour 2005). I will start with recommendations that could strengthen the UK 
veterinary profession and vet-farmer relation. Next I will propose interventations that can 
alleviate economic tensions across the UK dairy supply chain. Finally, I will argue what 
regulatory interventions and types of support from the UK government are needed to support 
the UK dairy industry as a whole. I will end this Chapter with a final conclusion of the thesis.  
 
8.7.1 Strengthen the veterinary profession 
 
The Herd Health Plan in the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme aims to stimulate the veterinary-farmer 
relation. It requires proactive, farm-specific health planning between the farmer and his vet: 
vets must undertake an annual review with farmers to evaluate the herd health status and AB 
usage in their herds. The Scheme recommends involvement of vets in all aspects of health 
planning throughout the year. Industry policymakers believe that these veterinary-farmer 
contacts can be pivotal in changing a farmer’s husbandry and AB practices.  
This thesis has evidenced that not all farmers are interested in the advice from vets. I argued 
this is not a ‘behavioural problem’ but the outcome of several networks pressures. Farmers 
need to juggle the responsibilities that come from actors both on and off the farm. The milk 
prices they receive from milk processors or retailers are tight and some farmers struggle to 
produce against the cost-production price of milk. Retailers and milk processors are also 
caught up in milk price wars; consumers expect low prices against high quality. Financial 
pressures lead farmers to look for quick fixes, such as AB-use, rather than changes to 
husbandry practices or animal housing requiring greater investment and often with uncertain 
outcomes. To remain in business, farmers want their dairy cows to be healthy to produce and 
sell as much milk as possible. But health is performed in different ways. To some farmers, this 
means investing in preventative disease interventions, high herd immunity status, and high 
housing standards. To others, health is performed by responding to problems as they occur, 
such as administering ABs. Living in isolated communities, farmers have often been removed 
from external advice and the need to change. Even though newer generations of farmers have 
received agricultural training and will bring in new knowledge to the farm, this will in most 
cases be diluted by the existing farm culture. This thesis has evidenced that farmers will often 
return to the lay protocols and practices they are familiar with.  
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Even though the dairy Red Tractor Scheme puts the Herd Health Plan forward as a tool to 
stimulate the engagement of both vets and farmers, as has been shown farmers have other 
priorities in their actor-networks to worry about. Farmers try to reduce their costs by avoiding 
calling out vets; vets have developed a business model based on selling drugs rather than on 
selling their time and expertise. This relationship has to be fundamentally changed if farmers 
are to be supported in becoming more responsible. Most importantly, the veterinary 
professions needs to be strengthened in order to achieve a healthy economic veterinary-farmer 
relation. 
 
Contractual relations between the veterinarians and farmers  
In the Netherlands, legislation that required a 1-1 relationship between vets and farmers 
reduced competition between veterinary practices, by ensuring that farmers can only procure 
veterinary services and medicines from one veterinary practice. Each livestock vet in the 
Netherlands needs to be certified on top of their degree to practice as a veterinarian in the 
livestock industry (Geborgde dierenarts, KNMVD). In a similar vein, the Dairy Red Tractor 
Farm Assurance Scheme can require that 1 veterinary practice, chosen by the farmer, becomes 
appointed in the Scheme. This practice will be responsible to fulfil the mandatory contact 
hours between the farmer and the vet. As there is a large variety of quality amongst veterinary 
practices in the UK, there is potential risk that some farmers receive less good advice than 
others. To ensure veterinary practices across the UK are up to date with their knowledge, the 
BVA should require all UK dairy vets to follow a short course on dairy herd health, for which 
they receive a certificate in return. The course should cover the topics that will be discussed 
during the regular contact hours, such mandatory disease programmes and preventative 
strategies. This certificate enables vets/practices to become included in the Scheme.  
 
Re-distribute husbandry expertise to veterinarians 
Due to the competitive milk market, retailers and milk processors have their own expert teams 
and agricultural consultants (kite, promar) who dictate and audit the husbandry standards. This 
undermines the local veterinary practices who are often left out of the discussion. But local 
vets are the first point of contact for the farmer, rather than the consultants. In addition, 
different types of information circulate which complicate husbandry practices. One way to 
reduce the different knowledge sources is to send independent supply chain consultants to 
local veterinary practices instead of farms. By working together with local veterinary practices, 
farms can be more closely monitored in accordance with supply chain expectations, while vets 
can invest in knowledge and their relation with farmers. The Red Tractor Scheme could 
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include a standard which requires a liaison between supply chains and local veterinary 
practices. 
 
Veterinary-farmer relation: implement regular contact moments  
The Red Tractor Scheme should require a minimal number of annual contact hours between 
the veterinarian and the farmer. This could be initially subsidised by either the government or 
by the food supply chain. Alternatively, veterinary practices could offer annual consultancy 
packages at an affordable price. Opening up isolated farms to up-to-date tailored advice could 
support the transition from responsive farming to responsible farming. Prevention strategies, 
such as herd immunity, disease control programmes, biosecurity, breeding techniques, housing 
investments and environmental standards should be regularly addressed and progress towards 
achieving aims regularly monitored.   
 
8.7.2 Alleviate milk supply chain tensions 
 
I have shown how responsible AB-use standards enter existing competitive dairy markets, 
tailored to the interests of supply chain members, rather than public health concerns. Different 
policies, different penalty-reward systems and different engagement strategies inevitably 
fragment AB practices, rather than levelling them out. This results in dairy farmers engaging 
in various irresponsible AB activities outside the numerical and paper realities relied upon by 
policymakers and the public. Another worrying trend is the overflows created by the strong 
retailer involvement in the UK dairy supply chain. Although the competitive supply chain 
model is meant to drive dairy husbandry innovation, we see the opposite happening. The 
retailer-aligned farmers (25%) receive extra support, guidance and stable milk price income, 
in comparison to the non-aligned milk processor farmers (75%). Aligned farmers are 
stimulated to innovate their farming practices, while non-aligned farmers are stimulated to 
invest in milk quality and safety. As a result, a large group of dairy farmers are unable to make 
the transition towards responsible farming. The following proposals could alleviate some of 
these tensions. 
 
Re-distribute responsibility for antibiotic standards 
The formulation of AB initiatives should be distributed to actors outside economic markets, 
rather than being solely left to economic actors. This does not mean economic actors are 
excluded from the discussion, but they should not be left in full independent control of the 
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interpretation, design and implementation of AB policies. Instead of trusting a competitive 
model to do the work, the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme could dictate the standards (in 
consultation with the industry, consumers and government) and improve auditing of their 
practices. By distributing this responsibility away from milk processors and retailers, they can 
invest their resources in other mechanisms, such as National Milk Recording, veterinary-
farmer contact hours, and milk quality differentiation strategies.   
 
Improve transparency of milk contracts and their pricing mechanisms 
The different milk contracts lack transparancy in their pricing mechanisms. This leaves 
farmers in the dark about which milk contracts to choose and what it actually means for them 
when signing up for a contract. Different milk prices, either volatile or fixed, and milk contract 
expectations disrupt milk supply chain integration. This issue has already been raised by the 
National Farmers’ Union (NFU) and a dairy code was designed to provide transparency and 
confidence in the milk contract between milk processor and milk producer. The NFU has 
argued for the Code to be mandatory in order for farmers to get fair milk contracts. This is, 
however, not currently the case, with milk contracts and their pricing mechanisms remaining 
confidential and preventing detailed comparisons between the contracts, besides the prices 
paid (Costa-Font and Revoredo-Giha 2017). This should be picked up again by agricultural 
authorities and dairy organisations to improve farmer equality and dairy supply chain 
integration.   
 
Consumer campaigns to debate the low milk prices 
The retailer-consumer relation determines the retailer expectations of how dairy products are 
produced and the price to be paid. This results in several constraining network activities: 
retailers defining profit margins of milk processors, milk-processor milk prices, retailer milk 
prices, milk production standards, the veterinary-farmer relation and more. One strategy to 
create more margin on the milk price is to raise awareness with consumers. The UK is one of 
the few countries in Europe where a bottle of milk is cheaper than a bottle of water. Retailers 
could invest in responsible farming dairy campaigns to create more consumer awareness. In 
addition, consumer expectations and their overflows should become openly discussed. Dairy 
organisations could work together to engage with society, media and policymakers with the 
dairy supply chain and other food supply chains.   
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Subsidise milkprice 
Being part of the European Union means that farmers in European countries receive a single 
farmer payment subsidy to achieve the aims set out in the CAP. In the case of the UK in 2019, 
this will change these circumstances; although farmers are not subjected anymore to European 
food laws, they will lose their subsidy. An alternative to the single payment system could be 
for the UK government to finance a minimal milk price. This ensures that UK dairy farmers 
are able to produce against the cost-production price of their milk at all times. In case the 
milkprice drops below cost-production price, a subsidy can be provided for the time being. 
One of the overflows of the single farmer payment is that farmers don’t necessarily invest the 
subsidy in innovation. The subsidies fail as such to deliver purpose. To reduce overflows from 
happening with milk price subsidies, the subsidy can be tied to a disease control program or 
to vet-farmer contact hours. This provides some oversight in how the money is translated in 
the farm. In case farmers fail to use the subsidies for which they are appointed to, farmers can 
lose their right on the subsidy.   
 
Subsidise disease control programmes  
To eradicate persistent herd health issues, such as mastitis and feet problems, the Red Tractor 
Scheme should include disease control programmes which have economic incentive for the 
farmer. This has proved to be successful in Sweden in which the government subsidises these 
programmes (Lundström, 2016). AHDB dairy has designed a Mastitis Control Plan and Health 
Feet Programme to support farmers in their practices (AHDB Dairy, 2017b, 2017a). These 
programmes can be made mandatory in the Red Tractor Scheme, funded by the UK 
government and/or dairy organisations such as AHDB dairy and Dairy UK, including 
subsidisation of laboratory costs. Local veterinarians should be made responsible to implement 
these programmes with their farmers.  
 
8.7.3 Official interventions / support 
 
All Red Tractor dairy farms are required to register their AB usage (written or digital). The 
dairy medicine book needs to be annually reviewed between the farmer and the veterinarian 
(Dairy Red Tractor 2018). Since March 2018, CIA’s can only be used as a last resort and must 
be supported by sensitivity testing or diagnostic testing. In addition, the standards recommend 
at least one member of staff is responsible for administering medicines to hold a certificate of 
competence (Dairy Red Tractor 2018). Although the dairy medicine book appears to evidence 
the delivery of results on paper, this thesis demonstrates that the standards do not necessarily 
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translate into farmer practices. Network pressures produce overflows as farmers and 
veterinarians find new ways to continue their practices, with farmers dictating what ABs they 
want from their vets. With only 1 contact moment per year, there is little follow up in a farmer’s 
husbandry and AB practices, farmers quickly fall back into old habits. Interventions at multiple 
levels, proposed in this discussion, are therefore essential to changing practice.   
 
Tighter regulation around prescribing/dispensing 
As long as farmers have their own medicine cupboards, they will use them, appropriately or 
inappropriately. One of the policy goals should be therefore to reduce the type and volume of 
ABs available on farms. Veterinary practices should not be able to prescribe over the phone, 
or dispense ABs in their veterinary practices, without clear veterinary oversight of how ABs 
end up in the dairy cow. The bulk delivery of ABs from veterinary practices to farms should 
be restricted. Regulation around prescribing/dispensing should therefore be tightened. 
Considering the potential destructive consequences of decoupling veterinary prescribing from 
sales (e.g. animal welfare, disruptive professional consequences), I propose to review the 
legislation implemented in the Netherlands. The Netherlands strengthened the position of vets 
via legislation that tackled farmer ownership over ABs (Speksnijder et al., 2014). Through 
legislation (UDD-maatregel), only vets are able to start AB treatment (although exceptions are 
made in cases where animal welfare could be compromised) (Mevius & Heederik, 2014). 
Farmers can only have ABs on their farms for the course of the treatment or for a short period 
in time, verified by their vet.  
Considering the infrastructure of the UK dairy industry at the moment, the former proposal 
might not yet be feasible. Nevertheless, Dairy Red Tractor could require farmers to limit the 
types and amount of ABs on dairy farms. This should be audited on a regular basis, with 
unannounced visits rather than announced. This intervention could also limit farmers’ use of 
ABs that have gone out of date and reduce the ‘waste’ disposal of out of date ABs into the 
environment. Farmers should also not be able to administer CIAs themselves. Interventions 
that restrict AB-use are however vulnerable to overflows: it could lead to more off the radar 
practices on farms. Therefore, it is essential that this intervention is executed with other 
interventions that reduce the network pressure on farmers to use ABs.  
 
Establish a cross-sector antibiotic surveillance institute 
When UK policymakers responded in 2016 to the O’Neill reports (2015, 2016), supply chains 
were made responsible for collecting AB usage data or developing national surveillance usage 
systems. Consequently, the supply chains spend much time and resources to achieve these 
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targets. In the UK dairy industry, this has resulted in a lack of progress, with still no 
surveillance system in place by the end of the year 2018. Moreover, collecting both on-farm 
usage and veterinary usage is considered a long-term rather than a short-term goal. The 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark all have either a government-led or private-led institute 
that collects on-farm and veterinary usage data for each livestock sector. This can improve 
oversight of what happens with ABs, from sales, to prescribing, to dispensing, to 
administration. With the VMD being responsible for collecting veterinary sales and sector 
usage data to develop the UK-VARRS reports, they could take this responsibility from the 
shoulders of the industries. With the expertise, knowledge and resources available, they can 
collect and analyse AB usage data of livestock farms, analyse veterinary prescription patterns, 
and define benchmarks (in cooperation with the sectors), regarding the quantity and types of 
ABs used within each livestock sector. The Dairy Red Tractor Scheme can subsequently use 
these benchmarks to inform their expectations of farmers’ AB-use and veterinary prescription 
patterns (SDa Autoriteit Diergeneesmiddelen, 2019). As this thesis has shown, data 
surveillance systems present a thin description of reality.   
 
Make National Milk Recording (NMR) obligatory 
National Milk Records (NMR) is the UK’s leading supplier of milk recording services. They 
deliver tools to manage cows’ production, health and fertility and provide management 
information on individual cow performance in terms of milk quality, yield and fertility. As 
membership involves a fee, not all dairy farmers in the UK record their milk. By making 
national milk recording mandatory in the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme, more knowledge about 
the husbandry practices of farmers will become available to veterinary surgeons and auditors 
of the milk contracts. An important reason to make NMR mandatory is that it will support 
farmers to adopt SDCT. NMR provides insight in the Somatic Cell Count (SCC) history of 
individual cows. This delivers information on mastitis risks in individual cows and informs 
the SDCT protocol. Moreover, farmers can challenge themselves to improve their husbandry 
practices and hygiene protocols to improve milking practices. This will lower the long term 
need for ABs significantly during the dry cow period. To distribute the financial burden, 
retailers and milk processors should include this requirement in their milk contracts, for which 
farmers will be compensated through the milk price they receive. I will discuss in the supply 
chain section what support is needed for milk processors and retailers. 
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Agriculture, antibiotic practices and the environment  
Milk processors and the Dairy Red Tractor Scheme require farmers to dispose of milk 
contaminated by residues into slurries, rather than feeding it to calves. Although these 
initiatives might reduce the risk of milk residues entering the food supply chain, they create 
potential new environmental risks to AMR. Even though dairy supply chains/industry 
policymakers are aware of this trend, potential overflows of this practice are ignored. To 
prevent new environmental AMR hazards from happening, The UK’s Animal Health Plant 
Agency (AHPA) should allocate resources to assessing the risks arising from overflows. 
Research councils could make money available to support research in this area of concern. 
Responsible farming needs be aligned with environmental debates. How do we innovate our 
industries so they coincide with targets on climate change, sustainable energy use, landscape 
architecture and biodiversity? What place is there for more traditional farming systems? 
Should we reduce quantity but improve quality of food animal products? Is there a willingness 
in society to consume less animal products if this will translate itself ‘responsible farming? 
Answers to these questions should be openly debated with the public, in order to inform future 
Dairy Red Tractor Scheme standards and dairy markets. 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
 
Using the methodology of examining the dairy AB actor-networks of the UK dairy sector, I 
have demonstrated how different matters of concern about dairy ABs circulate. By tracing 
ABs in their actor-networks, I discovered what dairy actors are of importance and to whom, 
and how this steers AB decision-making: how milk residues drive milk processor policies; 
how customer profiles drive retailer policies and how agricultural interests define Red Tractor 
farm assurance standards. To farmers, AB decision-making is situated in complex agricultural 
networks; milk prices, milk contracts, milk withdrawal times, milk residues, on-farm staff, 
disease interpretations, AB availability, and veterinary prescribing accessibility. All of these 
and more define how farmers end up using ABs. Similarly, medicine-driven veterinary 
business models, drug price competition between veterinary practices, peer pressure, farmer 
pressure, over the phone prescribing re amongst the most important factors in defining how 
vets prescribe ABs. 
The understanding of actor-networks is crucial if we want to evaluate how industries take up 
their responsibility in terms of AB governance. In fact, what my work emphasises is that AB-
use is an inherent dairy supply chain economic activity, instead of an individual choice of 
farmers and vets. AB decision-making in terms of policies and practices is situated in the co-
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existence and overlapping of multiple markets, ranging from pharmaceutical markets, 
consumer markets, contractual relationships in food supply chains, animal productivity, 
animal welfare and veterinary business models. Importantly, these markets do not like 
uncertainties; they prefer instead to frame problems and reduce uncertainties to avoid market 
unpredictability. As Callon et al. (2009, p.236) argue, ‘markets, when calculating interest, 
profits, and return on investments, draw a strict dividing line between that which is taken into 
account and that which is not’.  
With these markets strictly defining what to take into account and what to ignore in terms of 
responsible AB-use (to maintain maximum output in their economic actor-networks), they 
generate exclusions and overflows. Fragmented AB policies, tailored to the interests of dairy 
supply chain actors is the result. Moreover, these dairy supply chain AB policies are practiced 
in accordance with the economic interests of farmers and veterinary surgeons, potentially ‘co-
producing’ new invisible environmental, foodborne and human routes of AMR. Consequently, 
by making livestock industries responsible for implementing AB policies, without taking into 
account what ‘matters of concern’ drive their AB decision-making, AB policies and their 
practices will choose unexpected directions, with unintended consequences and overflows.  
The UK’s political culture is heavily influenced by the legitimacy of specialists and their 
scientific methods. It has become blinded by the false belief in the objectivity of science. 
Policy targets and instruments are implemented to purify the social factors that drive the 
‘misuse and overuse’ of ABs. The proposed methods of science, such as AB surveillance, AB 
programmes/guidelines and education, are expected to rationalise individual AB decision-
making. This culture-nature divide, however, fails to capture how AB-use is the outcome of 
actor-network decisions (involving both human and non-human actors). Rather it focuses on 
behaviours as individual decisions made by farmers or veterinary surgeons. Problematically, 
methods of science are unable to capture and tackle the actor-network complexities involved 
with AB decision-making. With the UK’s political culture trusting science, there is an implicit 
reliance on measuring targets and the outcomes of those targets. It ignores the complexity of 
livestock sectors actor-networks interpretations and practices of responsible AB-use. The 
UK’s trust in science, together with political and agricultural interests, paralyses these actors 
leaving them unable to question their own initiatives. Instead of making animal husbandry 
systems and their structural problems the central topic of discussion, we find that the debate 
recurrently focuses upon how to devise and perfect instruments that enable the measurement 
and management of AB-use. Consequently, dairy husbandry systems fail to innovate, resulting 
in the persistence of agricultural AB networks which have been described in this thesis.  The 
UK’s technocratic industry-led framework becomes a risk to AMR in itself: its methods and 
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practices ‘co-produce’ a whole range of new social and natural orders, lacking oversight of the 
overflows these new orders generate.  
Having exposed the complexity of dairy AB actor-networks and the overflows they generate, 
it becomes difficult to believe we can transfer antimicrobial policy responsibilities solely to 
the UK dairy industry. Neither can we trust farmers and veterinarians to throw their AB 
interests overboard if there are no financial alternatives offered. As I suggest, the problem is 
not AB-use in itself; the ‘misuse and overuse’ is merely a symptom of a dairy sector in need 
of structural change. In order to re-evaluate our policy frame and interventions, we need to 
engage with the complexity of dairy AB networks rather than wanting to reduce it. This 
involves examining ‘matters of concerns’ at multiple levels, from veterinarians, farmers, food 
supply chains, governments to consumers, and how they ‘co-produce’ each other. 
Interventions need to simultaneously address these multiple levels to reduce the risk of 
overflows. Moreover, we need to continuously work with overflows of interventions and tackle 
them rather than ignoring them.  
One topic I left mostly unexplored in this thesis are the potential effects of the UK leaving the 
European Union.  Being part of Europe means being part of their internal food market with 
food products produced against certain minimal standards. Although food standards come with 
overflows, leaving Europe means leaving a framework that tries to supports good husbandry 
practice, to the consumer, the animal and the environment. Brexit means entering new 
competitive agricultural markets with potential disruptions to the internal market. How will 
animal health and welfare, consumer expectations, and export positions be translated in food 
safety and quality? How can the UK compete with markets which have significant lower 
animal health and welfare standards? How will it set import and export tariffs without 
disrupting national markets? How will it patrol its borders to avoid the risks of importing non-
native livestock diseases? These are just a few questions which will need to be addressed if 
the UK leaves the EU.  
To conclude, we find that policy and science offer a reductionist way of seeing the world. 
Dairy AB-use gets boiled down to an issue of ‘overuse and misuse’, which results in a self-
fulfilling prophecy: if only we measure we can see how effective we are. Within this frame, 
overflows don’t matter because the frame has been set only to examine the use/misuse in 
relation to veterinary and farmer practices. However, in order to be effective, we have to look 
at the whole dairy supply chain network. The question next becomes how we can study AB-
use as part of a bigger picture of animal welfare, environmental impact and sustainable food 
production. Further research projects should therefore address the complex economic 
relationships which underpin food production, explore environmental concerns, include public 
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views, examine the overflows of responsible AB-use policies, compare country approaches, 
and more. But for now, with the uncertainty of Brexit and a UK dairy sector in need for support 
and security, it is important to work together at the levels proposed in this thesis to drive 
changes in the UK dairy sector as a whole.  
 
* * * 
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Appendix 1. Participant Information Sheets. 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet Policymakers 
 
How is policy on antimicrobial use in agriculture shaped and 
implemented in England and Sweden? 
 
What is the purpose of this study?                                                                                                 . 
This PhD research aims to understand how different agricultural-political cultures produce 
policy on AB-use in agriculture and antimicrobial resistance (AMR). A comparative 
qualitative case study will be performed in England and Sweden, to understand how policy on 
AB-use in farm animals is shaped and implemented within a specific agricultural-political 
context. The project will explore how involved human and animal agencies in both countries 
are involved in the management of the issue and how they experience the process of the 
governance of the issue. Themes of interest are the development of policy, the process of 
execution in practice, and the evaluation of policy as such. This will provide knowledge on 
how the process of policy development on AB-use in agriculture is entangled with a countries 
specific agricultural-political context. Hence, the project can serve as a platform for English 
and Swedish policy makers. 
Why have I been invited to take part?                                                                                .                                                                                                               
You have been invited to take part as you have knowledge and experience relevant to this 
study. If you do not wish to be involved in this study, then please let us know and we will 
remove your contact details from our mailing list. If you have any queries or concerns that are 
not covered by this information sheet please do not hesitate to get in touch (see contact details 
below).  
 
What will happen if I take part?                                                                                                                              
.If you agree to take part you will be contacted via telephone or email to find out when it would 
be convenient to talk to you. Your interview will be carried out face-to-face with the PhD 
student, so a convenient date and place will be arranged. The interview will, with your 
permission, be audio recorded so that all the points you make can be fully captured. Interviews 
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are anticipated to last between 30 minutes and an hour. All information you provide will be 
treated in strictest confidence.  
 
What will happen if I do not want to take part anymore?            
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary, and you are free to withdraw up to the point 
your data are included for analysis, without explanation.  
 
What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem?  
If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting Dr 
Robert Christley by email (robc@liverpool.ac.uk) or telephone (0151 794 6170) and he will 
try to help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel he cannot resolve then 
you should contact the Research Governance Officer on 0151 794 8290 
(ethics@liverpool.ac.uk). When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide 
details of the name or description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researchers 
involved, and the details of the complaint you wish to make. 
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
To ensure that your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity are protected the methods for this 
research have been looked at by an independent group of people called a Research Ethics 
Committee. This study has been reviewed by University of Liverpool Veterinary School 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Next steps 
Please take time to consider whether you want to be included in this research. The decision to 
participate is your own and you should feel under no pressure to do so. If you are happy to be 
involved please complete the accompanying consent form and return it to 
stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you very much for considering this information. 
Stephanie Begemann 
NIHR HPRU PhD Student  
The University of Liverpool, Leahurst Campus, School of Veterinary Science, Neston, CH64 
7TE  
Email: stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk  
Website: www.liverpool.a 
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Participant Information Sheet Industry England 
 
How is policy on antimicrobial use in agriculture shaped and 
implemented in England? 
 
What is the purpose of this study?                                                                                                 . 
This PhD research aims to understand how policy on antimicrobial use in agriculture and 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is governed and how the governance of the issue is perceived 
in practice. The project is interested in the different opinions on the governance of the issue 
and will explore how involved human and animal agencies experience the governance and its 
effects as such. Themes of interest are the involvement in the process of policy development 
on the issue, risk perceptions on food safety and antimicrobial resistance, and initiatives taken 
in practice since the implementation of policy. This will provide knowledge on how the 
process of policy development on antimicrobial use in agriculture and its implementation is 
perceived by involved stakeholders and can serve as a platform for English policy makers 
Why have I been invited to take part?                                                                                .                                                                                                               
You have been invited to take part as you have knowledge and experience relevant to this 
study. If you do not wish to be involved in this study, then please let us know and we will 
remove your contact details from our mailing list. If you have any queries or concerns that are 
not covered by this information sheet please do not hesitate to get in touch (see contact details 
below).  
 
What will happen if I take part?                                                                                                                              
.If you agree to take part you will be contacted via telephone or email to find out when it would 
be convenient to talk to you. Your interview will be carried out face-to-face with the PhD 
student, so a convenient date and place will be arranged. The interview will, with your 
permission, be audio recorded so that all the points you make can be fully captured. Interviews 
are anticipated to last between 30 minutes and an hour. All information you provide will be 
treated in strictest confidence.  
 
What will happen if I do not want to take part anymore?            
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary, and you are free to withdraw up to the point 
your data are included for analysis, without explanation 
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What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem?  
If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting Dr 
Robert Christley by email (robc@liverpool.ac.uk) or telephone (0151 794 6170) and he will 
try to help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel he cannot resolve then 
you should contact the Research Governance Officer on 0151 794 8290 
(ethics@liverpool.ac.uk). When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide 
details of the name or description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researchers 
involved, and the details of the complaint you wish to make. 
  
Who has reviewed the study?  
To ensure that your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity are protected the methods for this 
research have been looked at by an independent group of people called a Research Ethics 
Committee. This study has been reviewed by University of Liverpool Veterinary School 
Research Ethics Committee. 
Next steps  
Please take time to consider whether you want to be included in this research. The decision to 
participate is your own and you should feel under no pressure to do so. If you are happy to be 
involved please complete the accompanying consent form and return it to 
stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you very much for considering this information.  
 
 
Stephanie Begemann 
NIHR HPRU PhD Student  
The University of Liverpool, Leahurst Campus, School of Veterinary Science, Neston, CH64 
7TE  
Email: stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk  
Website: www.liverpool.ac.uk/  
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Participant Information Sheet Farmers 
 
How is policy on antimicrobial use in agriculture shaped and 
implemented in England? 
 
What is the purpose of this study?          
This PhD research aims to understand how policy on antimicrobial use in agriculture and 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is governed and how the governance of the issue is perceived 
in practice. The project is interested in the different opinions of divergent stakeholders on the 
governance of the issue and will explore how the industry, Veterinary surgeon s and farmers 
experience the governance and its effects as such. Themes of interest are how risk perceptions 
on food safety and antimicrobial resistance are experienced on local level and how political 
initiatives on antimicrobial use in agriculture are perceived and translated into practice. To 
fully capture the translation of policy to local level practices, the researcher would like to 
observe invited participant in their daily practices on matters related to AB-use in farm 
animals. The former will provide knowledge on how the process of policy development and 
implementation on antimicrobial use in agriculture is perceived by local agencies and can 
serve as a platform for English policy makers. 
Why have I been invited to take part?                                                                                .                                                                                                               
You have been invited to take part as you have knowledge and experience relevant to this 
study. If you do not wish to be involved in this study, then please let us know and we will 
remove your contact details from our mailing list. If you have any queries or concerns that are 
not covered by this information sheet please do not hesitate to get in touch (see contact details 
below).  
 
What will happen if I take part?                                                                                                                              
.If you agree to take part in participant observation, you will be contacted via telephone or 
email to find out when it would be convenient to you to participate in the study. The PhD 
researcher would like to study your work during work hours for a week. However, if you wish 
to take part for a shorter amount of time, this is also possible. During the observation, the 
researcher is interested in your activities related to animals on the farm. The researcher will 
observe your work and ask you questions related to biosecurity, your relationship with the 
veterinary practice, contact with retailers, and personal opinions on food safety and AMR. The 
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information provided by you will be recorded in a notebook of the researcher. Whenever there 
is access to personal information, such as log on medicine use in farm animals, your consent 
to use this information will be asked and a description will be given for what purpose it will 
be used.  
 
What will happen if I do not want to take part anymore?          
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary, and you are free to withdraw up to the point 
your data are included for analysis, without explanation.  
 
What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem?   
If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting Dr 
Robert Christley by email (robc@liverpool.ac.uk) or telephone (0151 794 6170) and he will 
try to help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel he cannot resolve then 
you should contact the Research Governance Officer on 0151 794 8290 
(ethics@liverpool.ac.uk). When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide 
details of the name or description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researchers 
involved, and the details of the complaint you wish to make. 
 
Who has reviewed the study?   
To ensure that your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity are protected the methods for this 
research have been looked at by an independent group of people called a Research Ethics 
Committee. This study has been reviewed by University of Liverpool Veterinary School 
Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Next steps   
Please take time to consider whether you want to be included in this research. The decision to 
participate is your own and you should feel under no pressure to do so. If you are happy to be 
involved please complete the accompanying consent form and return it to 
stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you very much for considering this information.  
 
Stephanie Begemann NIHR HPRU PhD Student  
The University of Liverpool, Leahurst Campus, School of Veterinary Science, Neston, CH64 
7TE  
Email: stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk Website: www.liverpool.ac.uk/  
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Participant Information Sheet veterinary surgeons 
 
How is policy on antimicrobial use in agriculture shaped and 
implemented in England? 
 
What is the purpose of this study?          
This PhD research aims to understand how policy on antimicrobial use in agriculture and 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is governed and how the governance of the issue is perceived 
in practice. The project is interested in the different opinions of divergent stakeholders on the 
governance of the issue and will explore how the industry, Veterinary surgeon s and farmers 
experience the governance and its effects as such. Themes of interest are how risk perceptions 
on food safety and antimicrobial resistance are experienced on local level and how political 
initiatives on antimicrobial use in agriculture are perceived and translated into practice. To 
fully capture the translation of policy to local level practices, the researcher would like to 
observe invited participant in their daily practices on matters related to AB-use in farm 
animals. The former will provide knowledge on how the process of policy development and 
implementation on antimicrobial use in agriculture is perceived by local agencies and can 
serve as a platform for English policy makers. 
Why have I been invited to take part?                                                                                .                                                                                                               
You have been invited to take part as you have knowledge and experience relevant to this 
study. If you do not wish to be involved in this study, then please let us know and we will 
remove your contact details from our mailing list. If you have any queries or concerns that are 
not covered by this information sheet please do not hesitate to get in touch (see contact details 
below).  
 
What will happen if I take part?                                                                                                                              
.If you agree to take part in participant observation, you will be contacted via telephone or 
email to find out when it would be convenient to you to participate in the study. The PhD 
researcher would like to study your work during work hours for a week. However, if you wish 
to take part for a shorter amount of time, this is also possible. During the observation, the 
researcher is interested in your activities related to animals on the farm. The researcher will 
observe your work and ask you questions related to AB-use in farm animals, biosecurity, your 
relationship with the farmer, relations with food and pharmaceutical industry, and personal 
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opinions on food safety and AMR. The information provided by you will be recorded in a 
notebook of the researcher.  
Whenever there is access to personal information, such as log on medicine use in farm animals, 
your consent to use this information will be asked and a description will be given for what 
purpose it will be used.   
 
What will happen if I do not want to take part anymore?          
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary, and you are free to withdraw up to the point 
your data are included for analysis, without explanation  
 
What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem?   
If you are unhappy, or if there is a problem, please feel free to let us know by contacting Dr 
Robert Christley by email (robc@liverpool.ac.uk) or telephone (0151 794 6170) and he will 
try to help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel he cannot resolve then 
you should contact the Research Governance Officer on 0151 794 8290 
(ethics@liverpool.ac.uk). When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide 
details of the name or description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researchers 
involved, and the details of the complaint you wish to make. 
 
Who has reviewed the study?   
To ensure that your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity are protected the methods for this 
research have been looked at by an independent group of people called a Research Ethics 
Committee. This study has been reviewed by University of Liverpool Veterinary School 
Research Ethics Committee.  
Next steps   
Please take time to consider whether you want to be included in this research. The decision to 
participate is your own and you should feel under no pressure to do so. If you are happy to be 
involved please complete the accompanying consent form and return it to 
stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you very much for considering this information.  
 
Stephanie Begemann NIHR HPRU PhD Student  
The University of Liverpool, Leahurst Campus, School of Veterinary Science, Neston, CH64 
7TE  
Email: stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk Website: www.liverpool.ac.uk/  
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Appendix 2. Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
Committee on Research Ethics 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
Title of Research 
Project: 
ABs, farm animals and arguments in England: How is policy 
shaped and what are its effects in practice? 
 
 
 
 
 
Please 
initial box 
Researcher(s): Stephanie Begemann, Rob Christley, Liz Perkins, Francine 
Watkins 
 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet dated 08-06-
2016 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.                                               .    
   
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw up to 
the point my data are included for analysis, without explanation. In addition, should 
I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.   
 
 
3. I agree that my participation will be recorded and I am aware of and consent to your 
use of these recordings for the following purposes: publication in thesis and possible 
publication in research papers. 
 
4. I  understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission 
for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I 
understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will 
not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the 
research, unless I have given permission. 
 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.                                       
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               Participant Name                           Date                    Signature 
  
 
 
                 
      Researcher taking consent                                        Date                   Signature 
 
 
 
 
Principal Investigator:    Student Researcher: 
Name:  Robert Christley   Name: Stephanie Begemann 
Work Address: Leahurst Campus, Neston, CH467TE        Work Address: Leahurst Campus, Neston, CH467TE        
Work Telephone: 01517946170   Work Telephone 0151 794 9542 
Work Email: rob.@liv.ac.uk   Work Email: stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk 
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Committee on Research Ethics 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
 
          
Title of Research 
Project: 
ABs, farm animals and arguments in England: How is policy 
shaped and what are its effects in practice? 
 
 
 
 
 
Please 
initial box 
Researcher(s): Stephanie Begemann, Rob Christley, Liz Perkins, Francine 
Watkins 
 
 
 
6. I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet dated 08-06-
2016 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.                                               .    
   
 
7. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw up to 
the point my data are included for analysis, without explanation. In addition, should 
I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.   
 
 
8. I agree that notes will be taken during the observation and I am aware of and 
consent to your use of these notes for the following purposes: publication in thesis 
and possible publicaiton in research papers. 
 
9. I  understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission 
for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I 
understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will 
not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the 
research, unless I have given permission. 
 
 
 
10. I agree to take part in the above study.                                       
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               Participant Name                           Date                    Signature 
  
 
 
                 
      Researcher taking consent                                        Date                   Signature 
 
 
 
 
Principal Investigator:    Student Researcher: 
Name:  Robert Christley   Name: Stephanie Begemann 
Work Address: Leahurst Campus, Neston, CH467TE        Work Address: Leahurst Campus, Neston, CH467TE        
Work Telephone: 01517946170   Work Telephone 0151 794 9542 
Work Email: rob.@liv.ac.uk   Work Email: stephanie.begemann@liverpool.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3. Interview guides 
 
Interview Guide Policymakers England 
Thank you for taking the time to speak to me today. This conversation should take about an 
hour, but may take more or less time depending on how much you want to say. During our 
conversation, I may take a few notes but I will be recording the session on a digital voice 
recorder so I don’t miss anything important. I want to reassure you all your responses will be 
kept confidential. This means that any information you provide will only be shared within the 
research team, and we will ensure information is anonymised so you cannot be identified. 
You don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to, and if you feel uncomfortable at 
any point and wish to take a break or end the interview, please let me know. If you have any 
questions before we start, please let me know.  
 
Introduction:  
This interview is being conducted to get your input about the governance of AB-use in farm animals 
and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in England. I am especially interested in what your thoughts 
and concerns are on the topic, and how you think the uncertainties on the topic should be 
managed.   
 
Interview Guide 
The opening section of the interview is intended to set the scene, initiate conversation with the 
participant, encourage them to feel at ease within the context and establish a rapport.  
Background and position of the interviewee: 
- Can you briefly describe your background? 
- Can you briefly describe your responsibilities in your current position?  
- How are you involved with ABs, animals, food and/or human health? 
- How do you think your background influences your thoughts and opinion on the topic?  
Policy: 
- Can you briefly describe your involvement thus so far with policy that concerns AMR? 
- Who informs the debate on political level concerning AMR?  
- How were decisions made in your organization with respect to the content of AMR 
policy? 
- How is a multidisciplinary approach addressed in your organization? 
- How does your organization evaluates the effects of policy in practice? 
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- What do you think of the UK Antimicrobial Resistance 2013-2018 strategy programme?  
Opinion: 
- What type of concerns have you had or heard on the topic? 
- How do you think involved stakeholders are taking up the implemented strategies? 
- Are you aware of any problems between involved stakeholders on the topic?  
- Is your organizational environment changing because of the debate? 
- What should the role of science be in the debate? 
- How is the government taking up its responsibility? 
- Are you satisfied with the progress made on the governance of the issue? 
- What do you think of the large differences in veterinary AB sales in Europe? 
- Do you take any precautions yourself towards the consumption of meet? 
- What are your concerns regarding imported meat? 
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Interview Guide England Industry 
Thank you for taking the time to speak to me today. This conversation should take about an 
hour, but may take more or less time depending on how much you want to say. During our 
conversation, I may take a few notes but I will be recording the session on a digital voice 
recorder so I don’t miss anything important. I want to reassure you all your responses will be 
kept confidential. This means that any information you provide will only be shared within the 
research team, and we will ensure information is anonymised so you cannot be identified. 
You don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to, and if you feel uncomfortable at 
any point and wish to take a break or end the interview, please let me know. If you have any 
questions before we start, please let me know.  
 
Introduction:  
This interview is being conducted to get your input about the governance of AB-use in farm animals 
and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in England. I am especially interested in what your thoughts 
and concerns are on the topic, and how you think the uncertainties on the topic should be 
managed.   
 
Interview Guide 
The opening section of the interview is intended to set the scene, initiate conversation with the 
participant, encourage them to feel at ease within the context and establish a rapport.  
Background and position of the interviewee: 
- Can you briefly describe your background? 
- Can you briefly describe your responsibilities in your current position?  
- How are you involved with ABs, animals, food and/or human health? 
- How do you think your background influences your thoughts and opinion on the topic?  
Policy: 
- Is your sector involved thus so far with policy that concerns AMR? If yes, can you 
elaborate on this? 
- Is your sector taking measures to limit the development of AMR? If yes, can you elaborate 
on this? 
- What do you think of the UK Antimicrobial Resistance 2013-2018 strategy programme?  
Opinion: 
- What type of concerns have you had or heard on AB-use in farm animals and the link with 
AMR in human health? 
- Are you aware of any problems between involved stakeholders on the topic?  
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- How do you think involved stakeholders are taking up the implemented strategies? 
- Is your organizational environment changing because of the debate? 
- What should the role of science be in the debate? 
- How is the government taking up its responsibility? 
- Are you satisfied with the progress made on the governance of the issue? 
- What do you think of the large differences in veterinary AB sales in Europe? 
- Do you take any precautions yourself towards the consumption of meet? 
- What are your concerns regarding imported meat and AMR? 
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Interview Guide Farmers and Veterinary surgeon s 
Thank you for taking the time to speak to me today. This conversation should take about an 
hour, but may take more or less time depending on how much you want to say. During our 
conversation, I may take a few notes but I will be recording the session on a digital voice 
recorder so I don’t miss anything important. I want to reassure you all your responses will be 
kept confidential. This means that any information you provide will only be shared within the 
research team, and we will ensure information is anonymised so you cannot be identified. 
You don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to, and if you feel uncomfortable at 
any point and wish to take a break or end the interview, please let me know. If you have any 
questions before we start, please let me know.  
 
Introduction:  
This interview is being conducted to get your input about the governance of AB-use in farm animals 
and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in England. I am especially interested in what your thoughts 
and concerns are on the topic, and how you think the uncertainties on the topic should be 
managed.   
 
Interview Guide 
The opening section of the interview is intended to set the scene, initiate conversation with the 
participant, encourage them to feel at ease within the context and establish a rapport.  
Background and position of the interviewee: 
- Can you briefly describe your background? 
- Can you briefly describe your responsibilities in your current position?  
- How do you think your background influences your thoughts and opinion on the topic?  
Policy: 
- Are you aware of professional involvement of your sector with policy that concerns AMR? 
If yes, can you elaborate on this? 
- Is your sector taking measures to limit the development of AMR? If yes, when did you first 
hear about taking measures and by whom was this delegated? 
- What do you think should be the responsibility of your profession in safeguarding AMR? 
- What should be the responsibility of the English government in safeguarding AMR? 
- What do you think of the UK Five Year Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy Programme 
2013-2018? Do you think your sector is enough involved in the Programme? 
- Are you aware of any problems between involved stakeholders on the topic?  
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- How do you think involved stakeholders are taking up the implemented strategies? 
- What should be the role of science in the debate? 
- How do other European/non-European countries taking up their responsibilities? 
Effects in Practice: 
- What type of concerns have you had or heard on AB-use in farm animals and the link with 
AMR in human health? 
- How did your work environment change because of policy measures? 
- What do you think of alternatives to antimicrobial use, such as vaccines, supplements, 
feeding strategies and/or biosecurity measures? 
- What measures do you take yourself in practice to limit AMR development? 
- Do you take any precautions yourself towards the consumption of meat? 
- What are your concerns regarding imported meat and AMR? 
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Appendix 5: published article 
 
How Political Cultures Produce Different Antibiotic 
Policies in Agriculture: A Historical Comparative 
Case Study between the United Kingdom 
and Sweden 
Stephanie Begemann,* Elizabeth Perkins, 
Ine Van Hoyweghen, Robert Christley and Francine Watkins 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to provide an understanding of how different countries formulate and regulate 
antibiotic use in animals raised for human consumption. A comparative case study was undertaken, analysing 
historical documents from the 1950s to the 1990s from the UK, the first country to produce a scientific report on 
the public health risks of agricultural antibiotic use; and Sweden, the first country to produce legislation on the 
growth promotor use of antibiotics in food animals. Sheila Jasanoff’s concepts of ‘co-production’ and ‘political 
cultures’ have been used to explore how both countries used different styles of scientific reasoning and 
justification of the risks of agricultural antibiotic use. It will be argued that national dynamics between policy, 
science and public knowledges co-produced different risk classifications and patterns of agricultural antibiotic 
use between both countries. UK’s political culture used ‘expert committees’ to remove the issue from public 
debate and to inform agricultural antibiotic policies. In contrast, the Swedish ‘consensus-oriented’ political 
culture made concerns related to agricultural antibiotic use into a cooperative debate that included multiple 
discourses. Understanding how national policies, science and public knowledges interact with the risks related to 
agricultural antibiotic use can provide valuable insights in understanding and addressing countries agricultural 
use of antibiotics. 
VC 2018 The Authors. Sociologia Ruralis published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Society for Rural Sociology. 
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes. 
Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 58, Number 4, October 2018 DOI: 10.1111/soru.12206 
 
Introduction 
lthough antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a universal public health concern, gaps remain 
in our current understanding of the magnitude of the problem in humans and animals 
and the impact on the environment. A major health concern is the ‘inappropriate’ agricultural 
use of antibiotics in animals raised for human consumption (O’Neill 2015). Whether or not 
there is a link between antibiotic use in animals and the development of AMR in humans 
through food and the environment is controversial (Schwarz et al. 2001; Kahn 2016). To 
address the uncertainty and scientific complexity of AMR, global efforts have been directed 
at reducing antibiotic use in both human and animal populations. Historical and recent data 
show large differences in antibiotic usage and its regulation between countries (EMA 2016). 
These differences have been explored in several studies focused on the political, economic, 
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technical, legal and behavioural causes that affect agricultural antibiotic use. However, all 
these studies adopt the stance of ‘what is wrong and what needs to be fixed’ (Dar et al. 2015; 
Meek et al. 2015; O’Neill 2015). By taking this stance, they reduce farm antibiotic use to a 
singular cause and solution, thereby failing to identify the relational component of these 
differences (Buller et al. 2015, Wallinga et al. 2015). Chandler et al. (2016) have used the 
concept of ‘antimicrobial infrastructures’ to describe the importance of historical trajectories 
of antimicrobials to consider how they have been used and regulated, as a way of 
understanding current practices. Kahn (2016) also examined the politics of AMR and 
agricultural antibiotic use in the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Europe and the US using an historical 
lens. Although Kahn (2016) describes at length the different scientific discourses and 
regulatory approaches, she does not examine how the earliest international scientific 
evidence, the ‘UK Swann report’ – the first report on the hazards of antibiotic use in food 
animals – resulted in different policy approaches to agricultural antibiotics between 
countries. 
This article explores the politics of antibiotic use in food animals and its possible link with 
AMR in humans. It uses an historical comparative analysis between the UK, the first country 
that produced international advice to restrict economic antibiotic growth promotors (AGPs) 
in animals produced for human consumption; and Sweden, the first country that officially 
banned the use of AGPs in animals produced for human consumption. It will also explore 
how these two countries produced different risk classifications and policies on agricultural 
antibiotic use. In direct contradiction to traditional risk policy studies which adopt the 
perspective that science is value free (Stirling 2010), it is argued that the UK and Sweden use 
scientific reasoning in different ways to assess the risks of agricultural antibiotic use. 
Theoretical reasoning from Science and Technology Studies (STS) will be used to demonstrate 
that science and its technologies are culturally influenced and a product of the context they 
are embedded in (Bijker et al. 1987; Jasanoff 2004; Sismondo 2011). STS is useful in this 
context because of the way it examines how science is produced, legitimated and integrated 
in the policies and products of societies (Metzler and Webster 2011; Ulucanlar et al. 2013). 
Resisting the rational production of scientific knowledge, Jasanoff (2004, p. 3) uses the 
concept of ‘co-production’, to show how science and its technologies both produce and are 
produced by ‘social practices, norms, conventions, discourse, instruments and institutions’. 
Consequently, the risks of biotechnologies are also co-produced and are framed by the 
contexts in which they are developed and used. To emphasise the entanglement of science, 
national politics and public knowledges, Jasanoff (2005, p. 21) has introduced ‘political 
cultures’, which she uses to explore how countries have specific ways of using science in 
political decision making about biotechnological risks. This, at the same time, steers 
knowledge and innovation of the biotechnology under discussion. In her comparative study 
between the UK, Germany and the U.S. on issues such as embryo research, genetically 
modified food, stem cell debate and other products of biotechnology, Jasanoff shows how 
different risk constructions and innovation policies emerged over time between the three 
countries, due to ‘different ideologies, priorities and ways of national reasoning’ between 
policy, science, and public knowledges (2005, p. 275). Moreover, scientific claims and their 
use do not possess the power of ‘truth’ in themselves; they are part of historically established 
ways of national risk framing, institutional arrangements, public input and culturally specific 
ways of legitimating science in society (Jasanoff 2005). At the same time, Jasanoff argues that 
‘the public’ is not a passive, homogeneous recipient of knowledge but instead, engages 
actively in the production and application of science and technologies (Jasanoff 2005, p. 255). 
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She refers instead to an assemblage of ‘publics’, emphasising the plurality of publics or public 
knowledges (2005, p. 255). Jasanoff is also interested in how publics have culturally specific 
‘tacit knowledge-ways’ through which they assess scientific claims (2005, p. 255). As other 
STS scholars have argued, publics are capable of acting within political systems and 
reinventing them, as well as being created and co-produced by them (Callon et al. 2001; 
Marres 2007; Asdal 2008). This is in contrast to models focusing on the ‘public understanding 
of science’, which see science as universal and attribute differences in social uptake of 
science as a consequence of public misunderstanding or ignorance and these differences can 
be overcome by better informing the public (Jasanoff 2005, p. 249). Instead, Jasanoff (2005) 
advocates we should explore how political cultures have specific ways of making science 
accountable to citizens and how these citizens in turn have culturally embedded ways 
through which they collectively acquire and apply knowledge about science and its 
technologies. Importantly, ‘social contracts’ can be in play between science and politics to 
‘steer’ scientific findings into political goals and to set boundaries on biotechnological risks 
(Jasanoff 2005, p. 226). This has also been argued by Stirling (2010), who suggests that we 
should explore presented risks beyond the ‘single definitions presented by science that are 
most amenable to political manipulation’ (p. 4). The way political cultures use science during 
the rationalisation of emerging biotechnological risks is formulated by Jasanoff (2004) as the 
stabilisation of biotechnologies. This concept of stabilisation will be used to study how farm 
antibiotics became legitimised/stabilised and problematised/destabilised over time through 
political cultures. Political cultures as such ‘co-produce’ the knowledge and innovations of 
biotechnologies. 
Following Jasanoff (2005), the period in the UK between the 1950s–1990s can be 
characterised as a political culture governed by ‘expert committees’ (p. 102). The 
government maintained (and still does) a strong relation with science and scientific ‘expert 
committees’ in the governance of risks. These expert committees are presented as providing 
independent and impartial advice to the government on the basis of evidence and means 
that they enjoy a widely respected status of ‘character, experience and expertise’ through 
which they gained public credibility (Jasanoff 1997, p. 228). The UK government uses these 
expert committees to settle scientific controversies and to act on behalf of the public under 
the imperative of public safety. Sweden on the other hand is not only characterised by State 
interventionism, but also by a ‘consensus-oriented’ political culture, bridging State and 
private actors (Bostrom and Klintman 2006, p. 165). Scientific controversies are managed 
outside€ the traditional science-policy arena. Instead of identifiable scientific experts being 
used as the (only) powerful actors to formulate and steer risk policies, as in the UK’s expert 
committees, the Swedish agricultural decision-making process involved wider public 
participation (Saifi 2004). This produces a more open approach towards the governance of 
the risks related to agricultural antibiotic use. 
The political cultures of both countries will be used as a framework to study how, between 
the 1950s–1990s, they co-produced the stabilisation, destabilisation and re-stabilisation of 
agricultural antibiotic use. The article starts by exploring the agricultural contexts of both 
countries and how antibiotics as both therapeutics and economic tools emerged in relation 
to the modernisation of agriculture. With the goal of maximising food production, agriculture 
and its modern techniques were used as a means to improve both countries’ economic 
position in return for cheap and abundant food. As such, agricultural antibiotics in both 
countries became legitimised in a ‘productivist’ framework. When scientific controversies 
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about the public health risks of economic agricultural antibiotics unsettled their use in the 
1960s, the UK Swann expert committee was established in 1969. However, they presented 
inconclusive results on the public health risks of antibiotics used in food animals. This allowed 
the UK’s political culture to downplay the public health risks thus enabling their continued 
use until the end of the 1990s. By contrast, Sweden’s consensus-oriented political culture led 
several scientific and non-scientific discourses to enter the debate, which led to a different 
risk management of agricultural antibiotics. The discussion explores what can be learned 
from understanding the impact of a country’s political culture on risk policies and the 
implications of this for future policy on agricultural antibiotic use. 
The methodology comprises of a comparative case study using a desk-based discourse 
analysis of primary and secondary sources between 1950–1990 based on the following 
search terms: ‘The Swann Report’, ‘farm antibiotics’, ‘antibiotic resistance’, ‘intensive 
farming’, ‘factory farms’, ‘animal welfare’ and ‘environmentalism’. Primary sources included 
European, UK and Swedish policy documents, UK newspaper articles of ‘The Daily Mail’ and 
‘The Times’ and the UK veterinary journal ‘Veterinary Record’. Secondary sources included 
scientific journals and books that discussed one or more of the former search terms. 
Following the methodology of a discourse analysis, attention was paid to what was said by 
whom in order to capture the coproducing effects of discourses and identities. This allowed 
an examination of how farm antibiotics in both countries became institutionalised through 
the interplay between scientific knowledges, expert committees, politics and public 
knowledges. 
Setting the scene: post-war productivist agriculture and the stabilisation of 
agricultural antibiotics 
At the beginning of the twentieth century around 10 per cent of the British population were 
employed in the agricultural sector, agriculture in the UK was of little 7695 economic and 
public interest (Self and Storing 1963). By contrast, Swedish society was characterised as 
‘agrarian’, with two thirds of the Swedish population working in small family farms 
responsible for supplying the needs of local communities (Morell 2011). Agricultural values 
were largely absent in the UK, while in Sweden there was a strong identification with nature 
(Self and Storing 1963; Morell 2011). This differences in terms of the value of agriculture, 
influenced the way in which agricultural antibiotic use became problematised. After the 
Second World War, Europe experienced the benefits of industrialisation which enabled 
agricultural economies to flourish. After years of food shortage, political targets were set to 
maximise agricultural output for economic purposes and to guarantee an era of food security 
(Grant 2005). The UK saw agriculture as a mechanism by which the national economy could 
be restored and its international trade position strengthened (Self and Storing 1963; 
Murdoch and Ward 1997; Grant 2005). The Swedish government wanted to make its 
agricultural sector more ‘rational’ and ‘efficient’, to transform its mostly rural society into a 
modern society (Flygare and Isacson 2011; Martiin 2015). The responsible agricultural 
government departments, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) in the UK 
and the Ministry of Agriculture in Sweden, became heavily involved with regulating 
agriculture during the 1950s–1970s (Murdoch and Ward 1997; Saifi and Drake 2008). To 
guarantee the stability of agricultural markets and agricultural prices, both countries set up 
agricultural price setting schemes that involved annual negotiations between State 
representatives and farmers to fix prices of agricultural products (Cox et al. 1986; Martiin 
2015). In the UK, Post-war agricultural policies were developed between the government and 
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agricultural stakeholders (Wales et al. 2006). Consumers in the UK were excluded from 
political decisionmaking by the government who believed that if they could guarantee the 
consumer food safety, ‘the consumer would unproblematically consume’ (Wales et al. 2006, 
p. 190). In Sweden, however, consumers were involved in the price setting schemes of 
agricultural products, and this was an important part of Sweden’s post-war agricultural 
politics (Martiin 2015), which were built on transparency and negotiation with its consumers 
(Vail et al. 1994). Nevertheless, in both countries, productivist attitudes towards modern 
agriculture prevailed between the 1950s–1970s. Farms, farmers and their representatives all 
became part of the economic construction of the agricultural sector, as the agricultural 
community became convinced that efficient and maximum food production could only be 
ensured when farming was industrialised (Murdoch and Ward 1997; Saifi and Drake 2008). 
The modernisation of agriculture not only produced new relations between the 
government, the agricultural industry and consumers, but increased market opportunities 
for various scientific technologies that improved animal husbandry systems, including 
agricultural antibiotics. Agricultural antibiotics were introduced therapeutically in both 
countries by the end of the 1940s to treat sick food animals (Randall 1969). By the beginning 
of the 1950s, it was discovered in the United States that when antibiotics were fed in low 
doses to food animals, these animals showed improved growth, food conversion ratio, and 
reproductive performance; so-called Antibiotic Growth Promotors (AGPs) (Soulsby 2007). 
The Post-war modern agricultural landscape, and its close relation with science as a means 
to industrialise agricultural husbandry, allowed agricultural antibiotics to be used as both a 
therapeutic (including preventative use) and an economic tool in the use of animals in food 
production. In the decade that followed, antibiotic use in food animals took on new purposes, 
quickly establishing them as standard, not only for the treatment of disease, but to prevent 
disease and as Antibiotic Growth Promotors (AGPs) (Randall 1969). The use of antibiotics as 
growth promoters acquired special attention as they could be used as ‘economic tools’. In 
addition, as AGPs they did not require a veterinary prescription (Barton 2000). Importantly, 
there was no European legislation at that time and each member State approved its own 
regulations about AGP use (Castanon 2007).  
Strong relations developed between agricultural ministries and farmer unions with a 
strong interest in managing the agricultural market-place together. However, while the UK 
excluded public debates from political discussions, Sweden made agricultural issues part of 
wider societal debates. Importantly, in Sweden, the high value placed on nature, combined 
with concerns about the impact of agricultural techniques on the environment raised 
environmental concerns in Swedish political debates (Vail et al. 1994). Moreover, the public 
participation model in Sweden allowed these concerns to infiltrate scientific risk debates on 
modern agriculture practices (Vail et al. 1994). The differences in governmental models and 
the co-production of consumers regarding the governance of agricultural policies therefore 
greatly influenced how both countries received the first scientific report on agricultural 
antibiotic use, and how the issue was problematised. 
Controversies in the 1960s: political cultures and the destabilisation of agricultural 
antibiotics 
The UK: antibiotic scientific controversies and the role of ‘expert committees’ 
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In the 1960s, after agricultural antibiotics were constructed as economic and therapeutic 
tools, the first scientific evidence on resistant bacteria in food animals was reported (Randall 
1969). At the same time, animal welfare concerns from consumers started to raise questions 
about modern agriculture (Stuart 1964). The UK’s political culture of establishing expert 
committees to settle discussions played an important role in how agricultural antibiotic use 
was to become framed and regulated. In the UK, the problematisation of intensive farming 
practices and ‘animal welfare’ at the beginning of the 1960s can be seen as one of the first 
‘expert’ discourses in which antibiotic use was considered and ‘co-produced’ by science and 
the UK government. A key event in the UK at this time was the publication of animal welfare 
activist Ruth Harrison’s book ‘Animal Machines’ in 1964, in which she described the moral 
and ethical dimensions of intensive poultry and livestock farming. Intensive livestock farms 
became framed as ‘factory farms’, referring to the automated practices and detrimental 
livestock conditions. The book initiated extensive public debate and led to mass 
demonstrations in London that condemned the ‘cruel’ modern farming methods (Winter 
1964). However, the agricultural industry and farmer communities responded stating that 
Harrison presented an unfair picture of farming to the public (Stuart 1964). The National 
Farmer Union condemned the book as a ‘false picture of British agriculture’, and the Poultry 
and Egg Producers’ Association described its comments on intensive egg and poultry 
production as a ‘slur on production’ (Winter 1964). In the media, the response to Harrison’s 
condemnation of intensive farming practices was dismissed as ‘emotional reasoning’ (Food 
for the table – food for thought 1964). However, in 1965, in response to the public outcry on 
Harrison’s book, the government had to intervene to settle the controversies and to restore 
public trust in agricultural practices. They appointed an expert committee chaired by 
Professor Roger Brambell, who produced the ‘Report of the Technical Committee to Enquire 
into the Welfare of Animals Kept Under Intensive Livestock Husbandry Systems’, which 
became known as ‘The Brambell Report’ (Brambell Report 1965). Importantly, the UK’s 
political culture had a tendency to use scientific expert committees to explore matters 
‘technically’. These expert committees enjoyed a widely respected status of ‘character, 
experience and expertise’ through which they gained public credibility (Jasanoff 1997, p. 
228). The Brambell report concluded, surprisingly, that in the absence of scientific evidence 
to measure animal welfare, the ethical dimensions of animal’s feelings should be taken into 
account when making decisions on agricultural intensive systems (Woods 2012). However, 
the Brambell report (1965) also encouraged the ‘progressive state’ of intensive agricultural 
systems and claimed that in relation to housing standards and the continuation of antibiotic 
use in livestock: ‘the effects are more likely to be beneficial than adverse’ (p. 14). Although 
tensions between scientific and ethical perspectives on animal welfare still remain 
unresolved (Woods 2012), the Brambell report supported the continuation of intensive 
livestock practices and within this the use of antibiotics. At the same time, international 
scientists were reporting bacteria with drug resistance in both humans and animals and in 
the UK, questions were raised as to whether this could be related to the practice of antibiotic 
feeding in farm animals. The matter was examined by a joint expert committee under the 
chairmanship of Lord Netherthorpe in 1960 (Randall 1969) and their report concluded in 
1962 that the situation should be further explored, but reasserted there was no human 
health risk. The economic benefits of AGPs were re-emphasised and the committee advised 
continued feeding of AGPs to food animals (Randall 1969). As such, the ‘expert’ committees, 
used by the UK government to settle public controversies, were in fact co-producing the 
continued legitimation of agricultural antibiotic use. 
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In the years that followed, new scientific counterclaims on the relationship between drug 
resistance, food safety and AGP use were made by veterinarians (Anderson and Path 1968; 
Smith 1968). Moreover, veterinary scientists Anderson and Path (1968) believed that 
intensive animal husbandry systems and practices provided opportunities for resistant 
bacteria to develop and spread, and they questioned the economic purpose of farm 
antibiotics. Public anxiety was also starting to rise about the effects of chemicals on health, 
such as DDT, insecticides and on ‘things that may find their way into our food’ (The Times 
Agricultural Respondent 1969). As a result, the economic purpose of farm antibiotics 
continued to be questioned or ‘destabilised’ by competing scientific, political and public 
discourses. In response to these growing concerns another expert committee was 
established to address these scientific and public concerns – the Swann committee – who 
published their recommendations in the Swann Report in 1969. The remit of the committee 
was to discuss the control of AGPs (antibiotics distributed without veterinary prescription to 
serve economic purposes) and the control of therapeutic antibiotics (antibiotics needing 
veterinary prescription and which served medicinal purposes) (Randall 1969). An area of 
particular interest for the Swann Committee was to identify AGPs which would be of 
economic benefit to the U.K., but would not impact on the efficacy of therapeutic drugs for 
humans by developing AMR (Swann Report 1969). The Swann report (1969) concluded that 
agricultural antibiotic use in general could pose a hazard to human and animal health as it 
could stimulate the development of resistant bacterial strains. However, it also recognised 
the economic importance of AGPs use. It advised antibiotic used in animals should not to be 
used as growth promotors and suggested further exploration and monitoring of the issue by 
setting up yet another independent scientific committee (which would not happen until the 
late 1990s). Swann (1969) recommended that agricultural antibiotics should be divided into 
two risk categories: ‘feed’ antibiotics (AGPs) that would be available without prescription and 
‘therapeutic’ antibiotics that would only be available by veterinary prescription. The 
preventative use of antibiotics was considered less important. The shift in framing AGPs as 
‘feed’ antibiotics can be seen as a tactical move; it downgraded the risk of AGPs into a 
‘harmless’ food additive. The risk classification was supported by the veterinary community 
in UK who believed it was the higher dosages of therapeutics that led to AMR and not the 
sub therapeutic dosages of AGPs (Kahn 2016). In effect, the Swann report approved 
continuation of economic agricultural antibiotic use and ‘co-produced’ the use of farm 
antibiotics. The UK consumer was used to matters that concerned public safety being handed 
over to scientific expert committees who would inform the UK government (Jasanoff 1997; 
Wales et al. 2006). Although several UK consumer organisations existed at that time, they 
were not unified and did not therefore act as a co-operative pressure-group in support of 
consumers interests (Tivey 1968). The absence of a strong consumer movement limited the 
opportunity for consumers to participate in food policies (Tivey 1968). This is despite, the 
Chairman of the public group the ‘Farm and Food Society’ stating that: ‘there is now a 
mounting pile of evidence to show that “factory farming methods”, which over the last 
decade have made rapid advance with the full support of successive Governments and of the 
N.F.U., hold health hazards for the consumer’.1 
The UK government represented the interests of the consumers through the advice of 
expert committees, which kept issues related to food risks as a private dispute between 
policy actors and scientists (Lowe et al. 2003; Jasanoff 2005; Wales et al. 2006). Against this 
political culture of science-centred approaches towards food risks and lack of public 
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engagement, the risk classification of agricultural antibiotics into feed and therapeutic 
antibiotics became established and the risks were diverted from the public radar. 
Sweden: democratic formulation of the risks of agricultural antibiotic use 
Sweden’s strong environmental values and its political culture of consensus-oriented 
regulation of environmental and public health risks co-produced a different ‘space’ for the 
debate about agricultural antibiotics. During the 1960s–1970s, Sweden’s agricultural 
landscape underwent massive change (Saifi 2004). As with the UK, the Swedish agricultural 
model was characterised by State interventionism to modernise agriculture (Flygare and 
Isacson 2011). Although the Swedish public held the Swedish State ultimately responsible for 
a clean environment and a healthy society, environmental and agricultural policies were 
developed through democratic debate between science, State and consumers (Vail et al. 
1994; Bostrom and Klintman€ 2006). When Rachel Carlson’s book Silent Spring was published 
in 1962 in Sweden, it led to public discussions about the environmental effects of modern 
agricultural practices (Flygare and Isacson 2011). Public concerns were raised about chemical 
use and toxic substances entering the environment that could lead to adverse effects (Vail et 
al. 1994). Swedish animal production had a long tradition of controlling infectious diseases in 
livestock (Wierup 2001), but veterinarians were concerned that antibiotics were increasingly 
being used to cover up poor animal husbandry practices (Kahn 2016). This prompted 
veterinarians to question the dependency of Swedish agriculture on industrial techniques. 
After the publication of the Swann report, Swedish veterinarians were one of the first groups 
to raise concerns about AGPs. Swedish farmers, who were dependent on the internal market, 
worried about the loss of trust by consumers in their products and also started to question 
the use of AGPs (Kahn 2016). When scientific evidence was published raising questions about 
the growthpromoting effects of AGPs on calves in the early 1970s, it led the calf and beef 
production industry to voluntarily end the use of AGP (Wierup 2001). In a public letter, the 
Swedish Farmer Association (LRF) promised the restrictive and careful use of antibiotics 
(Edqvist and Pedersen 2002). Moreover, the LRF itself requested that the Swedish 
government ban the use of AGPs in food animals. The Swedish Board of Agriculture 
reassessed the case but drew similar conclusions to the recommendations in the Swann 
report and advised the continued use of AGPs (Edqvist and Pedersen 2002). No consensus 
was reached between science, State, farmers and consumers on how to regulate AGPs and 
the controversies in Sweden on AGP use in food animals continued (Edqvist and Pedersen 
2002). To maintain the trust of consumers and to limit the development of resistant bacteria, 
farmers themselves proposed that antibiotics should only be used under veterinary control 
(Edqvist and Pedersen 2002). In 1981, a series of newspaper articles in Dagens Nyheter (Daily 
News) reported that more than 30 tons of antibiotics were used in feed animals for growth 
promotion each year (Cogliani et al. 2011). Swedish consumers were outraged and a 
consumer report in Sweden in 1984 showed that consumer faith in meat had dropped 
significantly, which prompted farmers to produce food without the use of drugs (Cogliani et 
al. 2011). As scientific uncertainty continued, both consumer organisations and the LRF asked 
for mandatory policy measures to control the use of antibiotics (SOU 1997). The Swedish 
consensus-oriented political culture took both scientific and public knowledges seriously 
resulting in the 1986 Feeding Stuff Act, which banned the use of AGPs in agriculture (SOU 
1997). Despite this, concerns about the regulation of preventative and therapeutic use of 
agricultural antibiotics in Sweden continued to grow and this further impacted on the risk 
classification and use of agricultural antibiotics (Grave et al. 2006). 
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The Swann report in Sweden raised more concerns than it answered. While it resulted in 
further research, this reached similar conclusions to the Swann committee. As science in the 
political culture of Sweden fulfilled a democratic role instead of a determining role, the 
debate remained open and as such, the risks of economic and therapeutic use of agricultural 
antibiotics were constructed as a ‘visible’ societal issue. This was in contrast to the UK’s 
exclusive reliance on expert committees to inform and frame the risks about agricultural 
antibiotic use. The Swedish 1986 Feeding Stuff Act, which banned AGP use in agriculture, 
made Sweden the first country to build an economically viable agricultural system without 
using antibiotics to compensate for poor management and low housing standards (Wierup 
2001). 
1970’s–1990’s: political cultures and the re-stabilisation of agricultural antibiotics 
The United Kingdom: the classification of agricultural antibiotics as economic and therapeutic 
tools 
Following the publication of the Swann report in the UK, an article in the Financial Times 
responded with the message that ‘the case against antibiotic feeding has not been fully 
proved by any means. It could be said to be as much instinctive as factual’ (Cherrington 1969). 
The scientific uncertainties of the report became a focus of protests from farmers and the 
pharmaceutical industry in 1970 who feared the consequences of limited antibiotic use in 
food animals (Fishlock 1970; Reeves 1970). Farmers feared additional costs would be accrued 
were the recommendations to be implemented and protested that small providers would be 
forced out of business (Williams-Smith 1970). Although many politicians supported the 
report, a House of Commons (1969) meeting discussed the danger of economic losses due to 
feed additive stocks, effects upon husbandry systems and the extra costs of food production. 
This only became more intensified by the growing influence of Europe. When the UK joined 
the EEC and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1975, it had to engage with Europe’s 
agricultural focus on maximum food production and food security, which further incentivised 
the intensification of animal husbandry systems (Grant 2005). Europe followed Swann’s 
recommendations of dividing farm antibiotics into two categories: feed antibiotics and 
therapeutic antibiotics (Castanon 2007). British policy makers did not set up an independent 
committee to explore the AGP issue further and when Margaret Thatcher came into power 
1979, her deregulatory agricultural ambitions and disinterest in farming led to a dilution of 
the Swann Report’s recommendations (Edqvist and Pedersen 2002). In the decades that 
followed, several scientists (Levy et al. 1976; Linton 1977; Threlfall et al. 1978; Dutta and 
Devries 1984) reported evidence of the transfer of multidrug resistant bacteria between 
human and animals. However, in the absence of sufficient scientific evidence that the 
agricultural AGPs in use could pose a danger to animals, humans or the environment, they 
were allowed to be used (Castanon 2007). The potential risks of therapeutic antibiotics used 
in food animals, raised in the Swann report, became largely ignored up until the 1990s 
(Barton 2000). What becomes clear is that the political cultures of Europe and the UK treated 
the absence of conclusive evidence produced by expert committees on the link between the 
agricultural use of AGPs and AMR in humans as the absence of immediate risk. The media 
and consumers lost interest which kept further scientific scrutiny at a distance and enabled 
parts of the Swann’s report to become aligned with governmental economic interest and the 
productivist mentality of the agricultural lobby. The perceived absence of human health risks 
associated with AGPs resulted in a re-stabilisation of antibiotics in Europe and the UK turning 
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them into economic and therapeutic tools. The debate was effectively silenced until the mid-
1990s (Edqvist and Pedersen 2002). 
During the 1980s–1990s, environmental and agricultural sustainability discourses began 
to emerge that created more public awareness of food safety and food quality in Europe 
(Grant 2012). The Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in the UK during the 1980s–
1990s proved to be a critical event as the UK consumer lost trust in experts and blamed UK 
authorities for withholding information on the risks (Jasanoff 2005). A public debate 
developed which demanded that agricultural decision-making should become more 
accessible ‘beyond the farming unions and agricultural officials’ (Lowe et al. 2003, p. 24). The 
UK political culture started to experience a shift in the 1990s towards a style of governance 
that included consumer discussions and political transparency about the risks posed by 
science and its technologies (Jasanoff 2005; Irwin 2006; Wales et al. 2006). New scientific 
evidence of resistant bacteria in food during the late 1990s forced UK politicians into a review 
of agricultural antibiotics favouring public knowledges over the agricultural lobby 
(Department of Health 1998). The economic properties of AGPs that had made them so 
popular became a weapon used against them. AGPs were misused and overused because of 
their economic properties. Scientific committees, both in Europe and the UK, were set up by 
the end of the 1990s to evaluate antibiotic use and AMR both in humans and animals (Barton 
2000). As a result, Europe and the UK started to phase out AGP use, leading to a complete 
ban of AGPs 8 years later in 2006, and implemented further destabilisation of agricultural 
antibiotic use in the decade that followed (Soulsby 2007). 
Sweden: the re-classification of agricultural antibiotics: therapeutic use only 
Pushed by a strong environmental lobby, Swedish policymakers developed new goals during 
the 1980s to limit the environmental impact of mainstream agriculture, to stimulate local 
food production and to support organic farming (Flygare and Isacson 2011). Concerns were 
not restricted to politicians, farmers and consumers anymore, but were echoed as well by 
public discourses on animal welfare during the 1980s (Vail et al. 1994). Moreover, the 
Swedish writer Ann Lindgren, well known for the creation of ‘Pippi Longstocking’, published 
a series of satirical stories on farm animals in leading newspapers, fuelling the animal welfare 
debate in Sweden (Lohr 1988). A new Animal Welfare Act was passed in 1988 which was 
aimed at preventing animal diseases through high production standards on farms: Sweden 
was the first country in the world in which farm animals received rights (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries Sweden 1998). As earlier discussed, the UK government 
framed the animal welfare debate as a technical debate, which led to some technical 
modifications to improve housing systems but animal husbandry systems continued to be 
intensified (Woods 2012). The animal welfare debate in Sweden however was not silenced 
or dominated by science; it became a topic that involved a wide range of both technical and 
ethical discussions that questioned animal husbandry systems and their production 
techniques (SOU 1997). In contrast to the UK, animal welfare established itself as an 
important pillar in agricultural debates and pushed farmers and veterinarians to adjust their 
practices in favour of animal welfare (Federation of Swedish Farmers LRF 2015). 
After the ban of AGPs in 1986, agricultural antibiotics became classified as therapeutic 
veterinary medicines only and had to be dispensed through pharmacies, supplied by drug 
wholesalers or manufacturers (Wierup 2001). Veterinarians were not permitted to own a 
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pharmacy or sell medicines for profit (Wierup 2001). The ban of AGP use, concerns about 
AMR, therapeutic agricultural antibiotic use prescribed by veterinarians only, the new focus 
by the public on agricultural sustainability and the flaws of animal husbandry systems 
resulted in Swedish farmers searching for alternatives. For farmers to produce both 
economically and ecologically responsible products without the use of antibiotics, 
investments in animal environment and management became essential (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 1998). In the years that followed, actions were not only taken 
to limit the public health risks from feed antibiotics, but also to abolish prophylactic use and 
limit therapeutic uses of farm antibiotics. In addition, the Swedish National Veterinary 
Institute (NVI) started to collect scientific facts and statistics on antimicrobial use in farm 
animals during the 1980’s and undertook ‘problem-orientated’ research to limit further 
antibiotic use (Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries Sweden 1998; Cogliani et al. 2011). 
The Swedish approach to controlling infectious diseases in livestock led to the incorporation 
of preventive methods such as improved biosecurity, improved housing, more use of 
vaccines and vector control, better diagnostics including testing for sensitivity to 
antimicrobials (Wierup 2001). These measures, together with more effective use of 
antibiotics, lowered agricultural antibiotic use significantly in the years that followed. 
Swedish consensus-oriented policy culture framed the risks of agricultural antibiotics 
differently within a wider debate on the future intensive animal husbandry systems. As 
Sweden’s political culture was characterised by consensus through a clear separation of 
interests, it did not solely rely on scientists to inform their decision-making process (Asdal 
and Gradmann 2014). The scientific uncertainty on the risks of AGPs and antibiotic use in 
general forced Sweden to explore the topic further and eventually ban AGPs and restrict 
antibiotic use to avoid potential public health risks. Societal pressure on different fronts, such 
as consumer pressure, farmer concerns, animal welfare, sustainability discourses, 
contributed to the scientific governance of agricultural antibiotic use (Edqvist and Pedersen 
2002). 
Discussion 
Reflecting upon UK’s ‘expert’ oriented political culture, science has played an ambiguous role 
in the trajectory of farm antibiotics. Although scientists initially questioned the legitimacy of 
using farm antibiotics as AGPs, the immediate risks of both AGPs and therapeutic antibiotics 
were downplayed by expert scientific committees (Brambell, Netherthorpe and Swann) and 
the UK government, resulting in the continuation of their use. Within this political system in 
which consumers accepted the privileging of science over beliefs, advice from expert 
committees on farm antibiotics became constructed as ‘matters of fact’ instead of sites of 
controversy (Latour 1987). Hence, the UK government, experts and consumers did not act in 
isolation; they coproduced the ‘silent’ UK consumer. This enabled continuation of both 
economic and therapeutic use of agricultural antibiotics up until the late 1990s, when 
national food crises constructed a new type of consumer and institutional reform. In contrast, 
Sweden’s consensus-oriented political culture engaged with consumer concerns, and 
reshaped the debate (SOU 1997; Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries Sweden 1998). 
Scientific evidence was negotiated before risk policies were established. Absence of 
conclusive scientific evidence was seen in Sweden as a possibility of risk and the use of 
agricultural antibiotics for economic purposes in food animals became a serious issue. This 
pushed the Swedish Ministry to reclassify their use and resulted in the frame of therapeutic 
use only (SOU 1997). 
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Inevitably, the different historical risk framing and regulation of agricultural antibiotics has 
co-produced different agricultural antibiotic trajectories in recent years. In the last decade in 
the UK, renewed national and international attention to resistant bacteria in food animals, 
green discourses and consumer debates have destabilised agricultural antibiotic use. In the 
wake of several food scares during the 1990s, the UK government was forced by public 
opinion to reform its institutional structure; core values of ‘transparency and openness’ 
became entrenched in UK food policies (Irwin 2006, p. 301). To validate the neutrality of 
science, public engagement became a standard part of UK policy making (Wales et al. 2006). 
As such, the UK government institutionalised consumers as a legitimate actor to participate 
in food policies. Although consumers are now represented in a consumer committee within 
the new Food Safety Authority, their formal powers remain limited (Wales et al. 2006). 
Moreover, UK’s ‘expert’ policy culture still appears to dominate as publics are only able to 
enter into already formulated frames of governance (Irwin 2006). In contrast, Sweden had 
active consumers negotiating about the future of agricultural antibiotic use (SOU 1997). The 
UK government, responded to renewed national and international pressure on both human 
and agricultural antibiotic use by setting up a new scientific ‘expert committee’. Framed by 
the moral overtones of antimicrobial ‘overuse and misuse’, ‘The Review on Antimicrobial 
Resistance’ under Chairmanship of economist Lord Jim O’Neill was set up in July 2014 by past 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron, to restore public trust in UK’s governance of human and 
agricultural antibiotic use (Morris et al. 2016). In line with the overuse and misuse frame, this 
expert committee has formulated targets for the UK agricultural industry to reduce overall 
use in the agricultural sector from 62 mg/kg in 2016 to 50mg/kg by 2018 (Department of 
Health 2016). Through this target setting, the UK government will be able to provide 
‘evidence’ that usage has been lowered over time which legitimates its policies to the public. 
However, the problems and structural needs of the agricultural industry, such as farmer 
productivist mentalities, problems of agricultural housing and infrastructures and the 
financial problems arising from the small margins under the UKs agricultural industry (RUMA 
2016) remain largely unchallenged. In the past, price-setting schemes secured farmers 
income and empowered their position, but they are now struggling to survive as part of the 
UK’s neoliberal food market (Farndale 2016). This market is dominated by British 
supermarkets who keep the food prices artificially low by fighting over market share 
(Farndale 2016). As such, by maintaining the narrow frame of ‘antibiotic overuse and misuse’, 
the UK government indirectly showed its disinterest in the agricultural sector by not engaging 
with concerns from other publics to explore how the UK agricultural industry could be pushed 
toward to a healthy sustainable industry. Jasanoff (2005, p. 245) calls the former the 
‘stickiness of frames’, in that the frame through which governments approach issues/risks 
can lead to political inaction and inability to deal with the issue at stake. The Swedish example 
has shown that the will to reduce antibiotic use depends on a variety of factors (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 1998). The Swedish political culture proved to be reflective 
and pragmatic in its risk management of agricultural antibiotic use. A consensus-oriented 
debate between scientific knowledges and non-scientific knowledges on agricultural 
antibiotic use and intensive farming enabled a broader scope of what was at stake and what 
needed to be done (SOU 1997; Cogliani et al. 2011; Magnusson 2016). At the same time, 
State interventionism was accepted as the boundaries of agricultural antibiotic legislation 
were collectively decided upon. This pushed the agricultural industry to restrict their 
therapeutic antibiotic use and to adopt new innovative techniques (Wierup 2001). Today, in 
line with the Swedish political culture, antibiotic strategies, antimicrobial guidelines, 
biosecurity, disease-control programmes, and optimised management and husbandry are 
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continuously negotiated between the different parties (EMA 2016). The Swedish government 
set up mandatory evaluation of farm building plans, and developed mandatory and voluntary 
disease control programmes which have economic incentives for the farmer. The latest 
European Medicine Agency Report (2016) on antibiotic sales for food-producing animals in 
2013 showed that the population-corrected (PCU) sales in tonnes of active ingredient was 
422 tonnes in the United Kingdom compared to 10 tonnes in Sweden. Differences in 
epidemiological profiles between countries of bacteria and AMR in humans and animals have 
been identified as well the in latest public health reports of both the UK and Sweden (ESPAUR 
2015; SWEDRES-SVARM 2015). According to a Swedish antibiotic expert: ‘Sweden is 30 years 
ahead of many other countries when it comes to reducing its antibiotics’ (Grecko in LRF 2015, 
p. 2). 
Although the concept of political cultures provides valuable insights into how political 
cultures produce different risk and regulatory frames on agricultural antibiotics, there are 
some limitations as well. When Jasanoff (2005) used the concept of political cultures to 
understand why biotechnological developments were received differently in three countries, 
the UK and Europe had just recovered from food scares, which both challenged and produced 
new relations between politics, science and consumers. Today however, the interplay 
between markets and consumers is becoming more important when exploring how political 
cultures construct collective knowledge on food issues and how this interplay acts upon 
existing science-policy frameworks. The dynamics between science, markets and consumers 
has been theorised by Buller and Roe (2014) by using Caliskan and Callons’ concept of 
‘economization’ and ‘marketization’. They showed how the animal welfare expectations of 
consumers have become assembled through ‘technics, practices and materialities’ into the 
body of the animals (Buller and Roe 2014, p. 142). In the governance of agricultural 
antibiotics, food supply chains increasingly dominate the science, techniques and standards 
that define ‘responsible’ antibiotic use in the bodies of animals and therefore products from 
our food animals (Davies 2017). Hence, the impact of markets should not be underestimated 
when exploring how political cultures produce collective knowledge on science and its 
technologies. However, the concepts political cultures and co-production provide only a 
limited understanding of how the sciencepolicy frames at a macro level filter into micro 
practices and local knowledges. Gray and Gibson (2013) have argued that farmer identities 
and practices are mainly shaped by the micro industrial agricultural networks they are part 
of, and advocate for more understanding of how these local networks influence local farmer 
decision-making. In a similar vein, Enticott (2012) has explored how veterinary expertise is 
enacted through ‘localized negotiations’ and ‘pre-existing material relations’ of the social 
worlds they are part of (Enticott 2012; p. 79). Tironi et al. (2013) have used Jasanoff’s concept 
of ‘civic epistemologies’ or public knowledges to explore how Chilean farmers make sense of 
Genetically Modified (GM) technologies. They critically discuss how the concept limits itself 
to ‘collective ways of knowing’ about scientific technologies and it fails as such to grasp why 
Chilean farmers on a subnational level deploy multiple, often contesting frames upon the 
‘nature, function and effects of GM technologies’ (2013, p. 102). To avoid the use of ‘fixed’ 
epistemic frames of civic epistemologies, the authors introduce the concept of ‘hybrid 
epistemologies’ to embrace the fluidity of knowledge production as such (Tironi et al. 2013, 
p. 102). Hence, although the concept of public knowledges has proven to be useful to 
understand cross-national differences in the uptake of new technologies, limitations occur 
when differences are observed between public knowledges of science within the same 
country. Hence, if we want agricultural actors to adopt new antibiotic frames, a full 
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assessment of their antibiotic rationalities is essential. Although the combined use of political 
cultures and co-production offer predictive theoretical power to explore how countries use 
science to govern agricultural antibiotic use, complementary research is needed to 
understand how networks of antibiotics are actually ‘performed’ in the settings in which they 
are used. 
Conclusion 
This article has explored how the dynamics between policy, science and publics produced 
different styles of scientific reasoning and justifications of agricultural antibiotic use. It has 
argued that political cultures matter when trying to understand how farm antibiotics are 
regulated in different countries. Moreover, agricultural antibiotics and their infrastructures 
are heavily entwined with a country’s political culture. Although it is not denied that 
economic incentives influence agricultural antibiotic use, it is argued one should explore how 
economic incentives push political cultures in their agricultural decision-making regarding 
farm antibiotics. The entanglement of scientific knowledge, expertise, political models and 
public knowledges have been (and still are) co-producing the framing of agricultural antibiotic 
use, their actual use and the effects of their use. Binding antibiotic use solely into the moral 
public health framework of ‘overuse and misuse’ limits what might be possible, leaving the 
‘responsible’ use of antibiotics only partially achievable. Leaving a country’s agricultural 
political context and its science-policy nexus unexplored, risks missing the national drivers 
that influence the construction of farm antibiotics resulting in policy initiatives that fail (or 
succeed) to deliver on their goals. Exploring the controversies which surround antibiotic use 
on a national and international level offers the possibility of identifying new ways to change 
behaviour and allow for multiple viewpoints to be included in decision-making processes. 
Notes 
* Corresponding author. 
1 Better Farming or Self-Betterment? Factory “Farming” Under Attack, published in The Veterinary Record, Volume 86, 
page 110, author unknown. 
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